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“An Orang climbs so slowly and cautiously... Even when closely pursued, his
circumspection is amazing: he shakes the branches to see if they will bear him, and then
bending an overhanging bough down by throwing his weight gradually along it, he makes a
bridge from the tree he wishes to quit to the next.”
- T.H. Huxley
From: Evidence as to man’s place in nature (1863)
Abstract
It has been suggested that great ape cognitive abilities evolved in response to challenges
in the physical environment related to large body size. As wild orangutans travel through
the forest canopy compliant branches deform under their weight, which increases the
size of gaps to be crossed and poses issues of safety and stability; yet they achieve safe
and effiecient locomotion. Wild orangutans also build structurally complex nests and
select branches for nest-building on the basis of their compliant properties. Both of these
behaviours suggest that orangutans (1) are able to consider alternative possible actions
or to plan and execute appropriate sequences of actions; and (2) possess some knowledge
of object compliance (flexibility). This thesis investigated these cognitive abilities in
captive great apes (orangutans and bonobos) as well as human adults and children, by
presenting individuals with novel problem-solving tasks (puzzle-boxes) and novel objects
(locomotor supports) and observing their behavioural responses. Attempts were made
to address previous issues associated with studying physical cognition in animals, and
particular attention was paid to individual differences and the role of exploration when
interpreting results. Studying cognitive abilities related to wild orangutan behaviour may
have implications for the evolution of cognition in great apes.
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Chapter 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1
Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.1 Animal cognition and cognitive adaptations
In the broadest sense, cognition refers to the way in which organisms perceive, process
and remember information from the world around them, and how this subsequently
influences their decision making (Shettleworth 2010). Cognitive mechanisms are generally
thought to involve the mental representation of non-perceived situations, which enables
flexible behaviour and decision making in the face of novel challenges (Tomasello and
Call 1997; Seed and Tomasello 2010; Tomasello and Call 2011). Representation permits
individuals to model hypothetical situations, thus permitting the ‘testing’ of behaviours
before implementing actions (Suddendorf and Whiten 2001), or engagement in ‘mental
trial-and-error’ (Piaget 1954). Flexibility enables an individual to have some control over
its behaviour having assessed the current situation (Tomasello and Call 1997), in contrast
with inflexible, hard-wired behaviours, which are innate and triggered by external stimuli,
though they may appear quite complex (e.g. Fabre 1919). A key challenge in the study of
animal cognition is that the exact same overt behaviour may result from entirely different
underlying mechanisms (Tomasello and Call 2008; Chittka and Jensen 2011; Chittka et al.
2012).
Cognitive abilities, like morphological features, are likely shaped by natural selection in
response to specific challenges, and are one way in which individuals may solve adaptive
problems (Healy et al. 2009). For example, it is known that there is a relationship (albeit
correlational rather than causal) between food hoarding and spatial cognition in several
bird species, with hoarders having an enlarged hippocampus compared with non-hoarding
species of comparable body and brain size (Sherry et al. 1992). Cognitive skills may arise in
any species under particular conditions, such as habitat instability and food unpredictability
(Potts 2004; Seed and Tomasello 2010), where flexible, cognitively-guided behaviour is more
appropriate than innate behaviour (Seed et al. 2009a). In order to understand something
about the evolution of cognition, there is a need for direct comparisons of problem-solving
behaviour between species, to look for similarities and differences in performance (MacLean
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et al. 2012). This enables us to ask questions about when in an evolutionary lineage a
particular capacity might have arisen; what possible socio-ecological selection pressures
may have driven its evolution; what the ancestral state might have been; and the extent
to which phylogeny predicts variation in cognitive ability (Byrne 2000; MacLean et al.
2012).
1.2 Evolution of primate cognition
Brain size has tended to increase in absolute and relative terms throughout the primate
lineage (Montgomery et al. 2010), as has cognitive ability (Fig. 1.1).
Figure 1.1 – Partial primate phylogeny highlighting key branch points/evolutionary events
in primate cognitive evolution and some of the proposed selection pressures that may have
driven them. Based on information from Byrne (1997)
Although brain size is easier to measure than cognition, using it as a proxy for cognitive
ability is highly controversial (Healy and Rowe 2007), and there is ongoing debate regarding
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which, if any, measures of brain size actually predict cognitive capacity (e.g. Deaner et al.
2007; Barton 2012). Furthermore, organisms with much smaller brains than most primates
such as corvids and even some insects exhibit a diverse range of flexible behaviours (Emery
and Clayton 2004; Chittka and Niven 2009; Seed et al. 2009a), so larger brains may
facilitate, but do not automatically result in enhanced cognition (Chittka and Niven
2009).
Primate cognition is suggested to have evolved in response to complexities in the environ-
ment (Byrne 2000). These proposed complexities tend to be broadly grouped into one
of two categories: those relating to the social world and those relating to the physical
world (though these categories are somewhat overlapping and not mutually exclusive; it is
highly likely that both played an important role at different points in primate evolutionary
history; Fig. 1.1). Social complexities relate to other members of a community (mainly
conspecifics), and were first recognised as potentially playing an important role in the
evolution of primate cognition by Jolly (1966) and Humphrey (1976). Specific social
challenges faced by primates have been suggested to include: life in large groups (Dunbar
1998; Maclean et al. 2008; Sandel et al. 2011); the demands of fission-fusion societies
(Amici et al. 2008; Aureli et al. 2008); having to manage multiple cooperative and compet-
itive relationships (Machiavellian intelligence; Byrne and Whiten 1988); and exchanging
knowledge in cultural groups (Herrmann et al. 2007; Moll and Tomasello 2007). Physical
challenges posited to have played a role in the evolution of cognitive abilities in primates
include: having to locate dispersed food items (Milton 1981); extraction of concealed
food items (Parker and Gibson 1977); a dependence on ripe fruit (Potts 2004); arboreal
locomotion (Povinelli and Cant 1995); hierarchical processing of food items (Byrne 1995a);
and nest building (Fruth and Hohmann 1996).
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1.3 Great ape cognition: driven by unique physical challenges?
Challenges in the physical domain might be particularly important for understanding the
evolution of great ape cognition (Fig. 1.1), given that great ape societies are no more
complex than those of monkeys and so it is unlikely that social complexity alone was
responsible for driving great ape cognitive evolution (Byrne 1997). Although a distinctive
great ape cognition can’t be confirmed by the fossil record (Begun 2004), most research to
date points to the conclusion that the cognitive abilities of great apes exceed those of other
non-human primates (Byrne 1997; Thompson and Oden 2000; Suddendorf and Whiten
2001; Barrett 2003; Russon and Begun 2004; Deaner et al. 2006; but see Tomasello and
Call 1997 for an alternative view). For example, differences have been proposed relating
to mirror self-directed behaviour (Gallup 1970; Inoue-Nakamura 1997; de Waal et al. 2005;
Suddendorf and Collier-Baker 2009); the ability to form analogical concepts (Thompson
and Oden 2000); and an ability to reason causally and generate plans for future events
(Barrett 2003). Byrne and Bates (2010) suggested that great apes exhibit qualitative
differences in understanding (defined as taking account of underlying meaning or causal
role in an appropriate way) compared with other primate taxa, in realms as diverse as
communication, tool-use, ability to imitate, and knowledge of the self as an entity.
However, findings from a number of recent studies suggest that the great ape/monkey
cognitive divide might not be so clear cut. Amici and colleagues (2010) found that while
apes outperformed monkeys in tasks involving the tracking of object displacements, spider
monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) performed comparably to or even better than some great
ape species in tasks relating to object support and memory for object locations, which
the authors related to high levels of fission-fusion in spider monkey societies. Similarly,
Schmitt et al. (2012) compared the performance of two species of Old World monkey
(long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and olive baboons (Papio anubis)) with
data previously collected from great apes in the primate cognition test battery (PCTB;
Herrmann et al. 2007), which consists of 16 tasks to probe physical and social cognition
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skills. They concluded that performance between the apes and monkeys was largely
comparable (Schmitt et al. 2012). Although these studies both used multiple tasks, the
possibility remains that cognitive differences between monkeys and apes may exist in other
types of task, which might be more relevant to specific ecological challenges (the PCTB
is mainly based on tests originally designed for the field of developmental psychology;
Schmitt et al. 2012).
Based on evidence that there are some areas in which apes excel cognitively compared
with monkeys, this leads us to the question of what selection pressures could have uniquely
influenced a great ape common ancestor, but not other primates? Great apes in the
Miocene were large-bodied, arboreal (see review by Crompton et al. 2008) and committed
to a frugivorous diet in wooded habitats (Potts 2004). Having a large body in such
an environment exacerbated physical challenges (Byrne 1997), particularly with respect
to habitat compliance (flexibility). The canopies of forests are an incredibly complex
physical environment in which arboreal animals must travel, find food and mates, and
avoid predators. Problems unique to this particular niche, compared to those faced by
large-bodied animals that spend a relatively large proportion of time on the ground, are
(1) spatial discontinuity (gaps) in the canopy, which change dynamically as a result of the
compliant properties of supports and the actions of the animal, and (2) the fragility and
compliance of arboreal supports in the form of branches and lianas (Povinelli and Cant
1995). The mechanical problems of arboreality are enhanced at the terminal branch niche,
as branches naturally taper towards their periphery, and therefore deform more readily
under an animal’s weight (Grand 1972). This is where the majority of edible ripe fruits
and leaves are located (Cant 1992).
Povinelli and Cant (1995) suggested that arboreal gap-crossing is the most significant
problem that is unique to large-bodied, arboreal animals because, compared with smaller-
bodied animals: (1) habitat strength is reduced (so there is more chance of breakage);
(2) supports become less stable (and deform more readily); (3) downward deformation
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of supports increases the width of gaps to be crossed; and (4) there is an increased risk
of serious injury or even death. Smaller-bodied animals are still confronted with these
problems, but they don’t have to incorporate and respond to new information constantly,
as the surrounding habitat does not change as much in response to their body mass. They
are usually able to solve the problems of compliance via stereotyped behaviour patterns,
or discrete action schemata, and the risk of mortality in the event of a fall is considerably
lower (Povinelli and Cant 1995). For a large-bodied animal in this situation it would be a
great advantage to be able to ‘mentally try out’, or represent, the consequences of different
potential courses of action in order to form an appropriate plan before actually executing
actions, because of the potentially high costs associated with trial-and-error learning
(Povinelli and Cant 1995). Other aspects of physical cognition relevant to achieving
safe and effective locomotion in the canopy include an understanding of the compliant
properties of supports, knowledge of gravity, and the ability to judge the size of a gap in
the canopy relative to oneself.
Another behaviour seen in extant great apes but not monkeys is nest-building, which
Fruth and Hohmann (1996) have argued may have enabled large-bodied ape ancestors,
which were strong enough to bend and break branches, to form ‘feeding nests’ in the
terminal branch niche, to exploit food items which were inaccessible to other species. It
has also been suggested that having such a large body necessitated the building of sleeping
nests to increase stability and safety in the canopy during the night (Byrne 1997). Nest
construction is an example of physical problem-solving that involves selection of materials
with appropriate compliant properties, complex object (branch) manipulation, and the
combination of supports in a particular sequence (Healy et al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2011;
van Casteren et al. 2012). Raby and Clayton (2009) claim that nest-building behaviour
results from the triggering of a fixed action pattern, and there is “no evidence of planning”
being involved (p.315). However, little is known about the cognitive processes underlying
nest-building (Healy et al. 2008), and there is no reason to expect that they should be
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any less complex than those frequently assumed to be involved in tool use (Hansell and
Ruxton 2008).
It seems that two key features link arboreal locomotion and nest-building for great apes:
(1) the ability to consider alternative possible actions, or perform multiple actions in an
appropriate sequence (i.e. planning, as defined in section 1.5); and (2) some knowledge of
the compliant properties of objects.
1.4 Orangutans as a focal species
Orangutans (Pongo spp.) are the largest extant arboreal mammals and are highly sexually
dimorphic, with males and females averaging approximately 86kg and 38kg respectively
(Markham and Groves 1990). They are the only great ape species to remain exclusively in
the terminal branch niche, where their diet consists largely of ripe fruits, which is believed
to have been the habitat of the great ape common ancestor during the Miocene (Begun 2004;
Potts 2004). We cannot expect any living great ape to resemble the last common ancestor
(LCA) of all great apes (Crompton et al. 2010), and it can be assumed that orangutans have
refined their arboreal adaptations in the last 14 million or so years since their divergence
from the LCA. However, as the only great ape to have retained a predominantly arboreal
existence, they provide a key model for interpreting and understanding the shared features
of all extant great apes (Thorpe and Crompton 2006).
Observing the apparent function of cognitive abilities in extant organisms may provide
valuable clues as to their phylogenetic origin (Byrne 2000). Wild orangutan behaviour
is indicative of short-term planning, as well as some understanding of compliance in the
context of both arboreal locomotion and nest building. For example, orangutans rarely
reach arboreal ‘dead ends’ during their locomotion (Thorpe, personal observation) and
exhibit tree-sway to cross gaps, which has been argued to involve foresight (Chevalier-
Skolnikoff et al. 1982) and reduce energy expenditure (Thorpe, Crompton and Alexander
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2007). Recent evidence suggests that wild adult male orangutans may also exhibit longer-
term planning, by using their long call to indicate their intended direction of travel direction
up to one day in advance (van Schaik et al. 2013). There is also increasing evidence that
orangutans may use diameter as a proxy for support compliance during both locomotion
(Thorpe and Crompton 2005) and nest building (van Casteren et al. 2012, 2013). These
behaviours are discussed in more depth in relevant experimental chapters.
On this basis, captive orangutans were chosen as a starting point for investigating planning
ability and knowledge of object compliance in novel problem-solving contexts. Where
possible, comparisons were made with other great apes, specifically bonobos (Pan paniscus)
and humans (Homo sapiens), in order to increase the breadth of our knowledge of these
aspects of physical problem-solving ability, and potentially understand something about
their evolution. Orangutans and bonobos are of particular interest in the investigation of
cognitive abilities from a comparative perspective because they represent our most distant
and closest great ape relatives, respectively, and therefore potentially allow inferences
regarding the evolution of particular abilities to be drawn (Mulcahy and Call 2006b).
In the following two sections I will define and describe in more detail the type of planning
and knowledge of compliance that is of interest in this thesis, and review some of the
experimental work that has been carried out in these two areas to date. Rather than being
exhaustive I aim to highlight examples that are particularly relevant to the experiments
presented in this thesis; further examples are discussed in more depth in subsequent
chapters as appropriate.
1.5 Planning in the context of physical problem-solving
The type of planning of interest in this thesis, because of its ecological relevance to
the great apes, can be described as short-term planning, or planning for current needs
in a physical problem-solving context. (This is not to be confused with planning for
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future needs, which is a hotly contested topic in the field of animal cognition; see e.g.
Suddendorf et al. 2009; Osvath 2010). It can be defined as the ability to identify and
execute an appropriate sequence of actions, or consider alternative possible courses of
action prior to execution. In the context of physical problem-solving, as well as being
able to form a plan, individuals who have an understanding of the ‘folk physics’ (Povinelli
2000) of a task will be more effective at generating an appropriate solution. This type of
planning occurs during means-end reasoning and goal-directed behaviour, where primary
perceptual information and the current motivational state of an individual stimulates a
mental representation of the problem and the desired outcome, and ensuing behaviours are
directed towards accomplishing that goal (Suddendorf and Whiten 2001; Raby and Clayton
2009). This ability to ‘observe’ imagined consequences through mental simulation, together
with drawing inferences from previous experience and knowledge, enables the assessment
of the likely outcome of different actions and the anticipation of possible difficulties that
may be encountered during problem-solving in the absence of trial-and-error acquisition of
behaviour (Byrne 1995b). (It should be noted that in talking about mental simulation I
am not implying anything about animal consciousness or subjective experience; see e.g.
Shettleworth 2001; Byrne and Bates 2006).
In humans, this type of planning is typically investigated using tower tasks (e.g. Tower of
London; Shallice 1982), in which the aim is to rearrange a number of coloured discs on a set
of pegs so that they match the configuration of discs on a goal set of pegs. Such a task is
inappropriate for use with non-human animals, given that verbal instructions are required
to explain the aim and rules. Some attempts have been made to use the exact same tasks
as those used in developmental psychology to test non-human animals, such as combining
seriated cups, but subjects require extensive pre-training just to ensure that they grasp
the aim of the task (e.g. Johnson-Pynn et al. 1999). The most commonly employed test
of short-term planning ability in non-human animals seems to be sequential tool use, or
meta-tool use. In the simplest form of sequential tool use, a tool is used to access a second
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tool, which is subsequently used to access a reward. The number of intermediate tools
can be increased, which might be expected to increase cognitive demand (Wimpenny et al.
2009). This is differentiated from the use of ‘tool-sets’ observed in wild chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes ; e.g. Brewer and McGrew 1990), because in this situation all tools are used to
act upon the goal (Wimpenny et al. 2009).
One of the earliest examples of this type of experiment is possibly the most impressive.
Do¨hl (1968) presented a chimpanzee, Julia, with a double series of locked boxes (ten in
total) with transparent lids, each containing a key (tool) that opened one of the other
boxes. One series of five boxes and keys led to a box containing a reward, whereas the
other series led to an empty box. Julia succeeded in choosing the correct initial key from
two options, and had to turn away from the locked boxes to make this choice (Do¨hl 1968),
though it is not clear how much of an influence pre-training had on her performance. An
orangutan also performed successfully in a comparable task (Lethmate 1982). Julia also
succeeded in navigating a magnet through increasingly complex mazes, where only one out
of two possible paths led out of the maze (Rensch and Do¨hl 1968), again after extensive
pre-training on simpler mazes. (Several workers have since investigated planning using
computerised maze navigation tasks, which is discussed in chapters 2 and 3).
Since Do¨hl’s (1968) experiment with Julia many others have adopted sequential tool use
paradigms to investigate planning. Hihara (2003) found that Japanese macaques (Macaca
fuscata) were rapidly able to master sequential stick-tool use with a single intermediate tool,
though this may have been due to extensive pre-training. Also, in early trials individuals
often failed to retrieve the intermediate tool (Hihara 2003). Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) succeeded in a comparable task, but had also received
training in the form of previous experiments involving stick tool use (Mulcahy et al. 2005).
New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) solved a similar task spontaneously (Taylor
et al. 2007; though they are natural stick-tool users in the wild), and more recently
demonstrated the ability to use three stick tools sequentially (Wimpenny et al. 2009).
11
Chapter 1: General Introduction
Martin-Ordas et al. (2012) replicated and extended Wimpenny et al.’s (2009) study with
chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans and found the apes to be capable of using up to
five tools in sequence.
Similar studies have been conducted with rooks (Corvus frugilevus) and stone tools (Bird
and Emery 2009). Here, the apparatus consisted of three tubes with collapsible bases:
a narrow tube containing a reward (too narrow for large stones to fit in), a wide tube
containing a large stone and another wide tube containing a small stone. In order to
release the reward subjects had use a large stone that they were presented with at the
start of a trial to release the small stone, which was small enough to be inserted into the
narrow tube to release the reward. Four out of four subjects solved this task from their
first trial, though they had previous experience of operating the apparatus and of having
to select a small stone to retrieve a reward from a narrow tube (Bird and Emery 2009).
Kuczaj and colleagues (2009) investigated the planning skills of two bottlenose dolphins
(Tursiops truncatus) using a setup that was essentially a scaled-up underwater version of
the apparatus used by Bird and Emery (2009): dropping a weight into a tube released a fish.
The dolphins were trained to operate the apparatus by observing a diver dropping single
weights into it, and subsequently presented with two planning tasks. In the ‘multiple weight
test’, four weights needed to be dropped in to the tube to release a reward. Weights were
initially positioned close to the tube and both dolphins continued to collect and deposit
them individually. However, when the cost of doing this was increased by positioning
the weights further from the tube, both dolphins rapidly adopted a strategy of collecting
multiple weights at once (which they had never been trained to do), thus increasing the
efficiency of their problem-solving (Kuczaj et al. 2009). In the ‘retaining weight box test’
there were three versions of the apparatus, each requiring a single weight to release a
reward inside. Two of the tubes had open bases so that the weight fell out of the bottom
and could be re-used, whereas the retaining tube (which was clearly marked) had a closed
base and hence trapped the weight. When the experimental setup was adjusted so that
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the dolphins could look at all of the tubes once they had picked up the weight, both
subjects adopted a strategy of visiting the retaining apparatus last in the majority of trials
(though no statistics are presented so the significance of these results are unknown), thus
maximising the number of rewards obtained (Kuczaj et al. 2009). Taken together, these
results show both dolphins spontaneously succeeded in (a) increasing the efficiency of their
problem-solving, and (b) maximising their reward by performing actions in a particular
sequence in a novel context. It would be interesting to see how they would perform if
the complexity of this task was increased, by increasing the number of apparatuses and
modifying them so that they had to be used in an obligatory sequence (e.g. in a task akin
to Do¨hl’s (1968) series of locked boxes).
This focus on investigating planning using sequential tool use tasks may stem from the
field’s fascination with tool use in general, which perhaps derives from the old idea of
‘man the tool-maker’ (Seed and Byrne 2010), and the associated assumption that tool
use is indicative of advanced cognitive abilities (Hansell and Ruxton 2008). However,
presenting tool use tasks when what we are really interested in is planning immediately
biases against non-tool users, which is a particular issue for comparative work (see section
1.7 for additional discussion of similar issues). Although many non-tool users are capable
of using tools in captivity, and in some cases have demonstrated comparable or superior
knowledge of physical causality to closely related tool-users (e.g. woodpecker finches
(Cactospiza pallida) and small tree finches (Camarhynchus parvulus); Teschke et al. 2011),
tool use is known to pose its own cognitive demands (e.g. in addition to the planning
demands of a task), even for chimpanzees that are natural tool users (Seed et al. 2009b).
Another issue is that the majority of sequential tool use studies have involved at least
some pre-training of task components. Although it only seems fair to train animals in
the basic components of a task so that the focus is then on the planning aspect, this
increases the possibility that individuals could succeed through chaining previously learnt
task components together (e.g. Epstein et al. 1984). An alternative approach might be
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to present tasks where the motoric aspects are so simple that they require little to no
training to acquire, thus reducing the issue of chaining. This would also render tasks more
appropriate for comparative work with diverse species.
Planning during physical problem-solving has also been investigated by presenting animals
with puzzle-boxes that require a specific sequence of actions to be performed to open
them and retrieve a reward, and examining the effect of allowing a preview period on
performance. Dunbar et al. (2005) presented chimpanzees, orangutans and children with
puzzle-boxes that differed in the number of actions required to open them, and gave half
of the subjects the opportunity to examine the boxes (and potentially plan their response)
before being allowed to try and open them. Only children showed an effect of having had a
preview period (Dunbar et al. 2005). However, some features of this study are problematic.
The nature of the preview period differed between children and apes; children were asked
to draw the boxes, whereas boxes were simply left outside the enclosures of the apes. It
is possible that the apes did not attend to them at all. The performance measure was
the time taken to open the boxes, which may not be appropriate given that there was no
instruction to open the boxes as quickly as possible (this is obviously not possible with
non-human apes), and engaging in problem-solving may be rewarding in its own right
(Miyata et al. 2011; Clark and Smith 2013). Keas (Nestor notabilis) were presented with
a similar type of task in which they had to undo multiple locks, some of which required
sequential manipulations, to gain access to rewards (Miyata et al. 2011). A preview period
of 10-30 seconds did not improve their performance in terms of initial accuracy, but they
did correct errors more readily compared with birds that had not had an opportunity to
preview the apparatus (Miyata et al. 2011).
The preview paradigm is an interesting one, but in the absence of being able to instruct
subjects to plan their response (which has been shown to improve planning performance in
humans, e.g. Phillips et al. 2001) it is difficult to know if subjects are actually attending
to relevant task features or considering their response during that time. Furthermore there
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is arguably no real incentive to open the boxes correctly the first time as errors are easily
correctible, so there may be little motivation to plan a response before starting.
1.6 Compliance in the context of physical problem-solving
Compliance is an ‘invisible’ object property: unlike length, shape and diameter it cannot be
perceived using vision alone (though in natural materials diameter may be approximately
correlated with compliance). Weight is another example of an invisible object property.
Perceptually salient features have received much attention in the study of physical cognition
(e.g. Chappell and Kacelnik 2002, 2004; Mulcahy et al. 2005; Bird and Emery 2009); much
less is known about properties that are not directly perceivable using vision. It seems
surprising that there has not been more research into great apes’ understanding of object
compliant properties, given its ecological relevance and possibly important role in their
cognitive evolution (see section 1.3). Again, the vast majority of studies have examined
knowledge of compliance in the context of tool-use, and therefore many of the limitations
that were described for using sequential tool use to investigate planning (see section 1.5)
also apply here.
Povinelli and colleagues (2000) investigated the ability of seven captive chimpanzees to
select between two rakes; one with a compliant rubber head (non-functional tool) and
the other with a rigid wooden head (functional tool); when attempting to retrieve an
out-of-reach reward (the ‘flimsy-tool’ problem). Only the tool with the rigid head had
appropriate compliant properties for raking in the reward. The study subjects were
allowed to obtain experience with the different tools in the context of free play, and the
experimenter further demonstrated the relevant tool properties to them prior to testing.
In each trial, the two rakes were prepositioned with a reward in front of each head and
the subject could choose to pull one of the two rakes towards them. All subjects apart
from one responded exactly as would be expected by chance (functional tool chosen in
50% of trials), suggesting that they lacked an understanding of the critical functional
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properties of the tool (i.e. the compliance of the rake head) (Povinelli et al. 2000). The
validity of Povinelli’s (2000) findings have been criticised, because the chimpanzees were
immature at the time of testing (Anderson 2001) and were reared as a peer-group, having
been separated from their mothers in infancy (Whiten 2001). Evidence for the potential
relevance of these factors comes from a study by Furlong and colleagues (2008), who found
that nine enculturated (raised in a socio-communicatively rich environment) chimpanzees
succeeded in the flimsy-tool task (see section 1.7.3 for additional discussion of how rearing
history may influence cognition).
Several other researchers have conducted versions of the flimsy-tool problem with other
species. Santos and colleagues (2006) presented cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)
and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) with pairs of cane tools, one of which was
rigid (hardened clay) and the other compliant (thick rope). Subjects reliably selected the
functional tool over the non-functional tool across 24 trials, implying that they recognized
that a tool must be sufficiently rigid in order to rake in a reward (Santos et al. 2006).
Kacelnik et al. (2006) replicated Povinelli et al.’s (2000) experiment with a captive New
Caledonian crow. Interestingly, the subject chose functional tool with a rigid head in
100% of initial trials, but her performance rapidly declined over the course of each testing
session, possibly due to a lack of motivation (Kacelnik et al. 2006; see section 1.7 for more
discussion of non-cognitive factors that may influence task performance).
A study by Walkup and colleagues (2010) found that three orangutans given novel pairs of
tools consisting of one rigid (functional) and one compliant (non-functional) tool selected
the rigid tool to lever open a box containing a reward significantly more often than expected
by chance. Two of the subjects did this from the first trial and the authors postulated
that this either implied a pre-existing preference for rigid tools, or some level of causal
understanding of relevant tool properties (Walkup et al. 2010). In a series of experiments
similar to this, Manrique and colleagues (2010) investigated the ability of all four species
of non-human great ape to select an appropriate tool out of sets of three tools that varied
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in terms of their compliance, as well as irrelevant perceptual features such as colour. Here,
subjects were either allowed to manipulate the tools, observe them being manipulated
by the experimenter, or to simply look at them. This experience of the tools occurred
in a separate enclosure to where the tasks were located. When subjects experienced the
compliant properties of the tools, either by manipulating them directly or observing them
being manipulated by the experimenter, they successfully selected, transported and used
the functional rigid tool out of the sets to retrieve a food reward in two different tasks,
and most did so from the initial trial. However, when they were only allowed to visually
inspect the tools there was a marked reduction in performance (Manrique et al. 2010).
Importantly, subjects also selected the compliant tool from sets of one compliant and two
rigid tools when the task demands changed such that a compliant tool was required to
retrieve the reward (Manrique et al. 2010). This suggests that they did not simply have a
pre-existing preference for rigid tools as could have been the case in the study by Walkup
et al. (2010). Taken together, the results of Manrique et al.’s (2010) study suggest that
great apes can select appropriate tools for a task, based on their functional properties as
opposed to irrelevant perceptual features such as colour. Subsequently, capuchins (Cebus
apella) performed as well as, if not better than great apes (they were better at selecting
the compliant tool) when presented with the same series of tasks (Manrique et al. 2011).
Comparable studies of the ability to extract and utilize relevant information regarding an
object’s compliant properties in order to meet task demands have also been conducted
with human children. Klatzky et al. (2005) explored preschool children’s ability to judge
whether five sticks, which varied only in terms of their compliance, were appropriate
for stirring either sugar or gravel. Subjects were also presented with pairs of the sticks,
and asked which of the two was harder. In both tasks the children used appropriate
exploratory procedures (Lederman and Klatzky 1987), such as pressing and bending the
sticks, enabling them to discover their affordances without directly performing the task
(Klatzky et al. 2005). Berger and colleagues (2005) investigated whether 16-month-old
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toddlers considered the material properties of a handrail when attempting to cross a bridge
between platforms. The handrail was either sturdy enough to support the weight of the
subject (wooden), or gave way when leaned on (latex or foam). All handrails appeared rigid
and stretched between the platforms without sagging. The authors found that subjects
were more likely to cross narrow bridges when the handrail was sturdy as opposed to
wobbly, with deformability of the handrail being determined via exploratory manipulation
(Berger et al. 2005).
Taken together, evidence from studies with children (Berger et al. 2005; Klatzky et al.
2005), apes (Manrique et al. 2010) and monkeys (Manrique et al. 2011) suggests that
exploratory behaviour may play an important role in understanding and learning about
compliance, which is an unobservable feature of objects.
1.7 Studying physical cognition: considerations and challenges for
researchers
Just as physical cognition tasks aim to pose a challenge for the animals being tested,
developing appropriate paradigms is a real challenge for researchers. The aim is to design a
task that isolates the cognitive capacity of interest whilst retaining some ecological validity,
and present it in such a way that solving it requires subjects to use their cognitive skills
flexibly (Tomasello and Call 2011). Researchers must then attempt to infer something
about underlying mechanisms from the overt behaviour of non-verbal animals and try
to distinguish between explanations based on, say, abstract representation of physical
properties versus perceptually-based arbitrary information (Seed and Byrne 2010).
1.7.1 Captive vs. wild studies
The extent to which findings regarding the cognitive skills of captive animals can be
generalised to the species as a whole (i.e. their wild counterparts) is often questioned
(Tomasello and Call 2011). In the wild animals can be observed in their natural habitat
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performing natural behaviours, in the environment that their cognitive abilities evolved
to cope with. However, there are many potential confounding factors that cannot be
controlled in the wild and the previous experience of subjects is usually unknown (not
to mention the logistical challenges and expense of field research). Conducting cognitive
research in captivity on the other hand permits replication and control of some of the
confounding variables that are problematic in the wild, and researchers tend to have a
better idea of the previous experience of their test subjects.
It has however been argued that captive populations may develop unique cognitive skills.
Depending on the nature of the captive environment, cognitive skills might be expected to
be limited due to a lack of physical demands (Boesch 2007); or enhanced due to the safety
of the captive environment (Thornton and Lukas 2012), where food is regularly provided
and there are no predators. When individuals are faced with problems that they would not
come across in the wild they may also reveal skills not observed in their wild counterparts
(Tomasello and Call 2008). For example, species that are not known to use tools in the
wild have demonstrated proficiency comparable with tool-using species in captivity (e.g.
gorillas: (Mulcahy et al. 2005) and rooks: (Bird and Emery 2009)).
Given this situation, a good approach seems to be to observe animals in the wild to find
out what they do, and use this to inform controlled experimentation in captivity, with
the aim of discovering something about the underlying mechanisms involved (Tomasello
and Call 2008). This thesis has adopted this approach and is a step towards controlled
investigation of cognitive abilities that might be related to the physical challenges faced
by large-bodied arboreal animals, based on wild observations of orangutan locomotion and
nest-building.
Although it is not possible to say for sure whether findings with captive animals can be
generalised to the species as a whole, as Tomasello and Call (2008, p. 450) neatly put it:
“if we discarded all. . . data from captive apes we would currently know next to nothing
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about the cognitive skills of great apes”.
1.7.2 Designing appropriate tasks
Having decided that the best way to address a particular research question is through
controlled experiments with captive individuals, researchers next have to go about designing
tasks that are appropriate for probing the cognitive ability of interest. Isolating the cognitive
capacity of interest is not easy. Despite attempts to focus in on, for example, causal
reasoning or planning, additional processes such as working memory or inhibitory control
may simultaneously be taxed (Seed et al. 2012). Additionally, what constitutes a ‘problem’
and how difficult or complex it is for any given species or individual is not clearly defined
(Healy 2012). There is also a need to consider the natural behavioural propensities of the
species of interest to maximise the likelihood of them demonstrating how they solve a
problem and thus revealing their cognitive capabilities (Shumaker and Swartz 2002). This
is manageable where only a single species is of interest, but in the case of comparative
cognition where the aim is to compare the abilities of potentially anatomically diverse
species this is a huge challenge. Here, tasks need to be appropriate for testing species that
may have very different manipulatory abilities, levels of neophobia, exploratory tendencies,
visual acuity, temperament and motivation, to name but a few (Herrmann et al. 2011;
Auersperg et al. 2011, 2012). All of these ‘contextual’ factors could influence performance,
for reasons unrelated to the cognitive ability under investigation (MacLean et al. 2012; Seed
et al. 2012; Thornton and Lukas 2012). It is often the case that tasks originally designed
for testing a single species are subsequently used to test several other species, but with
slightly modified apparatuses and methodologies, which makes comparisons problematic
(Auersperg et al. 2012). The trap-tube provides a case in point. The original apparatus
(Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994) was designed to test causal reasoning and required
subjects to use a stick tool to retrieve a reward from a transparent tube, by avoiding a
single vertical trap. Almost twenty years on, a multitude of studies with primate and bird
species provides a clear example of how seemingly subtle methodological and procedural
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alterations can influence performance (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 – Summary of methodological and procedural factors that when modified have
been found to improve the performance of subjects in the trap-tube and other related tasks
(e.g. trap table)
It may in fact be impossible to design a task that is equally relevant to all species, as
any given task will likely be more relevant to the natural challenges faced by one species
(or group of closely related species) than another (Chittka et al. 2012; MacLean et al.
2012). However, a concerted effort to design such tasks is now both timely and necessary
(MacLean et al. 2012). One way of reducing the issue of comparing performance of
species in a single task is to present several individuals with multiple tasks designed to
probe the same or similar abilities, to reduce the likelihood of task-specific non-cognitive
factors affecting performance (Herrmann et al. 2007; Herrmann and Call 2012). Another
interesting approach has been to present a task that can be solved via several different
methods, and blocking that method once it is discovered (Auersperg et al. 2011; Manrique
et al. 2012). Such an approach reveals some of the contextual variables that influence
physical problem-solving performance in different species; for example exploratory and
manipulatory behaviour, as well as neophobia, were found to influence the success of keas
and New Caledonian crows (Auersperg et al. 2011).
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1.7.3 Dealing with the findings: small sample sizes, negative results and individual
variation
Working with great apes in captivity dictates that sample sizes will likely remain small.
The general approach of researchers has therefore been to suggest that, if a single individual
meets the experimenter’s chosen criteria for success in a given cognitive task, then the
entire species has the ‘capacity’ to succeed (Thornton and Lukas 2012). However, whether
a problem is ‘solved’, and therefore whether a subject is concluded to possess the capacity
in question, depends entirely on the criteria set by the experimenter. Furthermore, trial
success is frequently based on a binary choice (e.g. in the trap-tube) and overall task
success is based on a subject succeeding in more trials than expected by chance (Thornton
and Lukas 2012). There also tends to be a dichotomy in terms of explanation, in which
cognition is pitched against ‘just associative learning’ (Seed et al. 2009a; Chappell and
Hawes 2012); or ‘high level’ against ‘low level’ processes. In the case of a physical cognition
task, the former might be based on flexible, transferable causal understanding (e.g. of a
string being connected to a reward), whereas the latter might involve the use of arbitrary
perceptual cues (e.g. continuity between string and reward). In all likelihood, most
strategies will involve a combination of both or something in between the two, and such a
binary approach is both over-simplistic and unnecessary.
Individual variation in performance, and particularly data from individuals that consistently
fail a task, tends to be largely ignored or treated as ‘noise’ (Herrmann and Call 2012; Seed
et al. 2012; Thornton and Lukas 2012). Negative results do not necessarily mean that
a subject does not possess the cognitive ability under investigation. Rather, individuals
might fail for an array of reasons, such as the ‘contextual’ variables described in section
1.7.2, as well as subtle methodological nuances (Table 1.1). Looking in detail at the
behaviour of subjects that fail may provide a valuable insight into what strategies they
might be using (Chappell and Hawes 2012; Seed et al. 2012), as well as whether their failure
might be due to factors other than a lack of cognitive ability. Reducing peripheral task
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demands as far as possible is one way of potentially increasing the likelihood of subjects
exhibiting the cognitive ability of interest (Seed et al. 2012). In the trap-tube paradigm,
for example, eliminating tool-use (and therefore the ‘peripheral’ cognitive load associated
with it) significantly improved chimpanzees’ causal reasoning ability (Seed et al. 2009b;
Table 1.1).
Within captivity, rearing history may impact on an animal’s cognitive abilities. Boesch
(2007) has even recommended discarding all data collected from apes that have not grown
up in family groups. Enculturated chimpanzees and bonobos (individuals that had spent
a lot of time engaging and interacting with human caregivers in a socio-communicatively
rich environment) demonstrated significantly better cognitive skills than standard-reared
conspecifics, particularly in the social domain, based on a range of tasks from the PCTB
(Russell et al. 2011).
None of the apes involved in the research in this thesis were enculturated, but some of
them did differ in their rearing: some were mother-reared and others were hand-reared by
humans. However, Russell et al. (2011) found no differences in cognitive ability between
mother-reared and human-reared individuals in a group of 79 chimpanzees.
Extensive previous experience of cognitive testing may cause some individuals to become
‘test savvy’ (Tomasello and Call 2011), but all of the individuals in this thesis were relatively
na¨ıve to cognitive testing and had not previously been involved in any similar physical
cognition research.
1.8 Aims, objectives and structure of this thesis
The overall aims of this thesis were to expand our understanding of the ability of great
apes to plan during physical problem-solving, and to investigate how they might predict
and explore the compliant properties of objects. An interest in these particular aspects
of physical cognition stems from observed behaviour in wild apes, particularly orangutan
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locomotion and nest-building. There is a need to probe the underlying mechanisms involved
in these behaviours and establish whether the cognitive skills potentially involved in them
can be generalised to novel problem-solving contexts under controlled conditions. In
attempting to address these aims and develop paradigms for investigating them I tried to
keep in mind the challenges discussed in section 1.7. In particular, I strove to develop tasks
that could potentially be used to test species aside from great apes, including non-tool
users. I also adopted an approach of looking at data from separate individuals in detail
(including those that were unsuccessful) to try to establish what cues and strategies they
might have been using when attempting to solve tasks, as well as considering the role of
exploratory behaviour.
Specific questions addressed in this thesis include:
1. Are orangutans able to consider multiple obstacles related to the ‘folk physics’ of
arboreal gap-crossing (gaps and gravity traps) when attempting to retrieve a food
reward? (chapter 2)
2. Can orangutans and bonobos plan an appropriate sequence of actions (a) in a step-
by-step manner; and/or (b) in advance of action in order to retrieve a food reward?
How does performance in these tasks develop in children and is inhibitory control a
performance-limiting factor? How do adult humans perform in the advance planning
task? (chapters 3, 4 and 5)
3. Do orangutans use diameter to predict the compliant properties of barriers partially
blocking passage of a food reward in a puzzle-tube? (chapter 6)
4. How do individuals explore and learn about the compliant properties of novel
locomotor supports? (chapter 7)
Each empirical chapter in this thesis has been written as a stand-alone manuscript, but in
some places the reader is directed back to previous sections, for example where apparatuses
or methodologies were identical, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition of large sections.
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In chapter 2 I describe a study in which I presented a modified version of the trap-tube
apparatus to captive orangutans, to investigate whether they were able to look ahead and
consider multiple obstacles (gaps, traps and barriers) when attempting to retrieve a reward
item. The next three chapters (chapters 3, 4 and 5) detail experiments using a novel
piece of apparatus (the paddle-box) that I designed to address some of the methodological
concerns related to current tests of planning ability. In chapter 3, I adopted a comparative
approach, and presented captive orangutans and bonobos with two planning tasks with
different levels of complexity. In chapter 4, children were presented with the paddle-box to
examine the development of their performance in the two planning tasks and establish
whether the paddle-box might be an appropriate tool for investigating planning in young
children, given the current lack of suitable tasks. I also attempted to examine an issue
that arose in chapter 3; namely that inhibitory control could have been limiting the
performance of the apes in the more complex planning task. The performance of adults in
the more complex paddle-box planning task is investigated in chapter 5, because when
developing new tasks to probe the cognitive abilities of animals it is important not to
make assumptions regarding how human adults will perform.
Chapters 6 and 7 move away from planning to consider orangutans’ understanding of
the compliant properties of objects. In chapter 6 I examine whether orangutans use
diameter to predict the compliance of barriers blocking their retrieval of a food reward
in a puzzle-tube. A less controlled, more naturalistic approach is adopted in chapter 7
and orangutans’ knowledge of compliant properties is considered in the context of their
exploratory behaviour when interacting with novel compliant locomotor supports, with
particular reference to their positional behaviour.
Finally in chapter 8 I attempt to summarise the key findings of this thesis and draw some
overall conclusions. I also suggest some potential directions for future research.
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WHAT COGNITIVE STRATEGIES DO ORANGUTANS
(PONGO PYGMAEUS) USE TO SOLVE A
TRIAL-UNIQUE PUZZLE-TUBE TASK
INCORPORATING MULTIPLE OBSTACLES?
This chapter, largely in its current form, is published as:
Tecwyn, E.C., Thorpe, S.K.S., Chappell, J. (2012) What cognitive strategies do orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus) use to solve a trial-unique puzzle-tube task incorporating multiple
obstacles? Animal Cognition 15: 121-133
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Abstract
Apparently sophisticated behaviour during problem-solving is often the product of simple
underlying mechanisms, such as associative learning or the use of procedural rules. These
and other more parsimonious explanations need to be eliminated before higher-level
cognitive processes such as causal reasoning or planning can be inferred. We presented
three Bornean orangutans with 64 trial-unique configurations of a puzzle-tube to investigate
whether they were able to consider multiple obstacles in two alternative paths, and
subsequently choose the correct direction in which to move a reward in order to retrieve
it. We were particularly interested in how subjects attempted to solve the task, namely
which behavioural strategies they could have been using, as this is how we may begin
to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning their choices. To explore this we
simulated performance outcomes across the 64 trials for various procedural rules and rule
combinations that subjects may have been using based on the configuration of different
obstacles. Two of the three subjects solved the task, suggesting that they were able
to consider at least some of the obstacles in the puzzle-tube before executing action to
retrieve the reward. This is impressive compared with the past performances of great
apes on similar, arguably less complex tasks. Successful subjects may have been using a
heuristic rule combination based on what they deemed to be the most relevant cue (the
configuration of the puzzle-tube ends), which may be a cognitively economical strategy.
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2.1 Introduction
Solving naturally occurring problems in the physical environment is a key challenge faced
by animals on a daily basis, and has been proposed as a selection pressure to have driven
the evolution of enhanced cognitive capacities in the primate lineage (Byrne 1997). The
psychological mechanisms and cognitive strategies involved in physical problem-solving
are likely to vary between problems, species and even individuals (D’Mello and Franklin
2011). Some problems might successfully be solved through simple mechanisms such as
associative learning and reinforcement (the mental pairing of events that occur in close
temporal and spatial proximity, (Taylor et al. 2009), whereas more complex problems may
require higher-level cognitive processes for efficient performance to be achieved (Kaller et al.
2011). Solving particularly complex problems might necessitate the a priori identification
of an appropriate behavioural sequence, or the evaluation of alternative actions in advance
of execution. Such deliberative processes (as opposed to reactive processes; Sloman 1999)
might be thought of as the internal simulation of interaction with the environment, or
mentally ‘trying out’ potential actions in short-term working memory without actually
executing them (D’Mello and Franklin 2011).
Some behaviour observed in the wild is suggestive of deliberative cognitive processes. A
classic example is the anecdotal observation of a single chimpanzee that used a ‘tool set’
consisting of different types of objects to achieve the goal of extracting honey from a bees’
nest (Brewer and McGrew 1990). The processing of plant material by both mountain
gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei : Byrne et al. 2001) and chimpanzees (Corp and Byrne
2002) has been demonstrated to involve hierarchical, multi-stage procedures, with the
authors suggesting that sequence length may be an appropriate estimate of the complexity
of underlying mental processes. Another challenge posed by the physical environment,
particularly for large-bodied animals, is that of arboreal locomotion. Orangutans travelling
through a forest canopy face several unique challenges, particularly during gap-crossing.
Successful travel requires them to make correct decisions regarding which supports to use
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and avoid, as an inappropriate choice resulting in a fall, even between canopy levels, may
result in serious injury or even death, particularly for larger individuals (Thorpe et al.
2009). When choosing between alternate routes they are faced with a vast amount of
information to process from a multitude of potential perceptual cues, including the size
of the gap to be crossed, the type and diameter of supports at either side of the gap,
and how different supports are interconnected. The way that these factors interact may
influence the size of a gap to be crossed. For example, effective gap sizes can change if
the supports are highly compliant: these supports will bend when the orangutan applies
its weight, often changing the size of the gaps between adjacent trees. Furthermore,
Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) utilize tree sway, whereby a support is oscillated
to cross a gap in the canopy and progress forward (Thorpe and Crompton 2006). This
often initially requires the support to be swung in the opposite direction (backwards)
to the intended travel direction, in order to reach a sufficient magnitude of oscillation.
Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. (1982) suggest that such behaviour may be indicative of the
internal simulation of behaviour prior to acting as opposed to physical experimentation,
as during their focal period individuals always succeeded in making the transfers. Bard
(1995) also found that complex physical manipulations were exhibited significantly more
frequently during arboreal locomotion than in foraging by young wild orangutans in a
study based on Piagetian constructs. The author interpreted these findings as a use
of cognitive abilities to achieve efficient and productive travel. It was also noted that
planning was only observed in a locomotor context (out of seven defined contexts during
which manipulatory behaviours could potentially occur). This was in the form of two
juveniles selecting appropriate routes to reach their mothers who had used tree-sway to
cross a gap, which the juveniles were unable to repeat (Bard 1995). It has even been
hypothesized that arboreal locomotion may have been a precipitator for self-recognition
in the great apes (Povinelli and Cant 1995). It is suggested that the unique combination
of problems faced by a great ape ancestor during the Miocence, specifically an arboreal
lifestyle to which it became ‘committed’ and a large body mass, selected for the evolution
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of self-conception enabling the planning and successful execution of complex locomotion
through the rainforest canopy (Povinelli and Cant 1995).
The ability of animals to identify an appropriate sequence of actions or consider alternative
courses of action prior to execution has been investigated experimentally in several species,
but the majority of these have either involved tool use, which biases against non-tool-using
species, or used computerized tasks, which requires extensive training. Suddendorf and
Whiten (2001) describe experiments conducted by Do¨hl in the late 1960s in which a
chimpanzee was able to successfully complete a multi-stage task involving unlocking a
series of transparent boxes with keys, leading to a final box containing a reward. Only
by assessing the obligate sequence of stages in advance was the subject able to choose
the correct initial key, with the researchers claiming that she was able to successfully
evaluate the task up to five steps in advance. Lethmate (1982) adapted Do¨hl’s experimental
setting for an orangutan, so that it consisted of a choice-box and four boxes with unique
bolting mechanisms that could only be opened with a corresponding key. One of the boxes
contained a food reward, a further two contained keys (one of which could be used to open
the final box containing the reward) and the fourth was empty. The choice-box contained
two keys in separate compartments that each opened one of the two key-containing boxes.
Choosing one of the tools from the choice-box simultaneously blocked access to the other
tool. The contents of all boxes were visible to the orangutan, enabling it to choose
the correct initial key that led, via an intermediate sub-goal, to the box containing the
reward. Across 400 trials the orangutan chose the correct initial key significantly more
than expected by chance (in 312 trials), and the average duration of the ‘phase of planning’
before the initial action was 6.5 seconds (Lethmate 1982). More recently, Dunbar et al.
(2005) investigated whether allowing chimpanzees, Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)
and children to have a prior view of a puzzle-box before attempting to open it meant that
they retrieved a reward inside more quickly than when they were prevented from having a
prior view, predicting that the prior view should permit them to consider the nature of the
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problem and its possible solutions mentally, prior to attempting it. Although there was
seemingly an improvement in performance in the prior-view condition, detailed analyses of
the data revealed that this was likely a result of experience and learning due to the nature
of the experimental design, rather than ‘working out’ their actions in advance (Dunbar
et al. 2005). Further studies have investigated the ability to use tools in a means-means-end
sequence (i.e. use a tool to retrieve another tool, which could be used to retrieve a food
reward). Gorillas and orangutans were able to use a short tool to reach a longer tool, and
only did so when the long tool was needed to reach the reward (Mulcahy et al. 2005).
Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) learned how to sequentially use two tools within 50
trials after extensive training with both short and long tools (Hihara 2003). A similar
study with tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) found that subjects were only able to succeed at
a pulling task involving two tools hooked together (tools were not in spatially distinctive
locations due to the species’ limited manual dexterity) after sufficient training (Santos
et al. 2005). In recent work on New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) on the other
hand, some individuals succeeded at tasks requiring sequential use of 3 tools (Wimpenny
et al. 2009). Some authors suggest that certain individuals may even use abstract causal
rules in novel contexts (Taylor et al. 2010). Results from experiments with keas (Nestor
notabilis) in which subjects’ ability to open artificial fruit boxes requiring manipulations
in multiple steps was tested suggested that in more complex tasks, permitting a preview
period meant that birds were quicker to correct inappropriate actions (Miyata et al. 2011).
Evidence from studies on primates and birds using computer-based tasks is also indicative
of the identification of appropriate behavioural sequences prior to executing actions during
problem-solving. Biro and Matsuzawa (1999) demonstrated that a chimpanzee was able
to establish the correct sequence in a numerical ordering task prior to making its first
choice. In 2D maze navigation tasks chimpanzees and capuchins (Cebus apella) solved
more mazes without error than predicted by chance (Fragaszy et al. 2003). Both species
were capable of self-correcting mistakes and making appropriate detours (Fragaszy et al.
2003), though a later study found that capuchins frequently made errors when the correct
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path meant moving away from the global goal (Fragaszy et al. 2009). A similar study with
pigeons (Columba livia) found evidence of planning of actions one step (and possibly two
steps) in advance in computerized maze tasks (Miyata and Fujita 2008). Finally, in studies
of planning behaviour with two bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), subjects had
to learn to reuse a weight as a tool by dropping it into boxes that resulted in a reward
being released, but one of the boxes retained the weight so that it could not be reused.
Both individuals rapidly learned to visit the weight-retaining box last in order to obtain a
maximum reward (Kuczaj et al. 2009).
It is difficult to tease apart alternative explanations for seemingly ‘intelligent’ behaviour,
and the underlying mechanisms are often revealed to be relatively simple (e.g. Povinelli
2000). Taylor and colleagues (2007) claimed that New Caledonian solved a sequential
tool use task by using analogical reasoning, but Wimpenny et al. (2009) conducted
experiments that suggested simpler processes such as chaining (the interconnection of
separate behavioural repertoires, sensu Epstein et al. 1984) may be sufficient to explain
successful performance. Some recent studies have specifically aimed to differentiate between
behavioural strategies used during physical problem-solving. Hunt and colleagues (2006)
found that wild New Caledonian crows were probably using a two-stage heuristic strategy
to solve a tool-length task, whereby they initially used default behaviour, but adapted it
accordingly when it failed. Heuristic rules might be employed by animals when tasks are
cognitively demanding in order to reduce the effort associated with solving them (Shah
and Oppenheimer 2008). Cheke and colleagues (2011) presented Eurasian jays (Garrulus
glandarius) with a series of water-level tasks that manipulated the information that was
available to facilitate learning, enabling them to infer the mechanisms by which learning
occurred. The authors concluded that successful subjects seemed to rely on a combination
of instrumental conditioning and causal cues (Cheke et al. 2011).
We designed a puzzle-tube task based on the trap-tube paradigm (Visalberghi and Limon-
gelli 1994) which was designed primarily to investigate causal reasoning, but is also a useful
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way of testing a subject’s ability to consider the outcomes of different potential actions,
with regards to the position of a trap and its impact on the path of a reward. However,
unlike the original trap-tube apparatus in which the only obstacle was a single trap at one
side, we incorporated multiple obstacles at both sides to investigate how orangutans might
go about solving a problem involving the consideration of multiple steps and information
from several perceptual cues. We also attempted to address methodological and procedural
issues found to influence performance on previous trap-tube tasks, including the require-
ment to use tools (Seed et al. 2006; Tebbich et al. 2007), tools being prepositioned in the
apparatus (Girndt et al. 2008), having to push the reward away from oneself (Mulcahy
and Call 2006b) and a predisposition to avoid displacing rewards over traps (Seed et al.
2006; Tebbich et al. 2007; Martin-Ordas and Call 2009; Seed et al. 2009b). These studies
showed that subjects’ performances may be strongly influenced by procedural features of
the experimental design. Therefore, our task uniquely combined the following features:
 It did not require tool use
 It did not require the reward to be pushed away from the subjects
 It did not always require trap avoidance for the correct response
 It was presented as trial-unique configurations, so that the configuration of obstacles
had to be evaluated anew on each trial
 The number of trials was deliberately limited to minimise the possibility of the task
being solved using associative learning
In the present study we investigated whether Bornean orangutans were able to consider
the impact of multiple obstacles on the path of a reward, and therefore identify a priori
the correct direction in which to move the reward before executing actions to obtain it.
As well as establishing if subjects were able to solve the task (i.e. choose the correct
direction), we examined post hoc how they might have been attempting to do so. We
predicted that orangutans should perform well in such a task, given that they successfully
navigate gaps in the canopy without reaching arboreal ‘dead-ends’, suggesting that they
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decide on and follow routes prior to beginning their travel (Thorpe, personal observation).
As the most distantly related of our great ape relatives, their study is also interesting
from a phylogenetic perspective with regards to tracing the emergence of the cognitive
capacities related to complex physical problem-solving.
2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1 Subjects and housing
Three subjects, all mother-reared and housed at Apenheul Primate Park (Netherlands)
participated in the task reported here (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 – Study subjects: sex, age in years and whether they were born in captivity (C)
or in the wild (W)
Subject Sex Age Birthplace
Amos M 9 C
Sandy F 27 C
Silvia F 44 W
Eight adult orangutans (six females and two males) were initially identified for partici-
pation in the study; however five subjects were dropped following the initial phases (see
‘familiarisation phase’ section below for details). Both indoor and outdoor enclosures were
equipped with climbing elements including tree trunks, fibreglass poles, ropes and netting,
and enrichment objects such as puzzle feeders were available.
2.2.2 Apparatus: the puzzle-tube
The apparatus was attached to the outside of the enclosure and consisted of a transparent
Perspex puzzle-tube (75 cm x 12 cm x 10 cm) with the following components that could
be manipulated by the experimenter (see Fig. 2.1):
1. Gap-size of traps: large (4.5 cm); medium (3 cm); small (2 cm)
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2. Trap direction: forwards (opening towards subject); backwards (opening towards
experimenter)
3. Ends configuration: each end could be open or closed
Figure 2.1 – Apparatus used in the experiment (a) showing interchangeable components:
traps with large (1) medium (2) and small (3) gaps that could face either forwards (towards
subject) or backwards (towards experimenter), and end pieces (4). The gap sizes were always
configured in the order shown in the plan view (b), though the entire configuration could be
rotated 180°. The reward (R) is shown in its central starting position for each trial
The apparatus permitted a total of four gaps in the base of the tube (two at each side of
the reward’s central starting position). The size of the reward (a walnut) meant that it
fell through large gaps but could be displaced over small and medium gaps. If the trap
beneath a large gap was facing forwards then the reward could be retrieved by the subject
(for an example, see Fig. 2.2c). If on the other hand the trap was facing backwards then
it was lost by the subject (as shown in Fig. 2.2d and Fig. 2.2e) and collected by the
experimenter and disposed of. The direction in which the traps beneath small and medium
gaps faced was irrelevant as the reward never fell into them, but they were included so
that the location of a single trap type could not be used as an arbitrary cue. At one
side of the puzzle-tube there was a small gap followed by a medium gap and at the other
side a medium gap followed by a large gap (see Fig. 2.1b and Fig. 2.2). The basis for
this configuration of gaps was that if subjects only considered the obstacles closest to the
reward, i.e. the first gap that must be navigated, then we would expect them to move the
reward towards the smaller of the two gaps. Thus, the initial small gap on one side of the
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tube potentially acted as a perceptual ‘lure’, because compared to the initial medium-sized
gap on the other side it should have seemed that the reward was less likely to fall through.
However, as a large gap resulted in the reward being retrieved in some trials but lost in
others, trap direction and the configuration of the end pieces also had to be considered. If
an end of the tube was open and the two gaps on the same side were small enough for
the reward to pass over, then the reward could be retrieved from the end (see Fig. 2.2a).
Therefore, because there were multiple obstacles in each direction, subjects needed to look
ahead and consider the effect of each obstacle on the reward in order. Only by evaluating
the multiple obstacles at both sides of the puzzle-tube (the configuration of gaps, the
direction in which the trap beneath the large gap was facing, and whether the ends were
open or closed) before selecting the initial direction in which to move the reward could
subjects achieve perfect performance. However, by attending to some cues but not others
performance could still differ from what would be expected by chance (i.e. a 50% success
rate; see section 2.3.4 for detailed explanation).
2.2.3 General procedure
Subjects were tested in separation rooms (10-15 m2) where they were held on a regular
basis for feeding and cleaning purposes. During the testing phase they were tested in
isolation except for one adult female (Sandy) who was accompanied by two dependent
juveniles. Subjects were not food deprived before the trials, water was available ad libitum
and they could choose to stop participating at any time. The reward in each trial was a
walnut and subjects remained motivated to obtain them throughout the study. Subjects
manipulated the reward through a series of finger holes (see Fig. 2.1a) and could retrieve
the reward either via an open end of the tube or a forward-facing trap beneath a large
gap.
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Familiarisation phase
All eight potential subjects were presented with the puzzle-tube in its simplest configuration,
with a continuous solid base (no gaps or traps) and both ends open. This tested whether
the ability to access the reward by rolling it out of either end of the tube was within
their sensorimotor repertoire and also familiarised them with the apparatus to minimise
the risk of neophobic responses during the testing phase. Four subjects were dropped
from the study at this stage due to a lack of interest, motor problems or becoming too
nervous or frustrated in the separation areas. Following baseline testing the remaining four
subjects then participated in a simpler task (the gap-size task) than the one reported here,
consisting of 32 trial-unique configurations that incorporated only a single gap at each
side of the tube, which could be small or large (basic methods and data for this task are
provided in Appendix A). Subsequently a further subject was dropped from the study as
she repeatedly attempted to squeeze the reward through the central finger hole rather than
moving it in either direction from its central starting position. The remaining subjects
that participated in the testing phase were Amos, Sandy and Silvia (see Table 2.1).
Testing phase
Based on the three puzzle-tube variables (gap-size, trap direction and ends configuration)
we generated 64 trial-unique configurations (32 oriented left and right), three schematic
examples of which are shown in Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 – Three schematic example configurations of the puzzle-tube apparatus showing
both gap-size (L= large; M= medium; S= small) and trap-direction (open box= forwards-
facing; crossed box= backwards-facing), as well as ends configuration (open or closed).
Examples of the correct direction in which to move the reward (direction of arrow) and the
access point for obtaining it (head of arrow) are shown (a - c); and the outcome for the same
three example configurations if the incorrect direction is chosen (d – f)
Limiting the total number of trials minimised the opportunity for learning across the
task and reduced the chance of the task being solved through associative learning and
reinforcement. These 64 trials were pseudorandomised into 6 blocks of either 11 (blocks
1-4) or 10 (blocks 5 and 6) trials. Order of block presentation was randomised for each
subject. Subjects received one block per day, with session referring to the sequential order
in which the blocks were presented.
In each trial, the test subject was presented with the empty apparatus for a preview period
of up to 20 seconds, though this was cut short if the subject lost interest in the apparatus
or became frustrated. The reward was then placed in the centre of the puzzle-tube for the
subject to manipulate. In each trial the reward could be retrieved if it was moved towards
one side but not the other (the ‘correct’ side varied between trials). Fig. 2.2 shows some
schematic examples of the outcomes of moving the reward in the ‘correct’ (Fig. 2.2a-c)
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and ‘incorrect’ (Fig. 2.2d-f) directions.
2.2.4 Data scoring and analysis
All trials were videotaped. For each trial we scored whether the initial choice of direction
(defined as the direction in which the subject first moved the reward, even if this was
subsequently switched) was correct or incorrect, and whether it was to the left or right.
Subjects were allowed to correct their mistakes if they chose the incorrect initial direction,
so in some ‘incorrect’ trials they eventually went on to retrieve the reward. If a mistake
was corrected prior to the reward reaching an impeding obstacle (closed end or large
backwards-facing gap) this was scored as ‘self-corrected’. The dependent measure was the
percentage of correct responses defined as choosing the correct initial direction in a trial.
Two-tailed binomial tests were used to assess whether individual subjects’ initial choice
of direction across the 64 trials differed from what would be expected by chance (50%
correct) and also whether they showed any directional preferences. The alpha value for
the significance level was always 0.05. Data were analysed using PASW Statistics 18 (IBM
SPSS Inc. 2009) and R 2.11.1 (LME4 package, R Development Core Team 2010).
Rule simulations
When attempting to solve the task, subjects could have used the configuration of one or
more of the obstacles as a cue for choosing the direction in which to move the reward.
To explore whether this might have been the case we generated simulated performance
outcomes (% correct responses) semi-manually using a computer for the 64 trials based on
five different procedural rules and six rule combinations (see Fig. 2.4 caption for details of
rules) and plotted these together with subjects’ performances (Fig. 2.4). For example, if
subjects chose the initial direction in which to move the reward based on the procedural
rule ‘always move the reward away from the large gap’ (‘avoid L gap’ in Fig. 2.4), we
could produce a simulated ‘% correct responses’ outcome by examining each of the 64
trials in turn and generating an initial choice of direction based on following that rule, and
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determining whether this would have been correct or incorrect for that particular trial.
For rule combinations, rules were used in sequence on each trial until an unambiguous
outcome was achieved (i.e. the reward was either gained or lost). For example, for the
rule combination ‘O end/L gap’ (see Fig. 2.4), in all trials where there was only one open
end the reward was moved towards it (first rule: ‘O end’). However, in trials where both
ends were configured the same the rule ‘O end’ generated an ambiguous outcome, so the
second rule (‘L gap’) was used; i.e. the reward was moved towards the large gap, resulting
in the reward either being gained or lost. For rules and rule combinations that involved
direction being chosen at random (decided by random numbers generated in Excel), the
simulation was repeated 10 times to give a range of possible outcomes (n=640).
GLMMs
We used generalised linear mixed modelling (GLMM) (Crawley; 2007; Melis et al.; 2011) to
assess the effects of testing session (1-6) and the puzzle-tube variables (ends configuration,
gap-size and trap direction) on whether the initial choice of direction was correct or
incorrect. Only one gap-size was used in the models as the configuration of gaps was
always as shown in Fig. 2.1b (or rotated through 180 degrees).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Initial choice of direction
Amos’ and Sandy’s performances differed significantly from chance-level (50% correct)
across the 64 trials (binomial test: 51 out of 64 trials correct; p<0.0001 and 43 out of 64
trials correct; p=0.008 respectively, see Fig. 2.4). Silvia chose the correct initial direction
in 25 out of 64 trials, which was below chance level but not significantly so (binomial test:
p=0.103). Fig. 2.3 shows subjects’ performances across consecutive testing sessions.
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Figure 2.3 – Percentage of correct responses by each subject across the six consecutive testing
sessions. There was no significant improvement in subjects’ performances, though Sandy’s
performance did show a net improvement. Horizontal dotted line indicates chance-level
performance (50% correct)
Amos’ performance differed significantly from chance level in his first testing session
(binomial test: 10 out of 11 trials correct; p=0.012; see Fig. 2.3). Amos and Sandy both
chose the correct initial direction in the first trial in five out of the six testing sessions,
including the first trial of their first sessions. Amos’ performance ranged from 70-91% of
trials correct within a session, and Sandy’s from 50-91%. Sandy’s performance showed
a net overall improvement in performance across sessions (see Fig. 2.3); this was tested
quantitatively in the GLMMs below. Silvia’s best within-session performance was 50% of
trials correct in session 2, with her poorest performance occurring in session 3 (30% of
trials correct, see Fig. 2.3).
2.3.2 Directional preferences
Neither Amos nor Sandy showed a directional preference across the 64 trials (binomial test:
p=0.53 and p=0.10, respectively). Silvia on the other hand showed a significant overall
preference to move the reward to the right (64.1% of trials; binomial test: p=0.03).
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2.3.3 Self-correction
Amos did not self-correct in any trials. Sandy self-corrected her initial choice of direction
in 2 out of 21 (9.5%) and Silvia in 8 out of 39 (20.5%) incorrect trials. All self-corrections
occurred when the impeding obstacle was a closed end of the puzzle-tube; never when it was
a large backwards-facing gap. Subjects usually self-corrected following tactile exploration
of the closed end.
2.3.4 Rule simulations
Subjects’ individual performances and the simulated outcomes based on various rules and
rule combinations are shown in Fig. 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 – Percentage of correct responses for the three subjects (n=64) and simulated
performance outcomes based on five procedural rules and six rule combinations: Random
= move reward in random direction; Left = move reward left; Right = move reward right;
L gap = move reward towards large gap; avoid L gap = move reward away from large gap
(n=64 for each). O end = move reward towards open end of tube; C end = move reward
towards closed end of tube. For rule combinations (e.g. O end/random), rules were used
in sequence on each trial until an unambiguous outcome was achieved (i.e. the reward was
either gained or lost). Simulations involving direction being chosen at random were repeated
10 times to give a range of possible outcomes (n=640). For boxplots the line across the box
is the median and the whiskers indicate the range of outcomes for ten repeated simulations.
Dotted line indicates chance-level performance (50% correct); dashed box shows that Amos’
and Sandy’s performances fell within the range of simulated outcomes for the O end/random
rule combination, as did the other two rule combinations involving the configuration of the
open end
As Amos’ and Sandy’s performances both differed significantly from chance-level (see
Fig. 2.4) this suggests that they were not choosing the direction in which to move the
reward randomly (‘Random’), or based solely on a directional bias (‘Left’, ‘Right’). Neither
were simply avoiding the large gap or succumbing to the potential ‘perceptual lure’ of
the small gap (‘avoid L gap’), nor always moving towards the large gap (‘L gap’), as
all of these simulations generated performance outcomes of around 50% correct (see Fig.
2.4). However, simulating directional choices for the 64 trials using the rule combination
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‘move reward towards open end of the tube; if not applicable choose direction at random’
(‘O end/random’ in Fig. 2.4) generated a range of outcomes significantly different to
50% correct (64.1 - 81.3%, Fig. 2.4). Both Amos’ (79.7% correct) and Sandy’s (67.2%
correct) performance fell within this range (see dashed box in Fig. 2.4). Two further rule
combinations based on primarily moving the reward towards the open end and secondarily
moving the reward either towards or away from the large gap (‘O end/L gap’ and ‘O
end/avoid L gap’ in Fig. 2.4) also resulted in a simulated performance outcome of 75%
correct (Fig. 2.4). Silvia’s performance did not correspond to or fall within the range of
any of the simulated performance outcomes (see Fig. 2.4).
2.3.5 GLMMs
We fitted a model with initial choice of direction as a binary response, subject as a random
factor, session as a covariate with fixed effect, and ends configuration (same, different),
gap-size 1 (large, small; which determines other gap sizes), and the direction each trap
was facing (forwards, backwards) as fixed factors. This analysis confirmed that subjects
were more likely to choose the correct initial direction when the ends were configured
the same, i.e. both open or both closed, as opposed to one open and one closed, as ends
configuration was the only factor that influenced whether the initial choice of direction
was correct or incorrect (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 – GLMM model output showing factors that influenced the whether the choice of
initial direction was correct or incorrect
Factor Estimate SE z p
Session 0.009 0.010 0.934 0.350
Puzzle-tube variables
Ends configuration 1.054 0.341 3.089 0.002**
Gap size 1 -0.292 0.334 -0.876 0.381
Trap 1 direction -0.129 0.332 -0.388 0.698
Trap 2 direction 0.438 0.334 1.309 0.190
Trap 3 direction -0.590 0.340 -1.733 0.083
Trap 4 direction -0.494 0.341 -1.449 0.147
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We compared this first full model with a model that did not include ends configuration
as a fixed factor. The fit of the second more parsimonious model resulted in a significant
reduction of fit (likelihood ratio test comparing the two models: q2=9.871; p=0.002),
indicating that ends configuration explains a significant amount of variance. Notably,
session had no influence on whether the initial choice of direction was correct or incorrect
(see Table 2.2), i.e. there was no significant variation in performance between testing
sessions. Additional analyses showed no interaction effects among the factors in the
model.
Ends configuration
In the subset of trials in which the puzzle-tube ends were configured one open and one
closed (n=32), Amos and Sandy chose the correct initial direction in 90.6% and 87.5%
of trials respectively. In the other trials where the ends of the tube were configured the
same Amos’ performance was the same whether the ends were either both open or both
closed (68.8%; n=32; p=0.052). Sandy’s performance in this subset of trials was close to
chance-level (46.9%, n=32; p=0.860), though she performed better when the ends were
both closed (56.3% correct; n=16) than when they were both open (31.3% correct; n=16).
This consideration of different subsets of trials supports the results of the GLMM analysis;
that the configuration of the ends does indeed influence performance. Silvia’s performance
was below chance-level in all subsets of trials.
2.4 Discussion
We devised a novel puzzle-tube task that aimed to investigate orangutans’ ability to
consider the impact of multiple obstacles in two alternative paths on a reward, prior to
choosing a direction in which to move it. When designing the task we aimed to minimise
the methodological and procedural concerns of previous studies based on the trap-tube
paradigm. We also developed a novel analytical method of rule-simulation for exploring
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how subjects may have been attempting to solve the task with regards to what potential
procedural rules or rule combinations might have been used.
Two of the three subjects (Amos and Sandy) solved the task (that is, performed significantly
above chance) across the 64 trial-unique configurations. Importantly, Amos performed
significantly above chance level in his first session, and both successful subjects responded
correctly in their initial trial in 5 out of 6 sessions. These results are impressive, given
that in previous studies only 2 out of 5 and 2 out of 6 orangutans solved arguably simpler
tasks in which they had to learn to avoid a single trap, and required a greater number of
trials to do so (Mulcahy and Call 2006b; Martin-Ordas et al. 2008). Furthermore, in both
of those studies the only variation between trials was the side on which the trap appeared.
Therefore, subjects could have solved the tasks based on the single procedural rule ‘move
the reward away from the trap’. In a study by Seed et al. (2009b) using a two-trap box
that did not require tool use, all eight chimpanzee subjects learnt to avoid a trap in 40-100
trials. However, only one subject was able to successfully transfer between two tasks that
required opposite responses based on the configuration of an arbitrary cue; the other seven
continued to use a single procedural rule (‘push toward the shelf piece’) that applied to
the previous task (Seed et al. 2009b).
Fragaszy et al. (2009) suggested that implementing a forced delay may support the selection
of behaviours other than the prepotent one, and there is some evidence to suggest that
orangutans may outperform other great ape species in tasks requiring inhibitory control
(Vlamings et al. 2010). Furthermore, keas were quicker to correct mistakes when opening
boxes with multiple locks following a short (10-30 second) preview period (Miyata et al.
2011). It is therefore possible that the short preview period in our experiment permitted
subjects to consider the multiple obstacles at each side of the puzzle-tube prior to acting,
though there were no obvious behavioural differences between subjects during this time
(Tecwyn, personal observation). Dunbar et al. (2005) did not identify an effect of prior
view on chimpanzees’ or orangutans’ speed of retrieving a reward from a puzzle-box.
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However, in the past orangutans have frequently been dismissed as “sluggish, slothful and
uninteresting” (Russon 2010, p. 981), which suggests that latency may not have been an
appropriate measure of performance due to inter-species behavioural differences. To our
knowledge this is also the first time that orangutans have been tested on a trap-tube-like
task that does not require tool use, so it is possible that the additional cognitive load of
having to use a tool may have been masking the species’ actual understanding of such
tasks in previous experiments, as was found to be the case for chimpanzees (Seed et al.
2009b).
What possible strategies could an animal potentially use when attempting to solve a novel
problem and how do these relate to our task? By deliberately limiting the total number of
trials reduced the potential for associative learning and reinforcement across trials, and the
fact that the GLMMs did not reveal a significant effect of testing session on performance
(i.e. subjects did not improve significantly at the task with additional trials, see Table 2.2
and Fig. 2.3) suggests that associative learning does not explain the performance of the
successful subjects. Amos in particular provides a strong case against learning across trials,
as he performed significantly above chance-level in his first testing session. Although it is
possible that subjects could have learned relevant associations prior to the study, to our
knowledge they had not been presented with any similar apparatus. A puzzle-feeder that
had been used by Sandy and Silvia in the past involved using a stick to navigate a reward
through a vertical maze, causing it to drop through a series holes and out of the bottom.
Amos had never used the puzzle-feeder.
A lack of evidence for learning does not, however, eliminate the possibility that subjects
were using a procedural rule from the initial trial (Fedor et al. 2008). Such a rule could
be based on an arbitrary or relevant cue, and could be appropriate or inappropriate. In
contrast to previous similar studies, in our task every trial configuration was unique, and
no single cue (e.g. a small gap) individually identified the correct directional response,
making it impossible to perform perfectly by using a single procedural rule in relation to a
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single cue. However, our rule simulations (Fig. 2.4) demonstrated that on our task at least
it was possible to perform significantly better than chance (though not perfectly) by using
one of the three following 2-rule combinations, all of which involved an initial examination
of the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends: ‘move reward towards open end of the tube;
if not applicable (a) choose direction at random; (b) move towards the large gap; or (c)
move away from the large gap’; (see dashed box in Fig. 2.4). It is feasible that Amos
and Sandy were using rule combination (a) as both of their performances fell within the
range of simulated outcomes for the 64 trials based on it (see Fig. 2.4). The results of the
GLMM analyses quantitatively supported the notion that successful subjects were able
to use ends-configuration as a relevant cue for choosing the direction in which to move
the reward when one was open and one closed, as they performed better in this subset
of trials compared to when both ends of the tube were configured the same (both open
or both closed). Furthermore, self-corrections only occurred when the impeding obstacle
was a closed end (not a large backwards-facing gap), which suggests that subjects were
able to use this as a cue, even if they did not do so prior to choosing their initial direction.
Self-correcting may be indicative of a ‘planful’ (Willatts 1989) or forward search strategy,
whereby subjects only look ahead to the obstacles in the path of the reward once it has
already been moved either left or right (Fragaszy et al. 2003; Pan et al. 2011).
A further possibly more cognitively demanding strategy would be to consider different
potential actions and their outcomes for each trial via deliberative processes in working
memory, prior to choosing which direction to move the reward in. Amos performed above
chance-level, though not significantly so (68.8% correct; n=32; p=0.052) in the subset of
trials where one open end could not be used as a cue for choosing direction (as both ends
were configured the same), which suggests that he may also have been able to use relevant
information regarding gap-size and trap-direction to some extent. This suggests that he
may have been considering obstacles other than the ends of the tube. Furthermore he was
equally able to both avoid the large gap and to use it to access the reward, as he performed
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equally well in trials requiring either one of these outcomes (11 out of 16 correct for both;
see Fig. 2.5). It therefore seems likely that Amos was either using deliberative processes
to some extent, or was able to use a number of procedural rules flexibly, depending on the
configuration of cues in a given trial. Alternatively, subjects could have used deliberative
processes when initially faced with the task, for example in the first or first few trials, and
subsequently constructed and used rules based on this limited experience. Fig. 2.5 shows
that, in fact, subjects could have achieved perfect performance by using three procedural
rules (R1-R3) based on the three possible configurations of the ends of the tube and
considering the position of the large gap (also see Fig. 2.2 for schematic examples of these).
The numbers in shaded circles indicate the number of trials in which individual subjects
chose the correct initial direction in trials with that configuration (see Fig. 2.5).
Figure 2.5 – Subjects could have chosen the correct initial direction in 100% of trials using
the decision tree shown here, which is based on the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends
and the location of the large gap in a given trial. When the ends of the tube were configured
one open and one closed (n=32) a single procedural rule (R1) could be used to identify the
correct initial direction. When the ends of the tube were configured both open (n=16) or
both closed (n=16), subjects also needed to consider the position of the large gap and use a
decision rule based on that (R2 or R3). Numbers in shaded circles show the number of trials
in which each subject chose the correct initial direction
In Fig. 2.2, subjects could have chosen the correct initial direction in each of the three
example configurations shown by using one of three rules shown in Fig. 2.5: in (a) by
using rule R1; in (b) by using rule R2; and in (c) by using rule R3. Using rule R1 would
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only require the subject to examine the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends, therefore
these trials (n=32) could be solved by following the simple procedural rule ‘move reward
towards open end of the tube’ (as in Fig. 2.2a). Using the other two rules (R2 and R3 in
Fig. 2.5) would require both ends-configuration and the position of the large gap to be
considered (as in Fig. 2.2b and 2.2c). The correct initial direction could also have been
chosen in the remaining 61 configurations using the decision tree shown in Fig. 2.5. But
why would subjects use procedural rules (if indeed this is what they were doing) rather
than considering each trial individually, and is one approach more cognitively demanding
than the other? Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) suggest that the use of heuristic rules in
problem-solving, for example examining fewer cues, may reduce cognitive effort (in humans
at least) by decreasing the amount of information to be held in working memory at a given
time. Such rapid, simple strategies may be advantageous in the natural environment and
do not rule out the capacity for more sophisticated strategies (Seed and Byrne 2010). In
our task, subjects could have opted to focus on the cue they deemed to be most important
(seemingly the puzzle-tube ends), and where there was a tie on this cue (if both ends were
configured the same) they may have examined what they deemed to be the second most
important cue (e.g. gap-size, see Fig. 2.5). Although this may seem contradictory as it
still requires multiple cues to be examined, it nonetheless reduces the cognitive demands
of the decision-maker as they are only ever considering a single cue at a time (Shah and
Oppenheimer 2008). Mitchell et al. (2009) discuss the use of simulation- versus rule-based
approaches in the development of passing false-belief tests in children, and suggest that in
this context at least, simulation is the effortful default, with cognitively economical rules
being derived from experience over time.
There was substantial between-subject variation in performance on this task, which makes
it difficult to generalise about the cognitive mechanisms involved. Even if two individuals’
performances were the same it is possible that one could have used heuristic rules to
solve the task whereas the other used more abstract reasoning (Chittka and Jensen 2011).
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However, differences in performance can prove revealing with regards to different strategies
used. In a recent study investigating understanding of gravity and solidity in great apes
Cacchione and Call (2010) found that different individuals used different strategies when
searching for a reward, and not all individuals were able to change strategy flexibly. The
use of different strategies may help to explain the differences in performance observed here,
with Amos being the most flexible. Sandy may have acquired a correct rule over time, as her
performance showed a general but non-significant trend of improvement across sessions (see
Fig. 2.3). Silvia may have been using an incorrect rule (such as always moving the reward
towards the closed end of the tube, which she did in 20 out of 32 trials where the ends were
configured one open and one closed, see Fig. 2.5) which would have led to a systematic
error within the subset of trials with the ends configured one open one closed, though
her performance did not appear to correspond with any of the simulated performance
outcomes (see Fig. 2.4). She did, however, self-correct in more trials than the other two
subjects (20.5% of her incorrect trials), which may be indicative of a more ‘planful’ than
‘planned’ strategy, as was found to be the case for capuchin monkeys navigating 2D mazes
(Pan et al. 2011). As a wild-caught orangutan, it is likely that Silvia’s opportunities to
gain learning experience in her early years were rather different to the other two subjects
(born in captivity), which may have affected her problem-solving behaviour (Lethmate
1979). During a nine year study Galdikas (1982) found that ex-captive orangutans released
into the wild exhibited tool-using behaviour in a much wider variety of contexts, compared
with wild orangutans. Galdikas attributed this to differential learning experiences during
critical learning periods before maturity (Galdikas 1982). Another point worthy of note
regarding Silvia is that she was the most difficult subject to encourage to come to the
apparatus (Tecwyn, personal observation), which may be indicative of her lower levels
of motivation and attentiveness compared to the other subjects. It is interesting to note
that the 9 year old subject performed best, as the four orangutans that solved trap-tube
analogous tasks in other studies were all aged between 11-18 years, from a tested range of
6-33 years (Mulcahy and Call 2006b; Martin-Ordas et al. 2008). This study increases the
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upper age tested to 44 years. It is possible that success in tasks of this nature may be
related to age class, as younger orangutans are generally more exploratory of their habitat
and its affordances, which is reflected in their larger locomotor repertoire (Thorpe and
Crompton 2005; Thorpe and Crompton 2006), but a far larger dataset would be required
to substantiate this.
In summary, our novel task improved on the methodological and procedural limitations of
previous similar tasks and minimised the potential for associative learning across trials by
presenting a deliberately limited number of trial-unique configurations. The design of our
task did not permit unequivocal conclusions regarding the use of higher-level, deliberative
processes to be drawn; rather our use of rule-simulations in the analyses demonstrated that
successful subjects could have solved the task by using a combination of two procedural
rules. GLMMs quantitatively supported the notion that the configuration of the puzzle-
tube ends was used as a cue for choosing direction. This is nevertheless impressive, as
performance did not improve significantly across sessions and Amos performed above
chance-level in his initial session, suggesting that if these subjects were using a rule-based
approach they must have already possessed some appropriate previously acquired causal
knowledge (for example the inability of a reward to pass through barriers and possibly
the size of a reward relative to a gap). Furthermore, the use of rules may in fact be a
cognitively economical strategy compared with the use of deliberative processes for each
trial (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). Silvia may have been using an incorrect rule (e.g.
move the reward towards the closed end), resulting in a systematic error that contributed
to her poor performance, though previous experience, motivation and attention may have
also played a key role.
Future studies should develop new paradigms to investigate the how tasks that require
consideration of multiple steps prior to implementing actions are solved, with regards to
cognitive strategies that subjects use. The focus should be on contexts in which animals
are more likely to go beyond using simple strategies and tasks should be constructed in
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such a way that success via the use of procedural rules is not possible. If the number of
steps to be considered between initiation of actions and achieving the desired outcome
could be systematically increased (which might be expected to increase cognitive demand
(Wimpenny et al. 2009), a ‘planning threshold’ could theoretically be reached. It would be
particularly interesting to compare the performance of a number of primate species on
such tasks to generate a phylogenetic reconstruction of this cognitive ability and to begin
to understand the socio-ecological challenges that may have driven its evolution. It is also
imperative that future studies continue to attempt to tease apart alternative underlying
cognitive mechanisms, with increased emphasis on detailed analyses of behaviour, as it
seems that such studies with primates are now falling behind those conducted with birds
(see e.g. Wimpenny et al. 2009; Cheke et al. 2011; Miyata et al. 2011).
This chapter has demonstrated that some at least some orangutans seem able to consider
multiple obstacles when attempting to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-tube apparatus.
However, success in this task was based on a binary choice, and post-hoc analyses revealed
that it was possible to solve the task using a combination of procedural rules. Therefore, in
the next chapter (chapter 3) I aim to address these issues with a novel piece of apparatus
designed to test planning ability, where success is not based on a binary choice and subjects
cannot always succeed by following procedural rules.
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Chapter 3
A NOVEL TEST OF PLANNING ABILITY: GREAT
APES CAN PLAN STEP-BY-STEP BUT NOT IN
ADVANCE OF ACTION
This chapter, largely in its current form, is published as:
Tecwyn, E.C., Thorpe, S.K.S., Chappell, J. (2013) A novel test of planning ability: great
apes can plan step-by-step but not in advance of action. Behavioural Processes 100:
74-84
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Abstract
The ability to identify an appropriate sequence of actions or to consider alternative possible
action sequences might be particularly useful during problem-solving in the physical
domain. We developed a new ‘paddle-box’ task to test the ability of different ape species
to plan an appropriate sequence of physical actions (rotating paddles) to retrieve a reward
from a goal location. The task had an adjustable difficulty level and was not dependent on
species-specific behaviours (e.g. complex tool use). We investigated the planning abilities
of captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) using the paddle-box.
In experiment 1, subjects had to rotate one or two paddles before rotating the paddle with
the reward on. Subjects of both species performed poorly, though orangutans rotated
more non-food paddles, which may be related to their greater exploratory tendencies
and bolder temperament compared with bonobos. In experiment 2 subjects could always
rotate the paddle with the reward on first and still succeed, and most subjects of both
species performed appropriate sequences of up to three paddle rotations to retrieve the
reward. Poor performance in experiment 1 may have been related to subjects’ difficulty in
inhibiting the prepotent response to act on the reward immediately.
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3.1 Introduction
Planning as an everyday concept has many connotations, and several terms are used more
or less interchangeably to describe a myriad of behaviours that do not seem to have much
in common (Parrila et al. 1996). At one end of the spectrum, planning can consist of
anticipating the consequences of motor actions, for example grasping an object in an
appropriate orientation (end-state comfort effect; Rosenbaum et al. 1990). This has been
demonstrated to develop early in humans (by 19 months of age; McCarty et al. 1999) and
also to have emerged early in primate phylogeny, being present in several lemur species
(Chapman et al. 2010). At the other end of the spectrum lies episodic future thinking:
the ability to mentally project oneself into an imagined future scenario (Suddendorf and
Corballis 1997). There is continuing debate regarding which, if any, non-human species
possess this latter capacity, with some researchers presenting experimental evidence for
animals imagining and planning for future events (Mulcahy and Call 2006a; Raby et al.
2007; Osvath and Osvath 2008; Osvath 2009; Osvath and Karvonen 2012) and others
arguing that foresight is an uniquely human ability (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007;
Suddendorf et al. 2009). Clearly, these two examples of planning, and the multitude of
intermediate cases, must pose very different cognitive demands and vary in terms of their
information processing requirements (Chappell et al. 2012; Tecwyn et al. 2012).
Bearing this in mind, it is important to specify the type of planning that is of interest here,
which is the type of planning that may be involved in problem-solving that is oriented
towards current needs. This can be defined as the ability to identify an appropriate
sequence of actions or consider alternative courses of action prior to execution (see Tecwyn
et al. 2012 for further discussion). Behaviours exhibited by wild great apes that may
involve this type of planning include the use of ‘tool-sets’ for extractive foraging of honey
by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes: Brewer and McGrew 1990); ‘engineering’ of alliances
with the most profitable partners by bonobos (Pan paniscus; Hohmann and Fruth 2002;
Aureli et al. 2008); hierarchical processing of plant material by gorillas (Gorilla beringei
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beringei : Byrne et al. 2001) and gap-crossing in the compliant forest canopy by orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus : Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. 1982).
How might planning for current needs be investigated experimentally? Several papers have
advocated developing experimental methodologies and paradigms that consider different
species’ predispositions to allow testing of multiple species (Santos et al. 2006; Amici et al.
2010; MacLean et al. 2012), as at present systematic interspecific comparisons are still
rare (Schmitt et al. 2012). This is important in order to avoid the presentation of tasks
in an ‘unfair’ manner, hence biasing for or against the abilities of certain species (Roth
and Dicke 2005). To date, studies investigating planning for current needs in non-human
species have mostly fallen in to one of two categories: those involving the use of tools,
and those involving computerised interfaces (but see e.g. Dunbar et al. 2005; Kuczaj et al.
2009; Miyata et al. 2011 for interesting alternative approaches).
Tool use studies of planning, usually focused on sequential tool use, or metatool use (e.g.
Hihara 2003; Mulcahy et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 2007; Bird and Emery 2009; Wimpenny
et al. 2009; Taylor et al. 2010; Martin-Ordas et al. 2012) have yielded many interesting
insights. However, they may not be ideal when attempting to develop a comparative
planning paradigm, for at least two reasons. First, they bias against non-tool-using species,
as the behaviours involved in solving the task may not form part of their natural repertoire,
and may require fairly precise manipulatory abilities (e.g. sufficient motor control to
hold a stick and insert it into a narrow tube). Second, there is evidence to suggest that
removing tool use from physical cognition problems can reduce cognitive load and improve
performance (Seed et al. 2009b). Therefore, if it is planning rather than tool use that is
the focus of study, it seems prudent to avoid the requirement for tool use.
Studies involving computerised environments have also been used to investigate planning
ability. These require subjects to use either a touch-screen or joystick, for example to
navigate through a two-dimensional maze (e.g. Fragaszy et al. 2003; Miyata and Fujita
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2008; Fragaszy et al. 2009; Pan et al. 2011) or to recall a sequence of numbers (Biro
and Matsuzawa 1999; Beran et al. 2004). Such techniques certainly have experimental
advantages, such as precise timing of stimulus presentation and automatic recording of
behavioural responses. However, they are expensive and time-consuming to implement, with
subjects requiring extensive training to use the experimental apparatus prior to the start
of testing. Furthermore, the physical and temporal distance between stimulus, response
and reward, and the need for refined motor abilities can be problematic, particularly for
younger individuals (Mandell and Sackett 2008).
A further problem with these and other cognitive tasks such as the trap-tube paradigm
(Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994) is that initial errors made by the subject are often
correctable. In trap-tube tasks for example, the reward can initially be moved in one
direction, but the direction could be switched before the reward falls in a trap. Although
error correction strategies can be enlightening (e.g. DeLoache et al. 1985), having the
option of correcting an error may reduce the motivation of subjects to make the correct
choice in the first place, or to plan for the correct solution (Tecwyn et al. 2012).
As well as considering the practical and paradigmatic issues raised above, it has been
suggested recently by MacLean and colleagues (2012) that it would be fruitful for researchers
to design tasks with an adjustable level of difficulty, in order to avoid the masking of
meaningful variation due to floor or ceiling effects. In the case of planning during problem-
solving, it would be useful to have a task that could distinguish between, for example, the
ability to make selections between alternatives (proto-deliberative; Sloman 2010) and the
ability to explore branching futures (fully deliberative; Sloman 2010), which differ in terms
of their computational burden.
The aims of this study were two-fold. First, we aimed to design a new paradigm appropriate
for comparative testing of planning ability in primate species (including humans) that:
 Did not involve complex tool use
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 Did not depend on species-specific behaviours/competences
 Had an adjustable level of difficulty
 Did not have a performance outcome that was dependent on a binary choice, in
order to reduce the possibility of the task being solved by chance
 Was not correctable, to encourage subjects to choose correctly initially
 Could be configured in a trial-unique manner, so the task had to be considered anew
for each trial
Second, we aimed to use the new paradigm to investigate whether captive bonobos and
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) are able to plan an appropriate sequence of actions (a) in
advance (experiment 1); or (b) sequentially (experiment 2), in order to retrieve a food
reward from a goal location. If the ability to plan was present in the great ape last
common ancestor, then we might expect both bonobos and orangutans to exhibit planning
behaviour. If it evolved more recently in an African ape ancestor, then we might expect
only bonobos to perform well in our planning task. If on the other hand orangutans
outperform bonobos, this may suggest that orangutans have refined their adaptations
(both anatomical and cognitive) for arboreal living, beyond those that were present in
the great ape common ancestor. As the only great ape species to remain in the terminal
branch niche (Grand 1972) and therefore still face the locomotor demands as posited by
Povinelli and Cant (1995), it seems feasible that orangutans have continued to face strong
selection pressure for the ability to mentally ‘try out’ different possible courses of action,
and may therefore potentially possess particularly refined planning skills.
3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1 Subjects and housing
Four bonobos housed at Twycross Zoo, UK and eight orangutans housed at Apenheul
Primate Park and Ouwehands Dierenpark Rhenen in the Netherlands, participated in this
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study (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 – Subjects that participated in the experiments reported in this study. C =
captive born; W = wild born; Mo = mother-reared; H = hand-reared
Not all subjects participated in all of the experiments, and in some experiments the
number of trials completed varied between subjects. This was to comply with zoo-
specific regulations relating to research. Details of which individuals participated in which
experiments are given in Table 3.1 as well as the separate methods sections for each
experiment below. The number of trials completed by different individuals is specified in
the relevant sections. Bonobos at Twycross and orangutans at Ouwehands were naive
with respect to cognitive testing, whereas orangutans at Apenheul had previously been
exposed to a trap-tube type task reported in Tecwyn et al. (2012; chapter 2 of this thesis).
The apes at all three institutions were managed with an attempt to simulate fission-fusion
societies, so composition of the groups in the different sub-enclosures changed on a regular
basis. Enclosures at all zoos were equipped with climbing elements including tree trunks,
fibreglass poles, ropes, netting, shelves, platforms and enrichment materials.
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3.2.2 Apparatus: the paddle-box
The paddle-box apparatus was attached to the outside of the enclosures and consisted of
an opaque Perspex box (60 cm x 60 cm x 6 cm) containing eight rotatable paddles (14.5
cm x 3.5 cm x 1.7 cm; 1-8 in Fig. 3.1a) on three levels (i-iii in Fig. 3.1a). There were four
possible goal locations (each measuring 11 cm x 4.5 cm x 4.5 cm; A-D in Fig. 3.1a) at the
base of the apparatus that could all either be open or blocked.
Figure 3.1 – (a) Schematic depiction of the paddle box apparatus from the test subject’s
viewpoint showing the paddles (1-8), levels (i-iii) and goal locations (A-D); (b) photograph
of the apparatus showing the reward on paddle 4 (level ii) and the open goal location in
position C, with the other three goals blocked; and (c) diagram of the paddle mechanism,
illustrating the three positions in which the paddles could be held by magnets (flat; diagonal
left; diagonal right)
The paddle-box was designed to be mechanically accessible to any animal capable of
operating the simple paddle mechanism, making it ideal for comparative testing of a
number of species, including non-tool users. The paddles were rotated by subjects using
wooden handles (7cm x 2.5cm x 1.7cm) that extended out of the front of the box and
were oriented parallel to the paddles inside the box (see Fig. 3.1b). The handles could
be operated in a number of ways; for example by pushing down from above or up from
underneath at either end of a handle, or by using a twisting action. They were designed to
be large enough so they did not require fine motor control and thus reduce the chance of
subjects accidentally turning them the wrong way. Once a paddle was rotated, directional
choices were not easily correctable because the reward rolled quickly off the paddle. The
experimenter (ECT) could quickly and safely configure the paddle-box between trials by
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rotating paddles using long rods that extended out of the back of the box. Each paddle
could be set up in one of three orientations (flat; diagonal left; diagonal right, see Fig.
3.1b for examples of these orientations). Paddles were held in position by weak magnets
(Fig. 3.1c) so that they were easily rotatable by the subjects, but a moving reward did not
displace them from their orientation.
3.2.3 General procedure
The experimental procedure varied between institutions in order to comply with the
different zoos’ regulations. All subjects were tested in off-show rooms (10-22 m2) where
they were held regularly for feeding and during cleaning of the main enclosures. The
bonobos at Twycross were not isolated for testing (in compliance with the institution’s
ethical guidelines), and consequently session length and the number of trials completed
varied between individuals. Usually however, a single bonobo monopolized the apparatus
during testing (though the individual varied between testing sessions), and minimal
competition for the apparatus was observed. Orangutans were tested in isolation apart
from Sandy who was accompanied by two dependent juveniles. Subjects were not food
deprived before the trials, water was available ad libitum and they could choose to stop
participating at any time. The food reward in each trial was a small piece of fruit (orange,
apple, pear) or bread and subjects remained motivated to obtain the rewards throughout
the study. Due to constraints imposed by the testing area dimensions, the paddle-box
was presented to orangutans at ground-level, whereas for bonobos it was attached to the
enclosure at a height of approximately 1.5 m (from the base of the paddle-box to the
ground).
3.2.4 Familiarisation
There was a minimal familiarisation phase to confirm the ability of subjects to retrieve
a reward from an open goal location. Each subject was presented with the apparatus
with goals B and C open and A and D blocked, and the reward starting on paddle 7 (see
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Fig. 3.1a). Subjects could retrieve the reward by rotating paddle 7 in either direction
and extracting the reward from one of the open goals. Once subjects had succeeded in
retrieving the reward five times, they were able to progress to the testing phase. None
of the subjects experienced the reward becoming trapped during familiarisation. All
subjects except for one achieved the familiarisation criterion within a few minutes of first
encountering the apparatus. One orangutan (Jewel) did not rotate the paddle with the
reward on within a few minutes, so the experimenter demonstrated the rotation action to
her. She subsequently succeeded in reaching the criterion for progressing to the testing
phase.
3.2.5 Testing phase
Two experiments were carried out, each described in greater detail below. In both
experiments, the reward could start on any paddle excluding paddles 1 and 3 (see Fig.
3.1a). The reason for this was that if paddles 1 or 3 were rotated towards the outer edge of
the paddle-box, the reward could simply drop down to the bottom of the apparatus, missing
out the paddles on the middle level. The minimum number of steps required to retrieve the
reward in any given trial ranged from one to three and was pseudorandomised within each
block, with the constraint that no more than two trials with the same number of minimum
moves occurred consecutively. The paddle that the reward started on (the start paddle)
and the level on which it was located (i-iii in Fig. 3.1a) were also pseudorandomised such
that they were not the same in more than two consecutive trials. In all trials only one
goal location was open and the other three were blocked. The open goal was white and
visually distinct from the blocked goals that were black (see Fig. 3.1b). If the reward was
successfully navigated to the open goal location it could be retrieved by the test subject
from the front of the apparatus. If the reward became trapped at one of the blocked goal
locations it could not be accessed by the subject and was removed from the back of the
apparatus by the experimenter. For some trials it was possible to retrieve the reward in
the minimum number of steps in multiple ways (a maximum of three), that is, there was
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more than one viable route from the start paddle to the open goal location. Impossible
configurations, in which the reward could not be moved from the start paddle to the goal
via any sequence of paddle rotations (e.g. reward starting on paddle 4 and open goal in
location D, see Fig. 3.1a) were never presented.
3.2.6 Data scoring and analysis
All trials were videotaped. For each trial, whether the reward was retrieved from the
open goal location (correct) or became trapped (incorrect) was scored. In some trials, for
example if a paddle was rotated very rapidly, the reward did not follow the path of the
pre-positioned non-food paddles and ended up in an unexpected goal location, i.e. subjects
were not rewarded when they should have been, or vice versa. If the reward ended up in
a blocked goal location when the paddles were configured so that it should have ended
up in the open goal it was scored as an ‘unexpected trapping’. Conversely, if it ended
up in the open goal location in this way it was scored as an ‘unexpected retrieval’. In
cases where a reward was ‘unexpectedly trapped’ despite the subject performing a valid
sequence of paddle rotations, this was scored as correct. If a reward was ‘unexpectedly
retrieved’ in this manner it was scored as incorrect. Information regarding each individual
paddle rotation was also recorded. Specifically:
 paddle identity (1-8 in Fig. 3.1a)
 whether it was the start paddle (paddle on which the reward started, e.g. paddle 4
in Fig. 3.1b) or a non-food paddle (all other paddles)
 direction of rotation:
– left or right
– towards or away from open goal location (this information was not recorded
for trials in which the start paddle was located directly above the open goal
location, as was the case for start paddle 4 and goal B, and start paddle 5 and
goal C, see Fig. 3.1a).
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 Non-food paddles that were rotated were further classified according to:
– whether they were relevant (rotation enabled the reward to be retrieved, e.g.
paddle 7 in Fig. 3.1b) or irrelevant (did not need to be rotated for the reward
to be retrieved)
– the level on which they were located, relative to the level of the start paddle
(same level; above; below)
– timing of rotation (pre-reward insertion; whilst the reward was on the start
paddle; after the reward had become trapped)
A second observer (JC) independently scored 20% of the trials. Inter-observer reliability
was calculated using Cohen’s kappa (k), and was excellent for all of the variables scored
(experiment 1: k ranged from 0.90 (direction of start paddle rotation relative to goal
location) to 0.98 (reward retrieval); experiment 2: k=0.89 for reward retrieval and 0.98
for direction of start paddle rotation (left or right)). Data were analysed using PASW
Statistics 18 (IBM SPSS Inc. 2009) and R 2.11.1 (LME4 package, R Development Core
Team 2010).
3.3 Experiment 1: advance planning task
This task was presented first as it was considered to be the most difficult in terms of
planning demands. Presenting an easier task first could potentially train subjects to
succeed in a more difficult task, which we wanted to avoid.
3.3.1 Methods
All four bonobos and five orangutans (Amos, Jewel, Sandy, Anak and Radja) participated
in experiment 1. Subjects were presented with up to 12 blocks of 12 trials. The total
number of trials completed by each subject depended on two factors: a subject’s availability
for testing, and their performance in the first eight blocks. If a subject successfully solved
any 2- or 3-step trials then they were presented with up to four additional blocks. This
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was because subjects that succeeded in this initial testing period through planning their
actions might have been expected to show repeated success with additional testing, and we
wanted to maximize the chance for subjects to display the ability to succeed at the task,
should it exist. Table 3.2 gives details of the number of trials completed by each subject.
3.3.2 Paddle-box configurations
Within a block, each trial was a unique configuration of the paddle-box apparatus requiring
a minimum of one, two or three paddle rotations to retrieve the reward. In 1-step trials
the reward could start on any of the three levels (i-iii in Fig. 3.1a); in 2-step trials the
reward either started on the middle or top level; and in 3-step trials the reward could
only start on the top level. In 2- and 3-step trials subjects had to pre-position one or two
non-food paddles before rotating the start paddle (see Fig. 3.2a for an example of a 2-step
trial). Pseudorandomisation occurred as described in section 3.2.3. The open goal location
was fixed within a block but changed between blocks. In each trial, only the start paddle
was positioned in the flat orientation. All of the other paddles were positioned in one of
the two possible diagonal orientations (Fig. 3.2a; see also Fig. 3.1b). This meant that
if the start paddle was rotated first, the reward would slide down to the bottom of the
apparatus and end up at one of the blocked goal locations (Fig. 3.2a; see also Fig. 3.1b).
Figure 3.2 – Schematic examples of how to solve (a) a 2-step advance planning trial
(experiment 1) and (b) a 2-step sequential planning trial (experiment 2) in the minimum
number of moves
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3.3.3 Results
The number of trials completed ranged from 43 to 120 (Table 3.2). In 8.0% of all trials the
reward was unexpectedly retrieved and 2.0% of trials resulted in an unexpected trapping.
Most unexpected retrievals occurred when the start paddle was located directly above a
goal location and the subject rotated it very rapidly, causing the reward to fall between
the two paddles beneath and into the open goal location, rather than sliding down either
one of them and becoming trapped. The number of 1-, 2- and 3-step trials in which the
reward was correctly retrieved by each subject is shown in Table 3.2, together with the
total number of trials completed by each subject and their first trial performance for each
trial-type.
Table 3.2 – Results of experiment 1 (advance planning) and experiment 2 (sequential
planning). Number of trials correct and the number completed, and first trial performance
for each trial-type (1-step, 2-step, 3-step). C = correct first trial; I = incorrect first trial; - =
did not participate
In the majority of trials (84.9% for orangutans and 98.3% for bonobos) only the start
paddle was rotated. Based on a subject only rotating the start paddle in a trial, the
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probability of success in a 1-step trial was 0.5, because one of the two possible directions
in which the paddle could be rotated resulted in the reward ending up in the open goal,
whereas the other direction led to it becoming trapped). Only Amos (orangutan) performed
significantly better than expected by chance (based on a 0.5 probability of success) across
the 1-step trials he completed (Table 3.2; binomial test: 24/38 trials correct, p=0.03).
Even within the subset of 1-step trials in which the reward started on the bottom level,
again only Amos’ performance was above chance-level (binomial test: 16/20 trials correct,
p=0.01).
Most of the subjects did not solve any of the 2- or 3-step trials in which one or two
non-food paddles had to be pre-positioned before rotating the start paddle (Table 3.2).
Three orangutans (Amos, Sandy and Radja) did retrieve the reward in some 2-step trials
(see Table 3.2) and they did this by pre-positioning relevant non-food paddles in advance
of rotating the start paddle.
Start paddle rotations
Two orangutans and one bonobo exhibited a significant tendency to rotate the start
paddle to the right (binomial test: Anak: 82/110, p<0.001; Jewel: 50/80, p=0.034; Cheka:
62/91, p=0.001) and one bonobo tended to rotate the start paddle to the left (binomial
test: Kichele: 66/96, p<0.001). The remaining subjects did not exhibit a directional
preference.
Fig. 3.3 shows that four out of five orangutans but no bonobos rotated the start paddle
towards the open goal location significantly more often than expected by chance.
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Figure 3.3 – Percentage of start paddles rotated towards (as opposed to away from) the
goal location by each subject in experiment 1. Numbers at the base of bars indicate the
total number of trials that each subject participated in that were included in this analysis. *
indicates p<0.05 and *** indicates p<0.001 in a binomial test
In some trials the start paddle was located directly above the open goal location; hence
it could not be turned towards or away from the goal. Within this subset of trials, each
of the four orangutans that preferentially rotated the start paddle towards the open goal
location in the above analysis (Fig. 3.3) rotated the start paddle in a random direction
(binomial test: p>0.05 for all).
Non-food paddle rotations
All of the orangutan subjects and two out of four bonobos rotated at least one non-food
paddle during the experiment. The total frequency of non-food paddle rotations for all
trials ranged from zero (Cheka and Keke) to 43 (Anak). Fig. 3.4 shows that orangutans
rotated more non-food paddles (both relevant and irrelevant) than bonobos. Orangutans
did not however rotate significantly more relevant than irrelevant non-food paddles (Fig.
3.4; Mann-Whitney U Test: N1=48, N2=47, p=1.000).
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Figure 3.4 – Total number of relevant and irrelevant non-food paddles rotated by each
subject across all trials in experiment 1. Numbers above the bars indicate the number of the
trial in which rotation of a relevant or irrelevant non-food paddle first occurred
For subjects that rotated relevant non-food paddles, the first trial in which this occurred
ranged from trial 1 (Anak) to trial 87 (Kichele; see numbers above bars in Fig. 3.4). Of
the six subjects that rotated both relevant and irrelevant non-food paddles, four rotated a
relevant paddle in an earlier trial than they rotated an irrelevant paddle (Fig. 3.4).
All subjects that rotated non-food paddles rotated more that were located below the
starting level of the reward as opposed to on the same level or above. Overall, 75.3% of all
non-food paddles rotated were below the level of the start paddle.
3.3.4 Discussion
Subjects generally failed at this task, even in 1-step trials (Table 3.2). In 93.1% of trials
only the start paddle was rotated, so subjects rarely pre-positioned any non-food paddles,
which was necessary for success in the 2- and 3-step trials. Three orangutans succeeded in
some 2-step trials by pre-positioning relevant non-food paddles (Table 3.2). Although this
may give an impression of an ‘understanding’ of the task in these particular trials, overall
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there was no significant difference between the number of relevant and irrelevant paddles
rotated (Fig. 3.4), suggesting that subjects may simply have been rotating paddles at
random. The position of the non-food paddles they did rotate (most frequently on levels
below the start paddle) may however indicate that subjects were aware that paddles higher
up in the apparatus were less likely to influence the path of the reward because the reward
only ever moved down towards the bottom of the paddle-box. Bonobos very rarely rotated
any non-food paddles (Fig. 3.4). However, the observed difference in propensity to rotate
non-food paddles may reflect a difference in the two species’ exploratory tendencies and
temperament (Herrmann et al. 2011), or variation in testing conditions, rather than any
difference in cognitive ability.
Although subjects generally only rotated the start paddle, four out of five orangutans
(but no bonobos) did preferentially rotate the start paddle towards the open goal location
(Fig. 3.3). Furthermore, in trials where the start paddle was directly above the goal, these
same subjects turned the paddle in a random direction. While turning the start paddle
towards the open goal did not enable subjects to succeed in the task, it suggests that they
may at least have encoded information about the relevance of the open goal for retrieving
the reward, and turned the start paddle so that the reward moved towards it. Subjects
that did not preferentially rotate the start paddle towards the open goal may not have
encoded the relevance of the open goal location, despite the fact that it was visually and
haptically distinct from the blocked goal locations (see Figure 3.1b). It is also possible
that these subjects may have exhibited this behavior, had they been given a small amount
of pre-training so that they learned about how the reward moved depending on which
way the start paddle was rotated. However, as there was no evidence for improvement in
performance across sessions this is perhaps unlikely.
The failure in 2- and 3-step trials of subjects that apparently encoded the relevance of the
goal location could either have stemmed from a lack of understanding of how non-food
paddles affected the path of the reward, or their inability to inhibit the prepotent response
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to rotate the paddle with the food on (i.e. the start paddle). Reaching directly for a
desirable object is known to be a prepotent response, the prevention of which requires
the ability to reject some alternative (inappropriate) actions and favour others (Diamond
1990). The salience of the food reward on the start paddle may have meant that subjects
were unable to divert their attention to other relevant aspects of the apparatus (i.e. the
positions of the non-food paddles) (Vlamings et al. 2010). Food salience is known to affect
the performance of several primate species in reversed contingency tasks, where subjects
are presented with a choice between a small and a large quantity of food, but they receive
the opposite of what they select (Boysen and Berntson 1995). In the delay of gratification
test on the other hand, apes have accumulated food items for several minutes before taking
the rewards (e.g. Beran et al. 2012).
It is unclear what caused the subjects that seemingly encoded the relevance of the goal
location to fail at this task. Possibilities included: (1) an inability to plan an appropriate
sequence of actions, (2) an inhibitory control problem, and (3) a lack of understanding
of how diagonally positioned non-food paddles influence the path of the reward. In the
second experiment we eliminated the two latter possibilities to determine whether this
improved subjects’ ability to plan in the task.
3.4 Experiment 2: sequential planning task
3.4.1 Methods
Three bonobos (Cheka, Keke and Kichele) and seven orangutans (Jingga, Yuno, Amos,
Jewel, Tjintah, Sandy and Anak) participated in experiment 2 (Table 3.1). Jingga, Yuno
and Tjintah had not participated in experiment 1 and so had no previous experience with
the apparatus apart from the familiarisation phase. All seven orangutan subjects were
presented with four blocks of 12 trials (one block with the open goal in each of the four
possible locations); the number of trials completed by the bonobos varied between subjects
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(Cheka: 55, Keke: 60, Kichele: 37).
3.4.2 Paddle-box configurations
In this experiment, all of the paddles were set up in a flat orientation at the start of each
trial. The number of steps required to solve each trial was dictated by the level on which
the reward started. As in experiment 1, all trials could be solved in one, two or three
steps. The key difference here was that all trials could be solved by rotating the start
paddle first, and then by rotating paddles on which the food was subsequently located, so
subjects never had to pre-position non-food paddles. An example of how to retrieve the
reward in a 2-step sequential trial is shown in Fig. 3.2b. In this trial there was only one
correct route from the start paddle to the open goal location. However, in several of the 2-
and 3-step trials the reward could be retrieved by taking a number of different routes. As
in experiment 1 the start paddle and number of steps required to retrieve the reward (i.e.
the start level) were pseudorandomised within each block. The open goal location was
fixed within a block but changed between blocks.
3.4.3 Results
Overall performance ranged from 54.1% (Kichele) to 97.9% (Yuno) of trials correct (see
Table 3.2 for individual performance in different trial-types). However, because the
probability of success varied between different trial-types, it was not possible to conclude
whether or not individual subjects’ overall performances were better than expected by
chance. Therefore, five different trial-types were identified, the probability of success for
each was calculated, and each subject’s performance within each trial-type was assessed.
Performance in different trial-types
In all 1-step trials there was a 50% chance of success, based on the start paddle being
rotated immediately (as was the case in experiment 1). The 2-step trials could be classified
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as those for which there was only one solution (i.e. only one possible route from start
paddle to goal, as in Fig. 2b), and those for which there were two solutions (two viable
routes from start paddle to goal). Similarly, 3-step trials could be split into those with
only one solution, and those with three viable solutions.
It was possible to calculate the probability of retrieving the reward by chance in each
of these 2- and 3-step trial-types based on the premise that subjects always rotated the
paddle on which the food was located at any given point in a random direction. For
example, to solve the 2-step trial in Fig. 3.2b (where there is only one valid route to the
goal) the subject had to rotate the start paddle to the left (step 1 in Fig. 3.2b), then
rotate the bottom centre paddle to the left (step 2 in Fig. 3.2b). The probability of this
sequence occurring was 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25. Therefore, for this trial-type there was a 25%
chance of the reward being retrieved by chance. Having calculated probabilities of success
for the different trial-types (see Appendix B1 for additional details), it was possible to
examine subjects’ individual performances using binomial tests, the results of which are
shown in Fig. 3.5 (see Appendix B2 for individual binomial test results).
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Figure 3.5 – Percentage of trials correct for each subject (Ch=Cheka, Ke=Keke, Ki=Kichele,
Ji=Jingga, Yu=Yuno, Am=Amos, Tj=Tjintah, Je=Jewel, Sa=Sandy, An=Anak) within the
five different trial-types in experiment 2. Numbers at the base of bars indicate the total
number of trials of this type in which the subject participated. Dashed lines indicate the
percent chance of retrieving the reward if the start paddle and subsequent paddles on which
the food was located were rotated in a random direction: (a): 50%; (b): 50%; (c): 37.5%;
(d): 25%; (e): 12.5%. * indicates p<0.05 in a binomial test. Binomial tests were not run for
(b) because the maximum number of trials completed by a subject was 4, but the graph is
shown for completeness
Binomial tests were not used to assess performance in the 2 steps, 2 solutions trials (Fig.
3.5b), because the maximum number of trials of this type completed by a subject was
four.
One bonobo (Kichele) and one orangutan (Jingga) did not perform better than expected
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by chance in any of the trial-types (Fig. 3.5). Three orangutans (Yuno, Amos and Anak)
and two bonobos (Cheka and Keke) performed better than expected by chance in all of the
trial-types for which binomial tests were run (Fig. 3.5). The remaining three orangutans
all performed above chance-level in all but one trial type; Tjintah did not reach criterion
in the 2 steps, 1 solution trial-type (Fig. 3.5d) and Jewel and Sandy failed in the 3 steps,
3 solutions trial-type (Fig. 3.5c).
Jingga, who was unsuccessful across all trial-types, was the only subject to improve his
performance across testing blocks. In block 1 he retrieved the reward in 42% of trials,
compared with a 75% success rate in his last block (Friedman test: q21=4.0, p=0.046).
None of the subjects exhibited significant directional preferences when rotating the start
paddle (binomial tests: p>0.05 for all). This includes the three subjects that did exhibit
directional preferences in experiment 1.
Two out of three orangutans (Jingga and Yuno) subsequently succeeded in an additional
version of this task, in which the goal location was switched between trials within each
block, as opposed to only between blocks (Appendix B3). Unfortunately it was not possible
to test any additional subjects in this version of the task, due to safety concerns associated
with the proximity between the experimenter and subject that was necessary to switch
the goal location between trials.
Factors associated with success
To explore the factors related to success in experiment 2, we fitted a generalized linear
mixed model (GLMM) with binomial error distribution, using correct or incorrect sequence
of paddle rotations as a binary response. We began by entering all probable explanatory
terms and possible two-way interactions between them. The start-level of the reward,
the location of the open goal, species and sex were included as fixed factors, as well as
start-level x goal location as an interaction term. Subject was included as a random
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factor on the intercept, and trial number as a random effect on the slope (Crawley 2007).
Terms were sequentially dropped from the model until the minimal model contained only
terms whose elimination would significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model
(Thornton and Samson 2012).
The full model (AIC=491.3) showed that the start-level of the reward influenced the
likelihood of subjects performing a correct sequence of paddle rotations (and hence retriev-
ing the reward). Dropping the interaction term (start-level x goal location) significantly
reduced the explanatory power of the model (likelihood ratio test comparing the two
models: q26=21.86, p=0.0013) so this term was retained. Neither sex nor species sig-
nificantly affected success, so these terms were dropped from the model. Trial number
explained little variance in the model; indicating that the subjects did not improve over
the course of the experiment (Crawley 2007). The minimal model (AIC=488.7) did not
significantly differ from the full model in terms of explanatory power (q24=5.38, p=0.25).
Post-hoc Tukey tests were used to investigate pairwise comparisons between the different
start-levels. There was a significant difference in performance when the reward started on
level 1 compared with level 3 (Z=3 .217, p=0.004), but no difference between levels 1 and
2 or 2 and 3.
3.4.4 Discussion
Most subjects performed well in this task. Only one orangutan and one bonobo failed to
perform better than expected by chance across any trial-type (Fig. 3.5), but the orangutan
(Jingga) did improve significantly across testing blocks. These results suggest that in
this experiment, the majority of subjects encoded the relevance of the open goal location
and were able to plan an appropriate sequence of paddle rotations to retrieve the reward,
or learned to do so during the experiment. It is particularly noteworthy that Yuno and
Tjintah were successful given that they did not participate in experiment 1, implying that
previous experience with the apparatus was not required for success in this task.
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The GLMM results and Fig. 3.5 show that when the reward started on the top level
subjects were significantly less likely to retrieve the reward compared with when it started
on the bottom level. This is what would be expected if the number of steps that must be
considered increases cognitive demand, as was found to be the case in sequential tool use
experiments with New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides: Wimpenny et al. 2009)
and great apes (Martin-Ordas et al. 2012). Interestingly, more subjects performed better
than expected by chance in the 3 steps, 1 solution trials (12.5% chance of success) than in
the than 3 steps, 3 solutions trials (37.5% chance of success). In the 3 steps, 1 solution
trials, the goal had to be located prior to rotating the start paddle, because if the direction
of this first rotation was incorrect then the reward was subsequently impossible to retrieve.
However, because the goal was always in position A or D (see Fig. 3.1a) for these trials,
subjects could succeed by using the rule ‘rotate paddle with food on towards the open
goal’. Also, in the 3 steps, 3 solutions trials the paddles had to be rotated in different
directions, whereas in the 3 steps, 1 solution trials every paddle had to be rotated in the
same direction, which may have been less challenging from a motor control perspective.
3.5 General discussion
Using a new paradigm (the paddle-box) we were able to manipulate the demands involved
in a physical planning task in which subjects had to retrieve a food reward from an open
goal location. By designing an apparatus that is simple to operate, does not require
complex tool use and has an adjustable level of difficulty, we feel that we have gone some
way to developing a test of planning ability appropriate for a range of species.
What evidence for planning?
Overall, subjects failed in experiment 1 but succeeded in experiment 2, though there was
substantial inter-individual variation in performance in both experiments. Although both
experiments in this study required subjects to select between multiple possible sequences of
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actions, experiment 1 posed more complex information processing demands than experiment
2. As well as needing to encode information regarding how the diagonally positioned
non-food paddles would influence the path between the reward’s starting position and
the goal, in 2- and 3-step trials subjects had to inhibit the prepotent response to turn
the start paddle with the reward on immediately. In experiment 2 on the other hand,
trials could be solved by always turning the paddle with the reward on first, because all
of the paddles were in a flat orientation. This permitted the task to be solved in a more
step-by-step manner, because the position of the reward relative to the goal location could
be reassessed at each level.
The fact that subjects of both species could retrieve the reward when they were able to
plan in a step-by-step manner (experiment 2) suggests that they did encode relevant task
features such as the relevance of the open goal. The success of two orangutans (Yuno and
Tjintah) in experiment 2 without having participated in experiment 1 also demonstrated
that prior experience with the apparatus was not a prerequisite for success in this task;
rather experiment 2 was (as predicted) an easier task. Successful performance of most
subjects in experiment 2 is in keeping with the ‘one-element planning’ demonstrated by
chimpanzees during 2D maze navigation, where subjects made decisions at each choice
point on the basis of one property (e.g. Euclidean direction to the goal; Fragaszy et al.
2003). However, in the 2- and 3-step trials that only had one possible solution in experiment
2 of our study, the initial paddle rotation had to be in the correct direction, otherwise
the reward would have ended up in a location from which its retrieval was impossible.
Therefore, in these trials, subjects had to plan their first move based on where the goal
was located. Furthermore, in trials in experiment 2 where there were multiple possible
correct sequences of action, orangutans solved them in a flexible manner, utilising different
routes from a given start paddle to a goal, sometimes turning the start paddle away from
the Euclidean direction to the goal (Tecwyn, personal observation). This suggests that
they did not simply rely on a procedural rule based on turning paddles towards the goal.
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Orangutans and bonobos have previously exhibited planning skills in captive experiments.
Martin-Ordas et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that all four species of great ape are
able to use up to five tools in sequence to retrieve a reward. Both species have also
been found to be capable of saving tools for future use (Mulcahy and Call 2006a). The
results of experiment 2 in this study provide evidence of the ability of captive orangutans
and bonobos to plan an appropriate sequence of actions outside of a complex tool-using
context.
Interspecific differences in paddle-box performance?
Unfortunately it was not possible to draw direct comparisons between the performances of
the two species due to unavoidable methodological differences, particularly those concerning
whether the subjects were tested individually or in a group. Generally speaking, individuals
that are able to concentrate and are not distracted will perform better in cognitive tasks
(Herrmann and Call 2012), and attention is known to be important in planning tasks
(Parrila et al. 1996). While orangutans were tested individually (apart from those with
dependent infants or juveniles), bonobos were tested in their social groups. This may
have disrupted their attention, and prevented them from perceiving and encoding relevant
task features. Conspecifics could have attempted to steal the rewards, which may have
introduced a competitive element and encouraged impulsive behaviour, depending on
which other individuals were present (Stevens and Stephens 2002). There was also the
potential for subjects in the same subgroup (Keke, Banya and Kichele) to learn to solve
the tasks through observation, but we found no evidence for this.
However, some differences between orangutans and bonobos were apparent in experiment
1, which when taken together with the findings of other experimental work warrant further
investigation. Although neither species succeeded in experiment 1, four orangutans but
no bonobos preferentially rotated the start paddle towards the open goal location. It
is possible that individuals that preferentially rotated the start paddle towards the goal
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were able to inhibit rotating the start paddle until they had attended to the goal location.
There is some evidence to suggest that orangutans outperform other great ape species in
other physical problem-solving tasks requiring inhibitory control (Vlamings et al. 2010;
Albiach-Serrano et al. 2012), whereas other studies have reported an absence of interspecific
differences (Vlamings et al. 2006; Uher and Call 2008).
Inhibition of inappropriate actions may be important for efficient locomotion through the
forest canopy (an idea that is touched upon by Vlamings et al. 2010). A large bodied ape
moving through the discontinuous, compliant forest canopy is faced with a vast amount
of information to process, and must make correct decisions regarding which supports to
use and which to avoid, as a wrong choice could result in a fall, causing serious injury,
or even death (Thorpe et al. 2009). In this situation, the ability to attend to what lies
ahead and mentally ‘try out’ different actions prior to choosing which route to take would
be highly beneficial (Povinelli and Cant 1995; Barth et al. 2004). Others have related
apparent differences in inhibitory control skills in primates to differences in their social
systems. Specifically, good inhibitory skills have been linked to species with high levels of
fission-fusion dynamics (Amici et al. 2008), because of the need to assess a situation before
acting, and respond in a way that is appropriate based on the current composition of the
party (Aureli et al. 2008). While both orangutans and bonobos are considered to experience
high levels of fission-fusion dynamics (Amici et al. 2008), orangutans have a more extended,
less cohesive social system (Aureli et al. 2008). This means that intraspecific competition
for food, which may promote impulsive food-grabbing behavior, is relatively reduced in
orangutans (Shumaker et al. 2001).
Three orangutans but no bonobos solved some of the 2-step trials in experiment 1 by
pre-positioning relevant non-food paddles. Orangutans rotated more non-food paddles
than bonobos overall, but they were not necessarily relevant. It is possible that this finding
may be related to species differences in exploratory behavior and temperament (bonobos
have been shown to be shyer of novel things than orangutans; Herrmann et al. 2011),
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rather than a difference in cognitive ability.
Why did apes fail in the advance planning task?
Negative results in tests of cognitive ability are notoriously difficult to interpret, because
there could be several different causes of failure (Seed et al. 2012). Although experiment
2 removed inhibitory demands, it also eliminated the need to encode how diagonally
positioned non-food paddles influenced the path of the reward, so it is difficult to determine
the relative contributions of these factors to failure in experiment 1. One way to try and
illuminate causes of failure in tasks designed to investigate a particular cognitive ability
is to minimise peripheral demands that are simultaneously taxed during testing (Seed
et al. 2012). For example, in the case of inhibitory control, it has been demonstrated that
replacing food with tokens in the reversed contingency task enables subjects to inhibit
the strong behavioural predisposition to select the larger quantity (Boysen and Berntson
1995; Boysen et al. 1996; Kralik et al. 2002; Albiach-Serrano et al. 2007; Addessi and Rossi
2011).
Another way of potentially reducing the inhibitory demands of the task presented in
experiment 1 would be to enforce a delay between subjects seeing the paddle-box with the
reward present and allowing them to respond. Children are known to be more likely to
avoid making an inappropriate prepotent response when a delay as short as two seconds is
enforced by the experimenter in several different tests of inhibitory control, and it has been
proposed that this is because the delay permits time for passive fading of the prepotent
response, rather than allowing time for active computation (Simpson et al. 2012). It would
be interesting to see if young children, whose inhibitory control skills are known to show
marked improvement between the ages of 3 and 5 years (Carlson and Moses 2001) also
struggled with the advance planning task before this age, and whether taking measures to
reduce inhibitory demands (e.g. by replacing rewards with tokens or enforcing a delay)
might improve their performance.
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Having found that orangutans and bonobos fail to perform appropriate actions in advance
of acting on a food reward in the advance planning paddle-box task, of particular interest
is the affect that inhibition may have on performance. To investigate this further and
to better understand the cognitive demands of the paddle-box task, in the next chapter
(chapter 4) 4- to 10-year-old children are tested with the paddle-box and measures are
taken to reduce the inhibitory demands of the task. The development of performance in
both sequential planning and advance planning tasks is also examined.
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Chapter 4
DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING IN 4-
TO-10-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN: REDUCING
INHIBITORY DEMANDS DOES NOT IMPROVE
PERFORMANCE
This chapter, largely in its current form, is under review as:
Tecwyn, E.C., Thorpe, S.K.S., Chappell, J. (2013) Development of planning in 4- to
10-year-old children: reducing inhibitory demands does not improve performance. Journal
of Experimental Child Psychology
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Abstract
There are currently relatively few tasks suitable for testing planned problem-solving
in children. We presented 4- to 10-year-old children (n=172) with two planning tasks
(sequential planning and advance planning) using the paddle-box apparatus, which was
originally designed to investigate the planning skills of non-human apes. First, we were
interested in the development of children’s performance in the two tasks, and whether the
strategies children used to succeed differed between age groups. Performance improved
significantly across age groups in both tasks. Strategies for success in the advance planning
task differed among age groups, with 4- to 5-year-olds performing more excess actions,
and a greater proportion of irrelevant excess actions, than older children. Findings are
discussed in relation to the development of performance in tower tasks, which are a
commonly used test of planning ability in humans. Second, based on previous findings
with apes, we predicted that introducing measures to reduce the inhibitory demands of
the advance planning task would improve children’s performance. Therefore, in this study
we introduced two methodological alterations that have been shown to improve children’s
performance in other tasks with inhibitory demands: (1) imposing a short delay before a
child is allowed to act; and (2) replacing reward items with tokens. Surprisingly, neither of
these measures improved the performance of children in any of the age groups, suggesting
that contrary to our prediction, inhibitory control may not be a key performance-limiting
factor in the advance planning paddle-box task.
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4.1 Introduction
Planned behaviour involves considering different sequences of action alternatives and
choosing between them prior to acting (McCormack and Atance 2011). It is a complex
cognitive process, the development of which occurs in conjunction with and is supported by
various key executive function processes. Executive functions are a group of skills necessary
for the control of thought and action required for reasoning, planning and problem-solving
(Anderson 1998; Baughman and Cooper 2007). Key executive functions include inhibitory
control, working memory and task switching (Asato et al. 2006; Baughman and Cooper
2007; McCormack and Atance 2011). Given that there are currently few appropriate
tasks for investigating planned problem-solving in young children (McCormack and Atance
2011), this study used a novel paradigm originally designed for testing non-human apes
(hereafter apes) to present two planning tasks to children, and explored whether inhibitory
control might be a key performance-limiting factor.
Development of planned problem-solving
Tower tasks, such as the Tower of London (ToL; Shallice 1982), are the most commonly
used tests of planning ability in humans (McCormack and Atance 2011). In this task
participants are presented with two sets of three pegs (start and goal), each with three
different coloured discs arranged on each set. The aim of each trial is to rearrange the
discs on the start pegs so that they match the configuration of discs on the goal pegs.
Problem complexity can be manipulated by increasing the number of moves required to
solve the trial, as well as by altering structural features of the problem, such as the number
of intermediate moves a participant is required to make (Kaller et al. 2011). The planning
demands of the task stem from the need to anticipate the consequences of one’s next actions
(McCormack and Atance 2011). Efficient performance involves mental representation of
the path from the start- to the goal-state, followed by behavioural reproduction of the
action sequence (Albert and Steinberg 2011).
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Several studies have examined the development of ToL performance across different age
groups. Luciana and Nelson (1998) found that 4-year-old children performed poorly in
3-step ToL trials compared with 2-step trials. However, subsequent work by Kaller and
colleagues (2008; 2011) demonstrated the significant impact that structural details of
seemingly comparable ToL trials (rather than just the number of steps) can have on
performance. Kaller et al. (2008) demonstrated that while 4-year-olds were able to solve
3-step trials that did not require an intermediate move (i.e. placing a disc on to a non-goal
peg), they struggled when an intermediate move formed part of the solution, despite being
instructed to plan their moves before starting. Kaller and colleagues (2008) suggested that
the key difference between these two types of 3-step trial was that whereas trials without
intermediate moves could be solved using a step-by-step perceptually-guided strategy,
those requiring an intermediate more necessitated planning in terms of searching ahead,
to anticipate the consequences of at least the first two steps. The authors suggested
that development of performance may have been related to a switch in strategy, from
a perceptually-guided one to planning ahead (Kaller et al. 2008). Asato et al. (2006)
investigated the development of performance in 2- to 5-step ToL problems in 8- to 30-year-
olds. Age effects were only found for the more complex 4- and 5-step problems. As age
increased, the number of excess moves being made decreased (Asato et al. 2006). Finally,
in a study of 10- to 30-year-olds, Albert and Steinberg (2011) found that performance in
3-step ToL trials was not mature until 16- to 17-years of age.
Children under five years find it particularly difficult to follow task instructions in tower
tasks (Baughman and Cooper 2007) or to operate commonly used computerised interfaces,
such as those used for maze navigation planning tasks (Miyata et al. 2009). There is
therefore a need to develop tasks that could be used to test the planning abilities of young
children and infants. Furthermore there is a lack of tasks that could potentially be used
for cross-species comparisons, which is important if we want to understand something
about the evolution of multi-step problem-solving and begin to elucidate which, if any,
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underlying cognitive mechanisms humans share with other animals.
The paddle-box paradigm
Tecwyn et al. (2013) developed a novel paradigm (the paddle-box) to investigate the
planning abilities of apes. The paddle-box consists of a transparent Perspex box containing
eight rotatable paddles on three levels. At the bottom of the paddle-box are four possible
goal locations that can each be configured as either open or blocked. Captive orangutans
and bonobos were presented with two different tasks: sequential planning and advance
planning. In both tasks, the aim of each trial was to turn a number of paddles to move a
food reward from its starting position on one of the paddles inside the apparatus (the start
paddle) to the open goal at the bottom. The reward could be successfully retrieved in a
minimum of one, two or three paddle rotations (classified as 1-, 2- or 3-step trials). The
key difference between the tasks was that for 2- and 3-step trials in the sequential planning
task subjects could always rotate the start paddle immediately and still potentially succeed.
In the advance planning task on the other hand subjects had to pre-position one or two
other paddles before rotating the start paddle, because if the start paddle was rotated
immediately the reward would become trapped. Both ape species performed well in the
sequential planning task, but generally failed in the advance planning task, because they
did not pre-position the relevant paddles before turning the start paddle (Tecwyn et al.,
2013). The authors suggested that the apes’ poor performance in the advance planning
paddle-box task may have been due to their difficulty inhibiting the prepotent response to
turn the paddle with the highly salient food reward on immediately (and hence failing
to perform the appropriate response of pre-positioning the paddles necessary for success;
Tecwyn et al., 2013).
A role for inhibitory control in planning tasks?
It is often the case that a task designed to test for a particular cognitive ability (e.g.
planning) simultaneously taxes other mechanisms (Seed et al. 2012). Inhibitory control is
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one such mechanism and is the ability to stop an inappropriate prepotent response, or
to ignore irrelevant information (Simpson and Riggs 2007). An example of a prepotent
response is reaching directly for a desirable object (Diamond 1990). Responses may be
prepotent because they are biologically predisposed; they are afforded by particular objects;
they are habitual; or they are associated with desirable consequences (Simpson and Riggs
2007). Inhibitory abilities develop slowly and are not fully mature until early adulthood
(Diamond 2002).
There is evidence that inhibitory control affects performance in tower tasks. Although the
ToL does not establish a strong prepotent response that needs to be inhibited in terms of
a salient reward item (unlike in the paddle-box task), participants need to inhibit making
tempting ‘trap’ moves (e.g. placing a disc in its goal position when an intermediate move
is required), and delay immediate, impulsive responding in favour of planning (Albert and
Steinberg 2011). In Kaller et al.’s (2008) study, 4-year-old children’s difficulty in solving
3-step trials requiring an intermediate move may have been related to their inability to
inhibit making an impulsive but inappropriate first step of placing a disc onto its goal
peg. Asato et al. (2006) found that increased success in 4- and 5-step ToL trials was
significantly associated with fewer errors in an eye-movement test of response inhibition in
8- to 13-year-olds, and attributed this to the continuing development of voluntary cognitive
control into adolescence. In their study of ToL performance in 10- to 30-year-olds, Albert
and Steinberg (2011) found that impulse control was the best predictor of performance.
Reducing the inhibitory demands of tasks: delays and tokens
Certain methodological alterations have been shown to reduce the inhibitory demands
of tasks and hence improve performance. In this study we test the effectiveness of two
particular measures that it is possible to implement with the paddle-box apparatus:
imposing a short delay before permitting a child to respond, and replacing rewards with
symbolic tokens.
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A well-known test of inhibitory control is the ‘day-night’ task (Gerstadt et al. 1994), in
which children are required to say “day” to a picture of a moon, and “night” to a picture
of a sun. Three- to-4-year-old children perform poorly, because they struggle to inhibit
saying what the stimuli really represent (Gerstadt et al. 1994). Diamond et al. (2002)
found that implementing a delay before children were allowed to respond – during which
the experimenter sang a short rhyme– enabled 3- to 4-year-olds to succeed. ‘Go/no-go’
tasks (Livesey and Morgan 1991) have also been employed to investigate the development
of inhibitory control in children. In this paradigm children are presented with a series of
boxes and told that boxes with a particular cue on the lid contain a reward and should be
opened (‘go’ trials) whereas boxes with a different cue on the lid are empty and should be
left shut (‘no-go’ trials). While 3- to 4-year-old children succeed in opening boxes on go
trials, they also frequently incorrectly open boxes on no-go trials, even when instructions
are made explicit and there are negative consequences of doing so (Simpson and Riggs
2007). In a version of the go/no-go task, Simpson et al. (2012) found that introducing
a 2 second delay between presenting the box and placing the cue on the lid significantly
improved children’s performance in no-go trials. The authors argued that increasing the
time between presentation of the triggering stimulus (the box) and allowing a child to
respond permits passive dissipation of the prepotent response to open the box, enabling
formation of an appropriate response strategy (Simpson et al. 2012). Mitchell and Poston
(2001) compared the performance of two groups of adults in a set of 5- and 6-step ToL trials,
all of which required inhibition of one ‘tempting’ but inappropriate move. Participants
in the experimental group were told to stop and think about certain moves whereas
participants in the control group were not. Inducing this delay significantly improved
performance in terms of the number of trials completed in the minimum number of steps
(Mitchell and Poston 2001).
The ‘windows’ task (Russell et al. 1991) has similar behavioural inhibition demands to
the go/no-go task. Here, each child plays with an opponent and is presented with two
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boxes with transparent lids: one containing a visible reward and one that is empty. The
child is told to point to the box they want their opponent to get, and that they will get to
open the other box themselves. Three-year-old children typically and repeatedly fail this
task (they point at the box containing the reward and therefore lose it to their opponent),
whereas 4-year-olds succeed. Hala and Russell (2001) have suggested that 3-year-olds’
difficulty in this task is related to having to inhibit the prepotent response of pointing at
the desirable reward, while holding the rules of the task in mind. Apperly and Carroll
(2009) found that replacing the reward (stickers) in the windows task with any one of five
types of symbol (token), including equally desirable sweets, and a photograph of stickers,
significantly improved the performance of 3- to 4-year-olds. The authors concluded that
because the children’s decision-making is dominated by the desire to obtain the reward,
symbols enable them to avoid impulsive responding and think more flexibly, permitting an
alternative appropriate response to be formulated (Apperly and Carroll 2009).
The aims of this study were twofold. First, we wanted to examine whether the paddle-box
paradigm would detect age differences in performance in the sequential planning task
and/or advance planning task (in terms of both success and strategy used), and interpret
our findings in the context of the existing literature on the development of performance in
tower tasks, given that they are well-established tests of planning ability. If results are
comparable, then this would suggest that the paddle-box is an appropriate paradigm for
investigating the development of planning in children. We predicted that even the youngest
children (4- to 5-year-olds) would perform well in the sequential planning paddle-box
task, given that orangutans and bonobos were capable of success (Tecwyn et al., 2013)
and 4-year-olds succeed in simple 3-step ToL trials (Kaller et al. 2008). We expected
performance in the advance planning task (particularly in 2- and 3-step trials) to improve
with increasing age, but possibly not reach ceiling, given that planning ability continues
to develop into adolescence (Asato et al. 2006), and 3-step ToL performance may not be
mature until 16-17 years of age (Albert and Steinberg 2011).
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Second, we investigated whether inhibitory control was a key factor limiting 4- to 10-year-
old children’s performance in the advance planning paddle-box task, by introducing two
methodological alterations that have been shown to improve performance in other tasks
with inhibitory demands: implementing a short delay before children were allowed to
respond (delay condition), and replacing stickers with symbolic tokens (tokens condition).
We predicted that, if inhibitory control was key to successful performance in the advance
planning task (because the prepotent desire to rotate the start paddle immediately needs
to be inhibited), then more children would succeed in the delay and tokens conditions
(where inhibitory demands are reduced), compared with in a control condition. Specifically,
we proposed that fewer children should rotate the start paddle immediately and instead
succeed in prepositioning relevant paddles in the experimental conditions. We predicted
that the experimental conditions should have no effect on performance in the sequential
planning task, because in this task children could always rotate the start paddle straight
away and still potentially succeed.
4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1 Participants
The final sample consisted of 172 children: 60 4- to-5-year olds (30 boys and 30 girls, mean
age = 5 years 0 months [5;0], range = 4;6 - 5;6), 60 6- to-7-year-olds (31 boys and 29 girls,
mean age = 7;1, range = 6;7 - 7;6), and 52 9- to-10-year-olds (26 boys and 26 girls, mean
age = 10;0, range = 9;7 - 10;6) from three primary schools in the Birmingham, UK area.
4.2.2 Apparatus: the paddle-box
The paddle-box apparatus was used (Tecwyn et al., 2013), which was originally designed
to investigate the planning abilities of apes. For a full description of the apparatus see
chapter 3 of this thesis (section 3.2.2 and Fig. 3.1 on page 61). In the present study
stickers were used as rewards instead of food items.
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4.2.3 Procedure
Children were tested in a quiet area close to their classroom. The experiment was presented
as a game where stickers could be won. Children sat at a table with the paddle-box and
two experimenters. The main experimenter ran the experiment and coded the data and the
second experimenter assisted with configuring the apparatus between trials. Children were
alternately assigned to one of three conditions: control, delay or tokens. First, children
completed the warm-up exercise to ensure they were able to operate the simple paddle
mechanism and retrieve the item from an open goal. All children were then presented
with six trials of two different planning tasks: sequential planning and advance planning
(12 trials in total). The order in which the two tasks were presented to a child was
counterbalanced. Within each task, children were presented with the same set of six
trials in the same order. Each trial was a unique configuration of the apparatus, with the
minimum number of steps required to retrieve the item (1, 2 or 3), start level and position
of the goal location pseudorandomised, with the constraint that none of them was the
same for more than two consecutive trials. For each task there were two 1-step, two 2-step
and two 3-step trials.
Warm-up task
Children were presented with the apparatus with goals B and C open and A and D blocked
(Fig. 3.1a, page 61, chapter 3). They were then given one of two sets of instructions,
depending on which condition they were assigned to:
Control and delay conditions: “Every time you manage to get a sticker out of the
puzzle you can keep it, OK? You can touch anything on this side of the puzzle (experimenter
indicates front of the paddle-box ). Let’s have a practice first”
Tokens condition: “Every time you manage to get a sponge out of the puzzle you will win
a sticker, OK? You can touch anything on this side of the puzzle (experimenter indicates
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front of the paddle-box ). Let’s have a practice first”
The sticker/sponge was then placed on paddle 7 (bottom centre, see Fig. 3.1a) and the
child was asked to try and get it out of the apparatus. If the child failed to do this
spontaneously, they were given neutral prompts such as “can you think how you might be
able to get the sticker/sponge out?” If they still failed, it was demonstrated to them by
the experimenter, and the warm up task was repeated until they spontaneously retrieved
the sticker/sponge.
Testing phase
Subjects in all three conditions were given the following instructions: “OK, now that we’ve
had a practice we’re going to play the game lots more times so you can try to win some
more stickers! I’m going to ask you to cover your eyes and not look each time I set up a
new game so it’s a surprise - is that OK?”
The next set of instructions varied between conditions as follows:
Control condition: “When I tell you to open your eyes, you can try to get the sticker”
Delay condition: “When I tell you to open your eyes you can look at the puzzle, but
please wait until I say ‘go’ before you try to get the sticker” (experimenter implements a 2
second delay)
Tokens condition: “When I tell you to open your eyes, you can try to get the sponge”
Having configured the apparatus, the sticker/sponge was placed on the start paddle by
the experimenter. Stickers were oriented so that they were facing the child. If the sticker
was retrieved in the control/delay conditions the child peeled the sticker off the sponge
and kept it. If the sponge was retrieved in the tokens condition the child passed it to the
experimenter in exchange for a sticker. If the item became trapped at one of the blocked
94
Chapter 4: Paddle-box: development of planning in children
goal locations in any of the conditions it was removed from the back of the apparatus by
the experimenter and the child did not receive a sticker for that trial.
Sequential planning task
In the sequential planning task, all of the paddles were set up in a flat orientation at the
start of each trial. The number of steps required to solve each trial was dictated by the
level at which the reward started. All trials could be solved in a minimum of one, two
or three steps. All trials could be solved by rotating the start paddle first, and then by
rotating paddles on which the reward was subsequently located (see Fig. 3.2b on page 66
in chapter 3 for an example of how to solve a 2-step sequential planning trial).
Advance planning task
In each trial only the start paddle was positioned in a flat orientation. All of the other
paddles were positioned in one of two possible diagonal orientations. This meant that if the
start paddle was rotated first, the reward would slide down to the bottom of the apparatus
and end up at one of the blocked goal locations. Therefore, the key difference between
this and the sequential planning task was that here, in 2- and 3-step trials, children had
to pre-position one or two other paddles before rotating the start paddle (see Fig. 3.2a
on page 66 in chapter 3 of this thesis for an example of how to solve a 2-step advance
planning trial).
4.2.4 Data scoring and analysis
Data were scored live. For each trial, we recorded whether the reward/token was successfully
retrieved from the open goal or became trapped at one of the blocked goal locations. The
measure of overall performance was the number of correct trials out of six in each task.
To examine performance differences between trial-types (1-, 2- and 3-step) the dependent
measure was the percentage of children succeeding in at least one out of two trials of that
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type. To gain a better understanding of why children might be failing in the advance
planning task, the number of children that only rotated the start paddle in every one of
their trials was also recorded. Strategies used in the advance planning task were examined
by scoring the number of excess paddle rotations performed, together with whether each of
these paddle rotations was relevant or irrelevant for retrieving the sticker/token. Relevant
paddles were defined as those that could affect the path between the start paddle and the
open goal, whereas irrelevant paddles could not.
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics 21. Non-parametric tests were used and all
statistical tests were two-tailed. The significance level of alpha was 0.05.
4.3 Results
Two key questions were investigated. First, we were interested in whether the paddle-box
paradigm would detect age-related trends in performance in the sequential planning and/or
advance planning task. Specifically, we examined whether older children succeeded in
more trials than younger children in both tasks, and whether strategies used to succeed
in the advance planning task changed across age groups. Second, we examined whether
inhibitory control might be a key performance-limiting factor in the advance planning
task, by implementing two methodological alterations that have been demonstrated to
improve children’s performance in other tasks with inhibitory demands, and analysing
their effect on performance measures.
4.3.1 Age-related trends in performance
Number of trials correct
There was no difference in overall performance (number of trials correct) based on gender
in either of the tasks (Mann-Whitney U test: sequential planning task: U=3361.0, n=172,
p=0.287; advance planning task: U=3134.5, n=172, p=0.079), so data for both genders
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were combined for all subsequent analyses.
Within each age group, children succeeded in significantly more trials in the sequential
planning task than in the advance planning task (Table 4.1; Mann-Whitney U Test: 4- to
5-year-olds: U=577.0, n=120, p<0.001; 6- to 7-year-olds: U=1199.5, n=120, p=0.001; 9-
to 10-year-olds: U=767.0, n=104, p<0.001).
Table 4.1 – Performance by age group for the two tasks
4 - 5 years 6 - 7 years 9 - 10 years
Overall trials correct (12) 5.76 ± 0.29 7.57 ± 0.36 9.60 ± 0.24
Sequential planning
Trials correct (6) 3.85 ± 0.17 4.38 ± 0.21 5.37 ± 0.12
% >1 x 1-step 88.0 90.0 100.0
% >1 x 2-step 85.0 93.3 100.0
% >1 x 3-step 81.7 88.3 100.0
Advance planning
Trials correct (6) 1.92 ± 0.21 3.18 ± 0.26 4.23 ± 0.22
% >1 x 1-step 86.7 96.7 100.0
% >1 x 2-step 26.7 50.0 76.9
% >1 x 3-step 20.0 50.0 84.6
% start paddle only 65.0 43.3 13.5
Note: ‘% >1’ variables represent the percentage of children succeeding in at least one out of two
1-, 2- and 3-step trials. Numbers in brackets are the total number of trials presented. Values
given are percentages or means plus/minus one standard error
The order in which the two tasks were presented had a significant impact on performance
in the sequential planning task for all age groups, with children getting significantly more
trials correct when the sequential planning task was presented after the advance planning
task (Mann-Whitney U Test: 4- to 5-year-olds: U=614.5, n=60, p=0.012; 6- to 7-year-olds:
U=738.5, n=60, p<0.001; 9- to 10-year-olds: U=548.0, n=52, p<0.001). In the advance
planning task, performance was better when this task was presented second in 6- to
7-year-olds (U=265.5, n=60, p=0.005) and 9- to 10-year-olds (U=151.0, n=52, p<0.001)
but order of task presentation did not affect the performance of 4- to 5-year-olds in the
advance planning task (U=340.0, n=60, p=0.09).
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Sequential planning task: 1-, 2- and 3-step trials
Nine- to 10-year-olds were significantly more likely to succeed in at least one 1-step trial
than both 4- to 5-year-olds (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.014) and 6- to 7-year-olds (Fisher’s
exact test: p=0.029; Table 4.1). The performance of 4- to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds
did not differ. 9- to 10-year-olds were also more likely to succeed in 2-step trials than 4- to
5-year olds (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.03) but not 6- to 7-year-olds. The performance of 4-
to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds did not differ. In 3-step trials, 9- to 10-year-olds were
more successful than 4- to 5-year-olds (q21=10.57, n=112, p=0.011) and 6- to 7-year-olds
(q21=6.47, n=112, p=0.03). The performance of 4- to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds did
not differ.
Within each age group, there were no significant differences in success rate between trials
requiring a minimum of 1-, 2- or 3-steps (Table 4.1; p>0.05 for all).
Advance planning task: 1-, 2- and 3-step trials
Four- to 5-year-olds were significantly outperformed by 6- to 7-year-olds (q21=3.927, n=120,
p=0.048) and 9- to 10-year-olds (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.007) in 1-step trials (Table 4.1).
The performance of 6- to 7-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds did not differ. There were
significant differences between the performance of adjacent age groups in both 2- and
3-step trials, with 9- to 10-year-olds more likely to succeed than 6- to 7-year-olds (2-step:
q21=8.62, n=112, p=0.003; 3-step: q
2
1=14.89, n=112, p<0.001), and 6- to 7-year-olds
being significantly more successful that 4- to 5-year-olds (2 step: q21=11.08, n=120,
p=0.001; 3-step: q21=11.87, n=120, p=0.001; Table 4.1).
Within each age group, performance was significantly better in 1-step trials compared
with 2-step trials (4- to 5-year-olds: q21=43.982, p<0.001; 6- to 7-year-olds: q
2
1=33.41,
p<0.001; 9- to 10-year-olds: q21=13.57, p<0.001), and in 1-step trials compared with
3-step trials (4- to 5-year-olds: q21=53.57, p<0.001; 6- to 7-year-olds: q
2
1=33.41, p<0.001;
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9- to 10-year-olds: Fisher’s exact test, p=0.006; Table 4.1). There was no significant
difference in performance between the 2- and 3-step trials for any of the age groups (Chi
square tests, p>0.05 for all).
The overall percentage of children only rotating the start paddle in all advance planning
trials (i.e. never pre-positioning any paddles) differed significantly between age groups
(Table 4.1). 65.0% of 4- to 5-year-olds only ever turned the start paddle, compared with
43.3% of 6- to 7-year-olds (Chi square test: q21=5.67, n=120, p=0.017). There was also a
significant difference between the 6- to 7-year-olds (43.3%) and 9- to 10-year-olds (13.5%;
q21=11.96, n=112, p=0.001).
Strategies for success in the advance planning task
Age group had a significant effect on how many excess actions (paddle rotations) were per-
formed in successful 2- and 3-step advance planning trials (Kruskal-Wallis test: q22 =15.09,
n=252, p=0.001). Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that 4- to-5-year-olds were
significantly more likely to perform more excess actions in successful trials (4.24±0.49)
than 6- to-7-year-olds (2.14±0.20; U=1025.0, n=129, p=0.002) and 9- to-10-year-olds
(2.20±0.14; U=1167.0, n=152, p<0.001). The number of excess actions did not differ
between 6- to-7-year-olds and 9- to-10-year-olds (U=4441.0, n=219, p=0.303).
Of the excess actions performed by children in successful 2- and 3-step trials in the advance
planning task, the percentage that were relevant to solving the task differed as a function
of age group (Fig. 5.1).
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Figure 4.1 – Percentage of relevant and irrelevant excess actions in successful 2- and 3-step
advance planning trials as a function of age group. ** indicates p<0.01, *** indicates p<0.001
in a Chi square test
Only 42.9% of 4- to 5-year-olds’ excess paddle rotations were relevant to solving the trial,
compared with 71.8% for 6- to 7-year-olds (Chi square test: q21=37.77, n=450, p<0.001;
Fig. 5.1). There was also a significant difference between the percentage of relevant paddle
rotations made by 6- to 7-year-olds (71.8%) and 9- to 10-year-olds (83.3%; q21=9.98,
n=524, p=0.002; Fig. 5.1).
4.3.2 Is inhibitory control a key performance-limiting factor? Impact of
experimental conditions on performance
Experimental condition (control, delay, tokens) did not have a significant effect on the
number of trials correct in any of the age groups, in either the sequential planning task
(Fig. 4.2a; Kruskal-Wallis test: 4- to 5-year-olds: q22 =1.74, n=60, p=0.419; 6- to 7-year-
olds: q22 =2.81, n=60, p=0.245; 9- to 10-year-olds: q
2
2 =0.073, n=52, p=0.964) or the
advance planning task (Fig. 4.2b; Kruskal-Wallis test: 4- to 5-year-olds: q22 =1.05, n=60,
p=0.591; 6- to 7-year-olds: q22 =1.23, n=60, p=0.540; 9- to 10-year-olds: q
2
2 =0.17, n=52,
p=0.921).
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Figure 4.2 – Median number of trials correct for each age group as a function of experimental
condition (control, delay, tokens) in (a) the sequential planning task and (b) the advance
planning task. Error bars denote the inter-quartile range. NS indicates p>0.05 in a Kruskal-
Wallis test
The percentage of children only rotating the start paddle did not differ significantly between
conditions, within any of the age groups (Fig. 4.3; Chi square test: 4- to 5-year-olds:
q22 =0.44, n=60, p=0.803; 6- to 7-year-olds: q
2
2 =0.950, n=60, p=0.622; 9- to 10-year-olds:
q22 =0.152, n=52, p=0.927).
Figure 4.3 – Percentage of children in each age group only rotating the start paddle in all
six advance planning trials, as a function of experimental condition. NS indicates p>0.05 in
a Chi square test
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4.4 Discussion
Our primary aims were (1) to investigate the development of performance in the two
paddle-box tasks across the three age groups tested, and hence assess its suitability for
a test of planning in children given that few appropriate tasks currently exist; and (2)
to better characterize the cognitive demands of the paradigm by establishing whether
inhibitory control was a key factor limiting children’s performance in the advance planning
task.
Development of planned problem-solving: age-related trends in paddle-box
performance
Children in all age groups performed significantly better in the sequential planning task
than in the advance planning task. This is as expected, given the relative complexity of
the two tasks. This finding also reflects the results of a previous study with apes (Tecwyn
et al. 2013). The two tasks share some key demands, including the need to locate the item
to be retrieved (start paddle), locate the open goal, and work out an appropriate sequence
of paddle rotations to get the item from start paddle to the goal. There are however some
key differences. The sequential planning task is visuospatially simpler as all of the paddles
are flat, so the item can be controlled in a step-by-step manner. Therefore, it is possible
to use a perceptually-guided strategy (turn the paddle with the item on towards the open
goal) that incrementally moves the item towards the goal. This is true of 3-step ToL trials
without any intermediate moves, which 4- to 5-year-olds are able to solve (Kaller et al.
2008). In the advance planning task, relevant paddles need to be pre-positioned before the
start paddle is rotated, which requires the anticipation of one’s actions, and planning in
terms of searching ahead. This task can be likened to ToL trials with intermediate moves,
which 4- to 5-year-olds struggle to solve (Kaller et al. 2008).
In both tasks, the average number of trials correct increased across age groups. In the
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sequential planning task all age groups performed well in all trial types (1-, 2- and 3-step).
Even in the 3-step trials, 81.7% of 4- to 5-year-olds succeeded in at least one out of two
trials. Children within a given age group performed equally well across all trial-types; i.e.
there was no evidence that they found 3-step trials more difficult than 1-step trials in
the sequential planning task. This may be because it was possible to solve all of these
trials using a perceptually-guided strategy, which Kaller and colleagues (2008) suggested
4-year-olds were capable of using to solve ToL trials.
There was more variation in performance in the advance planning task across age groups,
particularly in the 2- and 3-step trials. Only 20.0% of children in the youngest age group
succeeded in at least one 3-step trial, compared with 84.6% of 9- to 10-year-olds. In both
2- and 3-step trials, success increased across the age groups. Unlike in the sequential
planning task there was also variation between different trial-types within each age group.
Specifically, for all age groups, performance was significantly worse in 2- and 3-step trials
compared with 1-step trials. This suggests that younger children found it difficult to look
ahead and realise that other paddles had to be rotated before turning the start paddle, as
is thought to be the case for ToL trials with intermediate moves (Kaller et al. 2008). To
gain a better understanding of why children were failing in the advance planning task, we
examined the number of participants that only rotated the start paddle in every one of their
trials (i.e. during the task they never rotated any paddles apart from the start paddle).
The percentage of children doing this decreased significantly with age, possibly due to
the ongoing development of voluntary cognitive control (Asato et al. 2006). Furthermore,
unlike older children, 4- to 5-year-olds performed badly in the advance planning task
regardless of the order in which the two tasks were presented. It is possible that the
youngest children had difficulty ‘thinking outside the box’ of the most obvious option
(i.e. turning the paddle with the item on) (Apperly and Carroll 2009), whereas the older
children were better able to overcome this having had some (albeit limited) experience
with the apparatus.
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Age-related trends in performance: strategies for success in the advance planning
task
Because the advance planning paddle-box task can be solved in a variety of ways, it
enables the examination of different strategies for success. Four- to 5-year-olds performed
significantly more excess paddle rotations when solving 2- and 3-step advance planning
trials than children in the two older age groups. Asato et al. (2006) similarly found that
excess moves decreased with increasing age in 4- and 5-step ToL trials. These findings
reflect the fact that children in the youngest age group frequently solved 2- and 3-step
advance planning trials by immediately setting up all of the paddles in a flat configuration,
and then retrieving the item in a step-by-step manner as in the sequential planning task
(Tecwyn, personal observation). Older children on the other hand were more likely to
pre-position paddles diagonally, and therefore take fewer moves to solve a trial. These
strategies clearly differ in the amount of planning required to achieve them, but are
nevertheless equally effective. Of the excess actions performed in successful trials, older
children were more likely to perform excess actions that were relevant to solving the task,
as opposed to moving irrelevant paddles (i.e. paddles that could not influence the path
between the item and the goal). This likely reflects older children’s better understanding of
the task, and greater efficiency in problem-solving, possibly afforded by greater allocation
of cognitive resources to planning, or a switch to a strategy of planning ahead rather than
one based on the use of perceptual cues (Kaller et al. 2008).
At present there is a lack of appropriate tasks for testing the planning skills of young
children and infants (McCormack and Atance 2011). The paddle-box provides a paradigm
that may be more suitable than the currently available alternatives. Because the paddle-
box was originally designed for use with apes, it has the benefit of not requiring the subject
to understand complex verbal instructions or adhere to specific rules, unlike in the ToL
where participants have to understand, for example, that they are only allowed to move
one disc at a time.
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Comparison with ape performance
Direct comparisons of the performance of different species using identical tasks are essential
if we are to understand what distinguishes one species from one another in terms of cognitive
abilities (Dunbar et al. 2005). It is possible to draw some comparisons between the findings
of the current study and Tecwyn et al.’s (2013) findings with apes using the paddle-box, but
caution is always required when making cross-species comparisons (Boesch 2007). There
are inevitably unavoidable differences in testing, including number of subjects, number
of trials, time frame of testing, testing environment, conspecific experimenter and verbal
instructions for children, morphological differences and reward type. However, designing
tasks like the paddle-box that are operated via simple motor actions (turning paddles)
and allow children and apes to interact with the apparatus in the same way (using their
morphologically similar hands) maximizes the validity of comparisons. Hopper et al. (2010)
increased the validity of child-ape comparisons in their study by presenting children with
the test apparatus inside a transparent box with access holes, thus mimicking the physical
barrier between apes and the apparatus that is formed by the mesh of their enclosure.
The apes in Tecwyn et al.’s (2013) study performed most comparably with the 4- to
5-year-old children in this study. Both groups succeeded in the sequential planning task,
regardless of the minimum number of steps required to retrieve the item. Apes and 4- to
5-year-olds struggled in the advance planning task, and in most trials only rotated the
start paddle (i.e. failed to pre-position any paddles). Also, unlike the two older age groups
of children, apes and 4- to 5-year-olds rotated a high proportion of irrelevant paddles.
Is inhibitory control a key performance-limiting factor? Impact of experimental
conditions on performance
Neither of the two methodological alterations that were introduced to reduce the inhibitory
demands of the advance planning task (imposing a short delay and replacing stickers
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with tokens) improved the performance of children in any of the age groups. Specifically,
the experimental conditions did not reduce the likelihood of children performing the
inappropriate response of always turning the start paddle immediately, which we suggested
was the prepotent response that needed to be inhibited to enable success in the advance
planning task (Tecwyn et al., 2013). This is surprising given that both of these measures
have been demonstrated to reduce the likelihood of inappropriate prepotent responses in
other tasks (Mitchell and Poston 2001; Apperly and Carroll 2009; Simpson et al. 2012).
Although the non-inhibitory demands of paddle-box are different from those of the go/no-
go task, windows task and ToL, the inhibitory demands of all four tasks stem from the
requirement for behavioural inhibition of a prepotent manual response, as opposed to
cognitive interference due to competing equivalent verbal responses, as is the case in the
day-night task.
It therefore seems that inhibition of prepotent responding was not sufficient to enable
success in the advance planning task. Albert and Steinberg (2011) found that prepotent
response inhibition was not a predictor of ToL performance in 10- to 30-year-olds. The
authors argued that as well as inhibiting immediate responding, participants also needed
to sustain this delay in order to engage in effortful planning, and the development of this
impulse control was reflected in the maturation of performance in complex ToL trials
(Albert and Steinberg; 2011). However, whereas the ToL does not prime a strong prepotent
response, the paddle-box does due to the salience of the desirable sticker. Therefore, the
inhibitory demands of the advance planning task in this study are arguably higher than
those in the ToL.
Other measures may have improved children’s performance, such as instructing them to
plan their actions before starting or telling them to retrieve the item in the fewest possible
moves (both of which improve ToL performance in adults: Phillips et al. 2001; Unterrainer
et al. 2003). It is however questionable whether the youngest children in this study would
have understood and followed such instructions, and we wanted to maintain potential for
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comparability with non-human studies, and therefore chose measures that could potentially
be implemented in studies with other species. Delays have been implemented in non-
human studies of problem-solving, for example by presenting the test apparatus behind
a transparent Perspex barrier so that all of the components were visible but could not
be manipulated, and then removing the barrier after the delay period (e.g. Miyata et al.
2011). Tokens have also successfully been used in place of rewards in several studies with
non-human primates (e.g. Evans et al. 2012).
Conclusions
This study has demonstrated that the paddle-box is an appropriate tool for investigating
the development of planning ability in children, thereby providing a paradigm that is
more suitable for comparative investigations of planned problem-solving skills in children
and non-human primates than the currently available alternatives. There were clear
developmental trends in performance, particularly in the advance planning task. Results
from the sequential planning task suggest that, in keeping with other studies (e.g. Kaller
et al. 2008; Miyata et al. 2009), the ability to plan a simple sequence of actions is present
in early childhood, particularly where it is possible to succeed using a perceptually-guided
strategy. The capacity to plan a sequence with intermediate actions that requires looking
ahead, as was required for success in the advance planning task, increases throughout
childhood and is not mature by 10 years of age. Contrary to our predictions, inhibition of
a prepotent response was not found to be a key performance-limiting factor for children in
the advance planning task, based on the methodological alterations that were implemented
in this study. It is possible that it is not inhibition in terms of simply avoiding an
inappropriate response that limits performance in the advance planning task, but young
children’s (and apes’) limitations in allocating sufficient cognitive resources to planning an
appropriate response (Asato et al. 2006), or difficulty ‘thinking outside the box’ of the
most obvious option.
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Given that ceiling performance was not observed in 9- to 10-year old children in the
advance planning task, the performance of adults is examined in the next chapter (chapter
5). Also of interest is whether adults, like apes and children, also perform excess paddle
rotations, and/or rotate paddles that are irrelevant to solving trials.
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HOW DO ADULT HUMANS PERFORM IN THE
ADVANCE PLANNING PADDLE-BOX TASK?
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Abstract
In the field of animal cognition, assumptions are frequently made regarding how adult
humans would perform in tasks designed for testing the cognitive skills of animals. In
this study adult humans (n=32) were tested in the advance planning paddle-box task,
which was originally developed to investigate the planning abilities of non-human apes.
Adults did not perform ‘perfectly’, with over a quarter of participants failing in at least
one trial. Most participants made several excess moves when solving trials and some even
moved parts of the apparatus that were irrelevant to solving the task. Irrelevant actions
were performed less frequently when participants were given 5 seconds to complete a trial,
compared with when their time was unrestricted. Verbal explanations by participants
suggested that they moved irrelevant parts of the apparatus to increase the ‘safety’ of the
task and ’make sure’ the item did not become trapped. Results are discussed in relation
to previous findings on the performance of apes and children in the advance planning
task. This study and the findings of others demonstrate that adults do not necessarily
perform as expected in physical cognition tasks. This highlights the importance of testing
adult in cognitive tasks designed for animals, to provide a context in which to interpret
the performance of animals and to avoid making assumptions about how humans would
perform.
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5.1 Introduction
Novel tasks are frequently developed to investigate the cognitive abilities of non-human
animals (hereafter animals). However, when testing animals and reporting results of their
performance, implicit assumptions are made regarding how adult humans would solve
the same problems (Silva et al. 2005). For example, it is frequently assumed that when
solving physical problems adults would make use of the causal knowledge that they are
known to possess (Silva et al. 2005), such as an understanding of gravity or connectedness,
rather than using arbitrary perceptual cues such as colour or continuity. In fact, we rarely
know how adults faced with problems designed to test animals would respond (Anderson
2001).
Using adult humans as test subjects enables us to examine decision-making in physical
problem-solving tasks, whilst being confident that behaviour is not being influenced by
factors that are known to influence the behaviour of animals, such as species-specific
predispositions, a lack of cognitive ability, or too great a cognitive load (though these
factors may indeed vary between human individuals; Silva and Silva 2010). It also helps
to provide a context in which to interpret the performance of animals in similar tasks
(Silva and Silva 2012). Furthermore, if and when humans do perform in an unexpected
way, we have a luxury that is not available to animal cognition researchers: we can ask
them to explain their actions rather than having to draw inferences from their behavioural
responses, which may assist with the interpretation of decision-making in non-verbal
animals (Silva et al. 2005; Silva and Silva 2010; 2012). It should however be noted that
there are issues with subjective reports about higher mental processes, such as the fact
that information may be missing or erroneous, and some authors have questioned the
validity of findings based on people’s post-hoc verbal explanations of their problem-solving
behaviour (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson 1977).
Several studies by Silva and colleagues (2005; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012) have aimed to
111
Chapter 5: Paddle-box: performance of adult humans
increase our knowledge of human adult performance in some of the key tasks designed to
test the physical cognition skills of animals; including the trap-tube, trap-table, string-
pulling and tool selection tasks. The trap-tube (Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994) is a
clear plastic tube with a trap at its centre. A reward is placed at one side of the trap,
and in order to retrieve it a stick tool must be inserted at the end of the tube farthest
away from the reward, to push it away from the trap and out of the opposite end of the
tube. If the tool is inserted at the end of the tube closest to the reward, the reward will be
pushed into the trap. Capuchins (Cebus apella) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have
struggled to solve this task, even across dozens of trials (Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994;
Limongelli et al. 1995; Povinelli 2000). In a ‘critical condition’ designed to investigate
what a chimpanzee that had previously succeeded in the original version of the trap tube
problem understood about the task, Reaux and Povinelli (2000) presented a version of
the trap-tube with the trap inverted, so that it was positioned at the top of the tube,
rendering it ineffective. When the previously successful chimpanzee continued to insert
the tool at the end of the tube farthest from the reward (in 39/40 trials), the authors
concluded that the subject lacked any causal understanding of the relation between the
tool, reward and trap; rather she was using a perceptual rule based on the position of the
trap (Reaux and Povinelli 2000). This interpretation is problematic, first because there
is no incentive for subjects to alter their behaviour just because the trap is ineffective
(Chappell 2006), and second because Reaux and Povinelli (2000) implicitly assumed that
humans would revert to random responding when presented with the same task. Silva
et al. (2005) investigated this, and found that in fact, contrary to the assumption of
random responding, in 52/60 trials adults exhibited the same bias as Reaux and Povinelli’s
(2000) chimpanzee: they inserted the tool at the end of the tube farthest from the reward,
despite the absence of an effective trap. Such findings with adults have helped to identify
conceptual problems in cognitive tasks (Silva et al. 2005), and the trap-tube paradigm has
been subsequently developed and refined in order to minimise the methodological concerns
previously associated with it (e.g. Mulcahy and Call 2006b; Seed et al. 2006; Tebbich
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et al. 2007; Seed et al. 2009b). This has enabled more valid conclusions regarding animals’
causal understanding to be drawn.
Another related test of physical cognition that has been frequently presented to animals is
the trap table (Povinelli and Reaux 2000). In this task there are two rakes, each with a
reward positioned in front of them (i.e. between the head of the rake and the test subject).
One of the rakes also has a functional trap in front of it, whereas the other rake has a
painted square, or non-functional ‘trap’ in front of it, which shares surface-level perceptual
features with the genuine trap. To solve this task the subject should pull the rake behind
the painted ‘trap’, and hence avoid the reward falling in to the functional trap. Overall,
Povinelli and Reaux’s (2000) chimpanzees did not exhibit a preference for pulling the
rake on the side of the painted ‘trap’. Comparable studies with capuchins and gibbons
(Bunopithecus hoolock) have produced similar findings, though some subjects may have
solved the problem through learning associative rules (Fujita et al. 2003; Cunningham
et al. 2006). In a study by Santos and colleagues (2006) tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) also
failed in the trap table task, however vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) successfully
avoided the functional trap at above chance level (65% of trials).
Silva and colleagues (2005) presented adults with a schematic version (a drawing, rather
than the actual apparatus) of the trap-table task. However, the configuration between the
rakes, rewards and traps was such that either rake could be selected and the reward would
not fall in the trap. Surprisingly, subjects exhibited a strong bias to select the rake on the
side of the painted ‘trap’. When questioned about their decision-making, they all indicated
that they felt the reward was less likely to be lost if they selected the rake on the side of
the painted ‘trap’ (Silva et al. 2005). Further investigation using a real version of the task
produced comparable results to the schematic version, and revealed that several variables
aside from the presence of a real trap controlled people’s behaviour; including the distance
between a trap and the reward and the distance over which the reward had to be raked to
be retrieved (Silva and Silva 2006). Therefore, as was the case with the inverted trap-tube,
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findings with adult humans suggest that an absence of random responding should not be
taken to indicate a lack of understanding of the causal features of the task.
Further studies have revealed that in string-pulling tasks, where physical connection
between the string and an object is key to success, humans can also be influenced by
amount of contact (Silva et al. 2008) and perceptual continuity (Taylor et al. 2012). In a
stick-tool selection task, humans consistently selected a tool that was longer than required
to retrieve an item from a tube (Silva and Silva 2010), whereas New Caledonian crows
(Corvus moneduloides) tended to select tools of a length that matched the distance over
which a reward had to be retrieved (Chappell and Kacelnik 2002).
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that human adult performance in a variety
of physical cognition tasks cannot be assumed, and that relatively small methodological
and procedural alterations in task presentation may significantly alter behaviour, which
has important implications for the study of physical cognition in other animals (Silva and
Silva 2010).
Tecwyn et al. (2013) developed a novel paradigm (the paddle-box) to investigate the
planning abilities of non-human apes (hereafter apes) in a physical problem-solving context.
The paddle-box consists of a transparent Perspex box containing eight rotatable paddles
on three levels. At the bottom of the paddle-box are four possible goal locations that can
each be configured as either open or blocked. The aim of each trial is to turn a number
of paddles to move a food reward from its starting position on one of the paddles inside
the apparatus (the start paddle) to the open goal at the bottom. The reward can be
successfully retrieved in a minimum of one, two or three paddle rotations (classified as
1-, 2- or 3-step trials). In the advance planning task subjects have to pre-position one or
two other paddles before rotating the start paddle. Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and
bonobos (Pan paniscus) performed poorly in this task, because they failed to pre-position
relevant paddles before turning the start paddle (Tecwyn et al. 2013). Four- to five-year-old
114
Chapter 5: Paddle-box: performance of adult humans
children also struggled to solve the task, and ceiling performance was not observed in 9-
to 10-year-olds (Tecwyn et al. under review).
Having tested apes with the paddle-box (Tecwyn et al. 2013), and given the often surprising
performance of adults in other tests of cognitive ability designed for testing animals, the
main aim of this study was to investigate the performance of adults in the advance
planning paddle-box task. We were particularly interested, given previous findings with
apes (Tecwyn et al. 2013) and 4- to 10-year-old children (Tecwyn et al. under review)
in whether adults would solve trials in the minimum number of steps or whether they
would perform excess paddle rotations. We were also interested in whether adults, like
apes and children, would rotate paddles that were irrelevant to solving trials. Finally, we
investigated whether constraining the time people had to complete the task might result in
performance differences, compared with people who had unrestricted time to complete the
task. For example, it is possible that when put under time pressure people might spend less
time preparing and act more impulsively, potentially making more errors and exhibiting
behaviours that caused apes and some children to fail in the task. Alternatively, limiting
time for preparation may cause adults to solve the task more efficiently (i.e. perform fewer
actions) than when time is unconstrained.
5.2 Materials and Methods
5.2.1 Participants
A total of 32 unpaid participants (20 female, 12 male) with ages ranging from 18 to 41
years (mean: 21 years and 9 months) took part in this study.
5.2.2 Materials
The paddle-box apparatus was used, which was originally developed to investigate the
planning abilities of apes (Tecwyn et al. 2013). For a full description of the apparatus see
115
Chapter 5: Paddle-box: performance of adult humans
chapter 3 of this thesis (section 3.2.2 and Fig. 3.1 on page 61). The item to be retrieved
from the apparatus was a cube-shaped piece of sponge measuring approximatley 2 cm x 2
cm x 2 cm.
5.2.3 Procedure
Each participant was tested individually and pseudorandomly assigned to one of two
conditions: control (n=16) or 5-second (n=16), with the constraint that males and females
were equally distributed between the two conditions.
The same twelve advance planning trials were presented to each participant in the same
order, with each trial requiring a minimum of between one and three steps (paddle
rotations) to retrieve the item. Each trial was a unique configuration of the apparatus,
with the minimum number of steps, start level and goal location pseudorandomised, with
the constraint that none of them was the same for more than two consecutive trials. For
a full description of the advance planning task see chapter 3 of this thesis (section 3.3.2,
page 66). There were four 1-step, four 2-step and four 3-step trials. All 12 trials could be
solved in a minimum of 24 steps in total.
All participants were shown the paddle-box apparatus and given minimal task instructions;
specifically they were not informed of the minimum number of moves in which the item could
be retrieved; nor were they instructed to plan their actions prior to starting. Participants
were instructed to close their eyes between each trial so that they did not see the next
trial being set up. They were then given the following instructions, depending on the
experimental condition to which they were assigned:
Control condition: “Your task is to retrieve the item from the paddle-box. You may
begin when I tell you to open your eyes”
5-second condition: “Your task is to retrieve the item from the paddle-box. You will
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have five seconds from when I tell you to open your eyes”
Pilot work established that it was possible to complete a trial in 5 seconds, but this
duration was sufficiently short to put participants under some time pressure. Participants
in the 5-second condition had a large timer displayed next to them, which was started by
the experimenter when they were told to open their eyes.
5.2.4 Data scoring and analysis
Trials were video recorded for later analysis. For each trial we recorded whether the item
was successfully retrieved from the open goal or became trapped at one of the blocked goal
locations. The total number of paddle rotations performed was also recorded, together
with whether each of these paddle rotations was relevant or irrelevant for retrieving the
item. Relevant paddle rotations were defined as those that could affect the path between
the start paddle and the open goal, whereas irrelevant paddles could not. Preparation
time was recorded using a stopwatch, defined as the time between the participant opening
their eyes and performing their first paddle rotation.
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics 21. Preparation time data were log-
transformed to enable parametric statistics to be used. When it was not possible to use
parametric statistics because transformation did not result in normally distributed data,
non-parametric tests were used. All statistical tests were two-tailed. The significance level
of alpha was 0.05.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Overall performance
The item became trapped in a total of 11/384 trials. These were all 2- or 3-step trials,
and the item became trapped because participants failed to preposition all of the relevant
paddles before turning the start paddle. Eight subjects (25.0%; two male, six female)
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failed to retrieve the item from the goal location in one trial and one subject (female) lost
the item in three trials. Of the 11 trials in which the item became trapped, eight were
lost by participants in the 5-second condition and three in the control condition. Two
participants (both female) retrieved items in some trials (one and three, respectively) by
turning the start paddle and then quickly positioning relevant paddles once the item was
already moving.
5.3.2 Excess paddle rotations
Only 18.8% of subjects completed all of the trials in the minimum number of steps (24), by
prepositioning relevant paddles diagonally and not making any additional paddle rotations.
Two subjects performed 21 excess paddle rotations each. The number of paddle-box trials
completed in the minimum number of steps did not differ significantly between the control
and 5-second conditions (Chi square test: q21=0.227, n=378, p=0.634) and neither did
the total number of excess paddle rotations (Mann-Whitney U test: U =17585.5, n=378,
p>0.645).
The majority (76.9%) of excess paddle rotations were relevant to solving the trial; however
six subjects (18.8%) rotated multiple paddles that were irrelevant to solving the trial
(i.e. paddles that could not influence the path between the item and the goal). When
questioned about these irrelevant excess actions after completing all the trials, participants
consistently responded that they ‘wanted to make sure they [the irrelevant paddles] were
out of the way’.
Although the total number of excess paddle rotations was similar in the control and
5-second conditions (Fig. 5.1), the ratio of relevant to irrelevant excess paddle rotations
differed significantly between conditions (Chi square test: q21=5.535, n=143, p=0.019).
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Figure 5.1 – Total number of excess paddle rotations made by all participants in the control
and 5-second conditions in the paddle-box task, and the proportion of those paddle rotations
that were relevant and irrelevant to retrieving the item
In the control condition 31.1% of excess paddle rotations were irrelevant, compared with
14.5% in the 5-second condition (Fig. 5.1).
5.3.3 Euclidean direction to goal
One of the trials (trial 4) could be solved in a single step, but doing so required rotating
the start paddle away from the Euclidean direction to the goal location (Fig. 5.2a).
Figure 5.2 – (a) Schematic example of an advance planning paddle-box trial in which the
item can be retrieved in 1 step by turning the start paddle away from the Euclidean direction
to goal, and (b) a comparison of the performance of 4- to 10-year-old children (Tecwyn et
al., unpublished data) and adults in this type of trial
Although all 32 adult participants successfully retrieved the item in this trial, only 11 of
119
Chapter 5: Paddle-box: performance of adult humans
them (four male, seven female) retrieved the item in a single paddle rotation (Fig. 5.2b).
In contrast, although only 60.0% of 4- to 5-year-olds succeeded in a comparable trial, the
majority of those children (80.6%) did so in one step (Fig. 5.2b). Approximately half
of 6- to 7- and 9- to 10-year-olds that succeeded did so in a single paddle rotation (Fig.
5.2b). One out of five orangutans and two out of three bonobos that completed a trial
comparable to trial four is this study retrieved the reward item in a single step (Tecwyn et
al., unpublished data). All other ape subjects lost the reward because they turned the
start paddle towards the goal location, which resulted in it becoming trapped.
5.3.4 Preparation time
Log preparation time for each trial was entered into an ANOVA with condition, gender
and minimum number of steps (1-step, 2-step or 3-step) as between-trial factors. All
three factors had a significant effect on trial preparation time (condition: F (1,368)=108.452,
p<0.001; gender: F (1,368)=21.942, p<0.001; minimum number of steps: F (2,368)=6.470,
p=0.002). There were no significant interactions between any of the factors.
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that average trial preparation time was significantly shorter in
the 5-second condition compared with the control condition (Fig. 5.3a) and males had a
significantly shorter average trial preparation time than females (Fig. 5.3b).
Figure 5.3 – Factors influencing average (mean ± 1 S.E.) trial preparation time: (a)
condition; (b) gender; *** indicates p<0.001 in a post-hoc t-test
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Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that average trial preparation time
was significantly shorter in 2-step trials compared with 3-step trials (Fig. 5.4d). There
was no significant difference in preparation time between 1- and 3-step trials (p=1.000)
or 1- and 2-step trials (p=0.053), though preparation times tended to be longer in 1-step
trials compared with 2-step trials (Fig. 5.4d).
Figure 5.4 – Influence of the minimum number of steps required to solve a trial on average
preparation time in (a) 4- to 5-year-olds; (b) 6- to 7-year-olds; (c) 9- to 10-year-olds (Tecwyn
et al., unpublished data); and (d) adults. * indicates p<0.05, *** indicates p<0.001 in a
post-hoc t-test with Bonferroni correction
Analysis of variance also revealed a significant main effect of minimum number of steps
on average log preparation time for children within each of three age groups tested in
the advance planning task (Tecwyn et al., unpublished data). Post hoc t-tests with a
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Bonferroni correction revealed that for 4- to 5-year-olds there was a significant difference
in preparation time between 1- and 3-step trials only (p=0.002; Fig. 5.4a). For the 6- to
7-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds there was a significant difference in preparation time
between 1- and 3-step trials (p<0.001 for both) and 2-step and 3-step trials (p=0.014 and
p=0.046, respectively; Fig. 5.4b and 5.4c).
5.4 Discussion
This study examined the performance of adult humans in the advance planning paddle-box
task. The results demonstrate that adults don’t perform ‘perfectly’, or necessarily as
expected, which is in keeping with findings from other studies in which adults have been
tested with cognitive tasks originally designed for investigating the abilities of animals
(Silva et al. 2005; 2008; Silva and Silva 2006; 2010; 2012; Taylor et al. 2012). This study
also showed that in the paddle-box task, adults sometimes perform irrelevant actions, as
do apes and children. Also, rather than causing adults to make more errors, constraining
the time available to them to complete the task increased their problem-solving efficiency
in terms of reducing the number of irrelevant paddles that they rotated.
Although adult humans were predictably more successful than apes in the advance planning
paddle-box task, over a quarter of participants failed to retrieve the item from the open
goal location in at least one of their 12 trials because they did not preposition all of the
relevant paddles before turning the start paddle, suggesting that the task is non-trivial
for adults. Eight out of 11 items were lost in the 5-second condition, but the sample was
too small to establish whether the experimental condition influenced the likelihood of this
occurring. Two subjects retrieved the item in some trials by positioning paddles after they
had turned the start paddle, demonstrating that it is possible to succeed in the advance
planning task without making a complete plan and executing the planned action sequence
before turning the start paddle.
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The majority of participants performed some excess paddle rotations that were not
necessary for retrieving the item. This mainly occurred when participants solved 2- and
3-step trials by setting up the paddles involved in the path between the item and goal in a
flat configuration, rather than prepositioning them diagonally. They then moved the item
down through the levels in a step-by-step manner, thereby rotating each of the relevant
paddles twice instead of the minimum of once. Despite being less efficient in terms of
number of actions, such a strategy enables greater control over the item, and therefore may
potentially be perceived as ‘safer’. Some 4- to 10-year-old children also used this strategy,
but only when they had previously solved a task in which all of the paddles started in a
flat configuration (sequential planning task; Tecwyn et al. under review).
Perhaps surprisingly, despite average preparation time being significantly shorter in the
5-second condition compared with the control condition, the total number of excess paddle
rotations, and the number of trials solved in the minimum number of moves did not differ
between conditions. Phillips et al. (2001) also found no difference in the number of excess
moves or trials solved in the minimum number of moves in the Tower of London (ToL) task
when people were either instructed to fully pre-plan their response, or given only 5 seconds
to plan. The authors suggested that people may in fact carry out online planning from
scratch during execution of the task, regardless of how long they have spent pre-planning
(Phillips et al. 2001). However, as online planning is difficult in the advance planning
paddle-box task, given that once the start paddle has been rotated it is not easy to change
the path of the item, it seems more likely that in the present study a lack of difference in
these performance measures between conditions is due to all of the trials being fairly easy
for adults.
When the apes in Tecwyn et al.’s (2013) study rotated paddles that were irrelevant to
solving a trial, it was interpreted as a probable lack of knowledge of the way in which
the paddles could influence the path of the reward. However, in this study six adults
also rotated a number of irrelevant paddles, and this occurred significantly less often in
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the 5-second condition than in the control condition. Taken together with their verbal
explanations of wanting to make sure those paddles were ‘out of the way’ it seems that,
given unlimited time to solve a problem, some adults may be cautious in their approach,
performing additional actions to increase ‘safety’ and the perceived likelihood of success.
However, when time is limited, less time is allocated to preparation, so they are less
cautious and more efficient in their physical problem-solving.
Adults’ behaviour in trial four of this study is of interest, particularly when considered
together with the behaviour of children and apes in a comparable trial, as it reveals
differences in problem-solving strategy. The majority (21/32) of adults chose to make
excess moves in trial four, which enabled them to turn the start paddle towards the goal,
rather than make a single move that required turning away from the goal. This suggests
that most participants were strongly influenced by the Euclidean direction to the goal,
which may again be related to what they perceived to be the ‘safer’ strategy. Children
who succeeded in this type of trial were more likely to do so in a single step (Tecwyn et al.
unpublished data), possibly because they behaved less cautiously than adults. Euclidean
direction to goal has been shown to influence the decision making of capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella) in 2D maze navigation, with subjects particularly likely to make errors when
the correct route required moving away from the Euclidean direction to the goal (Fragaszy
et al. 2003; 2009). Orangutans in Tecwyn et al.’s (2013) study also preferentially rotated
the start paddle towards the goal location in the advance planning paddle-box task. In the
present study, seven females and four males solved the trial in a single step (by turning
the start paddle away from the Euclidean direction to goal). It would be interesting to
see if a larger sample size would reveal a gender difference in how this trial was solved by
adults, given that males are, for example, more likely to use Euclidean strategies when
giving directions, whereas females are more likely to use landmarks (Dabbs et al. 1998).
Males had significantly shorter preparation times than females, though this should be
interpreted with caution due to the small sample size. Speculatively, this could be related
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to gender differences in visuospatial abilities (e.g. Vecchi and Girelli 1998). Males may find
it easier to visualise the path from the item to the goal, and hence require less preparation
time than females. Alternatively, it may be that spending longer on preparation before
tacking a problem may be a choice reflecting personality characteristics such as impulsivity
(Phillips et al. 2001).
Interestingly, adult preparation time did not relate to the minimum number of steps
required to solve a trial in the way we might have expected. When 4- to 10-year-old
children were tested in a comparable set of advance planning trials, average preparation
time increased in a step-wise manner with increasing minimum steps; that is average
preparation time was significantly longer in 3-step trials compared with 1-step trials within
each age group tested (Tecwyn et al., unpublished data). This is in keeping with findings
from ToL studies where preparation time increases with increasing minimum number of
moves (Luciana et al. 2009; Albert and Steinberg 2011). However, for the adults tested
in this study preparation time was longer in 3-step trials than 2-step trials, but 1-step
trials had a significantly longer average preparation time than 2-step trials, and did not
differ from 3-step trials. This may reflect the fact that all of the trials presented in this
study were relatively straightforward for adults, as indicated by their shorter preparation
times compared with children. Also, unlike in ToL where all 1-step trials are equally
simple, 1-step advance planning paddle-box trials vary in their complexity. In their most
simple form the item to be retrieved starts on the bottom level of the paddle-box, and the
participant simply has to turn the paddle towards the goal directly beneath. However,
the item could also start on the top level, so that the item and goal are separated by a
greater distance than in the former example, and retrieving the item might require the
paddle to be turned away from the Euclidean direction to goal (as in trial four). It is
reasonable to expect that the latter trial type might require more consideration, and hence
longer preparation time, than the former type. This likely resulted in an increased average
preparation time for adults in 1-step trials overall.
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This study and the findings of others show that adult humans often do not perform as
we might expect in ‘simple’ tasks designed to probe various cognitive abilities of animals.
In the advance planning paddle-box task adult humans, like apes, sometimes failed to
retrieve the item; performed excess actions, some of which were irrelevant to solving the
task (particularly when time was unrestricted); and seemed to be influenced by Euclidean
direction to goal. Therefore, when developing novel tests of cognitive skills, animal
cognition researchers should strive to test adult humans in as comparable a way as possible,
to provide a context in which to interpret their findings with animals and to avoid making
assumptions about how humans would perform.
Having developed a task appropriate for comparative investigation of planned problem-
solving (chapters 3, 4 and 5), attention is next turned to another aspect of physical
problem-solving that may be particularly relevant to great apes: understanding of object
compliance. In chapter 6 orangutans are presented with a puzzle-tube containing vertical
barriers that impede the retrieval of a food reward, to investigate whether they use barrier
thickness as a visual cue to predict their compliant properties.
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Abstract
Moving around on compliant arboreal supports is a key challenge faced by wild orangutans.
How do they achieve safe and efficient locomotion, particularly during gap crossing? For
natural materials such as branches, diameter is a predictor of compliance. The aim of
this study was to investigate whether captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) use thickness
as a visual predictor of the compliant properties of barriers in a problem-solving context.
Three orangutans were presented with the task of retrieving a reward from the centre of
a transparent tube. The tube contained two vertical barriers of equal length that had
different compliant properties. The barriers partially obstructed the passage of the reward,
because the gap beneath each of them was too small for the reward to pass underneath. In
each trial, only one of the two barriers was sufficiently compliant to afford passage of the
reward underneath it. Three different conditions were presented. In the first condition the
barriers were designed to reflect the natural relationship between thickness and compliance;
i.e. the thinner barrier was the compliant one. In two further conditions, thickness was
decoupled from compliance, so that it could no longer be used as an accurate predictor.
Based on the initial direction that subjects chose to move the reward in, there was minimal
evidence that orangutans used thickness to predict compliance in this context. One subject
frequently explored the barriers haptically, and the information she extracted guided her
behaviour. The possibility remains that wild orangutans use diameter as a predictor of
arboreal support compliance during locomotion. More ethologically valid experimental
paradigms may be more likely to reveal such abilities, should they exist.
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6.1 Introduction
Knowledge of the functional properties of objects is key to many animals’ success in
the physical world. Of interest from a cognitive perspective is how individuals extract
relevant information and select appropriate objects when faced with challenges such as
extractive foraging, nest building, or arboreal locomotion. Some relationships between the
perceptual and functional properties of objects are directly and accurately perceivable
based on visual characteristics. Consider for example a stick tool: the stick’s length
directly relates to whether or not it can be used to obtain an out-of-reach food item, and
its diameter determines whether or not it can be inserted into a hole of a given size. There
is considerable experimental evidence demonstrating that non-human animals (hereafter
animals) are able to select appropriate tools based on directly perceivable properties,
including length (Chappell and Kacelnik 2002; Mulcahy et al. 2005; Sabbatini et al. 2012),
diameter (Chappell and Kacelnik 2004) and shape (Bird and Emery 2009).
Other relationships between an object’s visual appearance and its properties are more
complex, as its affordances (action possibilities; Gibson 1977) are based on invisible
structural features, or features that only become apparent once some action is taken, rather
than perceptually-based exemplars (Penn and Povinelli 2007). Weight and compliance (i.e.,
flexibility) are examples of such properties, as they both depend on an object’s material.
For example, two stones of the same size would have different weights if one stone was
sandstone and another was granite. Similarly, a living branch and a dead branch of the
same length and thickness would have different compliant properties. What mechanisms
could be involved in obtaining information about the invisible properties of objects? Do
individuals use visual cues to predict an object’s invisible functional properties? Are they
able to learn about features of objects that are not directly perceivable? Or do they need
to experience these properties directly via exploratory manipulation?
Vonk and Povinelli (2006) argue that non-human primates are unable to recruit unob-
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servable forces or entities to explain or predict the behaviour of objects. However, some
behaviour observed in the wild is indicative of knowledge of unobservable object properties
and how they relate to task demands. Chimpanzees select appropriate stones for to use
for nut-cracking according to the properties of different nuts (Boesch and Boesch 1983)
and use ‘tool-sets’ comprising sticks with different compliant properties (e.g. rigid sticks
for digging and compliant sticks for fishing) for extractive foraging of honey (Brewer and
McGrew 1990) and termites (Sanz et al. 2004). In a year-long field study of bearded
capuchins (Cebus libidinosus), resistance of the food item a subject was attempting to
crack open was found to predict the weight of the hammer stone used (Spagnoletti et al.
2011).
It is not only in the context of tool use that apparent knowledge of invisible object
properties is found. Living wooden branches and trunks are the most common natural
compliant substrates, and they are most frequently encountered by habitually arboreal
animals (Channon et al. 2011).The great apes are an arboreal clade and the challenges they
face in the physical world are exacerbated by their large body size (Byrne 1997). Being a
large bodied animal living in highly compliant, fragile arboreal habitat poses challenges
related to safe and effective locomotion and foraging that are not faced by smaller-bodied
animals (Cant 1992). An ability to predict the compliant properties of arboreal supports
would be highly advantageous given the potentially high cost of trial-and-error learning,
and the fact that it is not always possible to directly explore a support’s properties (e.g. if
it is located on the far side of a gap to be crossed). A recent study by van Casteren et al.
(2012) suggested that wild Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) selected nest building
materials on the basis of their compliant properties. They used more rigid branches for
the structural parts of the nest and more compliant branches for the lining, and seemed to
select them on the basis of their diameter (van Casteren et al. 2012). It is also known that
support diameter is associated with locomotor mode in wild Sumatran orangutans (Thorpe
and Crompton 2005), and it has been suggested that the greatest challenge faced by the
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last common ancestor of the great apes was safe, efficient locomotion in a fragile, compliant
arboreal environment (Povinelli and Cant 1995). Orangutans are able to successfully
navigate gaps in the canopy during arboreal locomotion. Gaps to be crossed may appear
to be a given size based on current visual information alone, e.g. the distance between two
horizontal supports (‘visual gap’, Figure 6.1a). However, the size of a gap may change
dynamically as a result of the compliant properties of the supports and the actions and
weight of the animal (e.g. a support might deform downwards creating a larger ‘functional
gap’, Figure 6.1b).
Figure 6.1 – Schematic diagram of a large-bodied arboreal animal approaching a gap
between adjacent supports that appears to be of a given size (a: the visual gap); but changes
size as a result of support deformation to produce a larger functional gap (b); a product of
the animal’s mass and the support’s compliant properties
In the wild branch diameter is a reliable and easily observable indicator of its compliance
(van Casteren et al. 2012, 2013). It therefore seems feasible that orangutans (as the only
extant great ape to remain exclusively in the terminal branch niche) might use the diameter
of supports as a predictor of their compliant properties during arboreal locomotion, and
potentially be able to infer something about how these properties relate to the size of a
functional gap to be crossed in the forest canopy.
Although observational evidence for animals selecting objects with appropriate invisible
properties is strong, there is a need for controlled experiments to probe the underlying
mechanisms involved in such behaviour. Several studies have investigated captive animals’
understanding of the compliant properties of tools, with mixed findings. In the flimsy
tool problem (Povinelli et al. 2000), subjects must select between two rakes for pulling
in an out of reach reward: one with a rigid head and one with a compliant head. Only
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the rake with the rigid head can be used to retrieve the reward. Despite direct experience
of the tool materials, and demonstration of their properties by the experimenter, six
out of seven chimpanzees failed to select the rigid tool for raking more than would be
expected by chance (Povinelli et al. 2000). When Kacelnik and colleagues (2006) replicated
Povinelli et al.’s (2000) experiment with a captive New Caledonian crow, they found that
the subject chose the functional tool with rigid head in 100% of initial trials, but her
performance rapidly declined over the course of each testing session (Kacelnik et al. 2006).
In contrast, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus
aethiops) reliably selected a functional rigid tool rather than a nonfunctional flimsy tool
across 24 trials (Santos et al. 2006). More recently, chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus),
orangutans and capuchins (Cebus apella) have all demonstrated the ability to select a tool
with appropriate compliant properties for retrieving a reward, from a set of two or three
tools (Walkup et al. 2010; Manrique et al. 2010, 2011). They were able to do so whether
they experienced the tools’ properties themselves, or had the properties demonstrated to
them by the experimenter. Subjects were sensitive to the task demands as they were able
to select a compliant tool rather than a rigid tool when required, and they were also able
to ignore irrelevant perceptual features such as colour (Manrique et al. 2010, 2011).
The aforementioned studies have indeed shed some light on animals’ understanding of the
compliant properties of tools. Findings suggest that at least some subjects are able to select
tools with appropriate compliant properties to meet different task demands. However, none
of these studies addressed whether subjects might use visual cues to predict compliance.
An elegant study by Visalberghi and colleagues (2009) examined wild capuchins’ (Cebus
libidinosus) use of size as a visual cue for predicting the weight of stones to be used for
nut cracking. Eight capuchins were initially presented with a small versus a large stone
of the same material, and they reliably touched the large stone first (and subsequently
transported it and used it to crack open a nut; Visalberghi et al. 2009). In order to
probe this selection process further, Visalberghi and colleagues (2009) also presented the
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capuchins with novel artificial stones, the invisible functional properties of which had been
manipulated so that they could not be accurately judged based on their visual appearance.
For example, in a ‘conflicting size and weight’ condition, subjects were presented with
a large light stone, a small light stone and a small heavy stone. In a further condition,
stones of the same size that had different weights were presented. The aim of artificially
confounding object properties is to violate the expectations of the test subject, prompting
a re-initiation of exploration in order to resolve the discrepancy experienced (Chappell
et al. 2012). In all of the artificial stone conditions where visual cues could not be used
to accurately predict weight, the capuchins touched the heavier functional stone first less
often than in the natural condition. However, they were successful in transporting and
using the functional stones because they used exploratory behaviours such as lifting and
tapping, from which they could extract relevant information regarding the stones’ weight
(Visalberghi et al. 2009).
Exploratory behaviour may be particularly important when an object’s properties cannot
be perceived via vision alone. It is known that humans spontaneously carry out specific
exploratory procedures that optimise the uptake of desired information about an object;
for example, haptic exploration in the form of application of force by pressing or bending
an object is commonly used to extract information about its compliance or hardness
(Lederman and Klatzky 1987). Children have been shown to explore object compliance in
the context of selecting an appropriate tool for a task (Klatzky et al. 2005) and judging
whether a handrail was sufficiently rigid to facilitate crossing a narrow bridge (Berger et al.
2005).
To our knowledge, no study has experimentally tested whether great apes use diameter
as a visual cue to predict compliance. As the only great ape to remain in the terminal
branch niche, orangutans might be expected to have continued to face strong selection
pressures for behaviour that enables safe, efficient arboreal locomotion, compared with the
other extant great apes. Therefore, the aims of this study were to investigate the following
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questions:
1. Do captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) use thickness of a vertical barrier to predict
its compliant properties, and to infer how this will affect the size of a functional gap?
2. Do captive orangutans use appropriate exploratory procedures to extract information
regarding the barriers’ compliant properties?
6.2 Materials and methods
6.2.1 Subjects and housing
Three orangutans housed at Apenheul Primate Park, Netherlands participated in this
study (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 – Study subjects: sex, age in years and whether they were born in captivity (C)
or in the wild (W)
Subject Sex Age Birthplace
Amos M 9 C
Sandy F 27 C
Silvia F 44 W
6.2.2 Apparatus
The apparatus was attached to the outside of the enclosure and consisted of a transparent
Perspex puzzle-tube (75 cm x 12 cm x 10 cm) with open ends (the same tube as used in
chapter 2 but with the gap and trap elements and end pieces removed so that the base
of the tube was continuous). Vertical barriers that varied in thickness and compliance
could be inserted into the top of the puzzle-tube. Thick barriers were approximately
three times wider than thin barriers. Compliant barriers were made out of rubber and
non-compliant barriers were made out of metal or plastic. All barriers had a similar black,
matte appearance. In each trial the reward (a walnut) started in the centre of the tube
and there was a single vertical barrier at each side of the tube (see Fig. 6.2).
134
Chapter 6: Puzzle-tube with compliant barriers: orangutans
Figure 6.2 – Schematic diagram of test apparatus showing the three different compliant
conditions that were presented to subjects. In each trial the reward (grey circle) started in
the centre of the tube and there was a single vertical barrier at each end of the tube. In each
condition (a-c) black represents the non-compliant barrier and grey represents the compliant
barrier (N.B. the barriers used in the apparatus all had a black, matte appearance)
Subjects manipulated the reward through a series of finger holes in the tube. They could
also explore the barriers directly through these holes. The vertical barriers were sufficiently
long that the ‘visual gap’ between the bottom of both barriers and the base of the tube
was too small for the reward to pass through (1.5 cm). Therefore, in order to access the
reward via either end of the tube (which were both open) the subject had to displace a
barrier sufficiently to create a larger ‘functional gap’ (see Fig. 6.3a).
Figure 6.3 – Schematic diagram of a compliant barrier being displaced (a), creating a
‘functional gap’ large enough for the reward to pass through; and a non-compliant barrier,
the affordances of which do not permit passage of the reward (b). Dashed arrows represent
the direction in which the reward is being pushed by the subject
In each trial the compliant properties of the two barriers meant that only one of them
afforded passage of the reward (see Fig. 6.3), so the reward could only be accessed via
one end of the tube (i.e. the side with the compliant barrier). Three different compliant
conditions were presented (see Fig. 6.2). In corresponding condition (Fig. 6.2a), subjects
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were presented with barriers designed to reflect natural compliant properties, i.e. the
thinner barrier was more compliant than the thicker barrier. In the next two conditions
subjects were presented with pairs of barriers where compliance did not predict thickness,
i.e. the functional properties were decoupled from the visual cue of thickness. In the
conflicting condition (Fig. 6.2b), thickness and compliance were confounded so that the
thicker barrier was more compliant than the thinner barrier. In the same thickness/different
compliance (S/D) condition (Fig. 6.2c), the two barriers were the same thickness, but one
was compliant and one rigid.
If subjects used thickness as a visual cue for assessing a barrier’s compliant properties
then the following performance outcomes would be predicted for the three conditions:
1. Corresponding: subjects should move the reward in the direction of the thin
barrier (correct) more often than expected by chance
2. Conflicting: subjects should again move the reward in the direction of the thin
barrier (incorrect) more often than expected by chance
3. Same thickness/different compliance (S/D): subjects should perform at chance-
level, as barrier thickness cannot be used as a cue
If haptic exploration plays an important role in extracting information regarding ob-
jects’ unobservable properties, subjects might be expected to use appropriate exploratory
procedures (e.g. pushing against the barriers) to determine which barrier is compliant.
6.2.3 Testing procedure
Subjects were tested in separation rooms (10-15 m2) where they were held on a regular
basis for feeding and cleaning purposes. Each condition was presented a total of twenty
times, in two blocks of ten trials. Orientation of the compliant barrier (and hence the end
from which the reward could be retrieved) was pseudorandomised within each block, with
the constraint that the compliant barrier could not appear at the same side of the tube
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for more than two consecutive trials. The corresponding condition was presented first,
followed by two blocks of each of the other two conditions in a random order. Subjects
received no more than one session per day and were tested in isolation except for one
adult female (Sandy) who was accompanied by two dependent juveniles. Subjects were
not food deprived before the trials, water was available ad libitum and they could choose
to stop participating at any time. One subject (Silvia) became inattentive during a testing
session and refused to return to the apparatus for the next trial despite encouragement.
The session was therefore terminated and completed two days later. Otherwise, subjects
remained motivated to obtain the rewards (walnuts) throughout the study.
6.2.4 Data scoring and analysis
All trials were videotaped. For each trial the following data were scored:
1. whether the initial choice of direction (defined as the direction in which the
subject first moved the reward, even if this was subsequently switched) was:
a) correct (towards the compliant barrier) or incorrect (towards the rigid barrier)
b) to the left or right
2. latency (s) to reward retrieval, defined as the time from a subject’s initial contact
with the reward to the time when the reward passed under the compliant barrier
3. the number of deliberate switches of the reward’s direction of movement
made by a subject. A deliberate switch was defined as a subject actively changing
the direction of the reward’s movement, by pushing it from the opposite side to that
used previously. If a reward rebounded backwards from a barrier due to the force
applied to it by a subject in a forwards direction this did not count as a deliberate
switch of direction
4. latency (s) to an initial deliberate switch of direction, defined as the time
between a subject first contacting one barrier with the reward and the subject making
a deliberate change of direction, as defined above
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5. occurrences of haptic exploration of barriers, defined as any direct physical
contact with a barrier, excluding pushing the reward against it
Two-tailed binomial tests were used to assess whether individual subjects’ initial choice of
direction across the 20 trials for each condition differed from what would be expected by
chance (50% correct) and whether they showed any directional biases. Latency data were
log-transformed to allow parametric statistical analysis. Where transformation did not
result in data appropriate for parametric analyses, nonparametric statistical tests were
used. General linear models (GLMs) were used to investigate which factors influenced
latency to reward retrieval and latency to an initial switch of direction. Condition, block
and whether the initial choice of direction was correct or incorrect were included as fixed
factors, and subject was included as a random factor. Where significant effects were
found and there were more than two levels within a factor, a series of post-hoc pairwise
Tukey tests were performed to find the source and direction of the significance. Alpha was
set at 0.05. Due to the infrequency of exploratory behaviour, these data are described
qualitatively. Data were analysed using PASW Statistics 18 (IBM SPSS Inc. 2009).
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Initial choice of direction
Table 6.2 shows the number of trials in which subjects chose the correct initial direction
(i.e. towards the compliant barrier) for the three different compliant conditions (n=20 for
each).
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Table 6.2 – Number of trials out of 20 in which the correct initial direction was chosen by
each subject in the three different compliant conditions. * indicates p<0.05 in a binomial
test. Italic values in brackets indicate the number of correct trials (out of 10) in block 1 and
block 2, respectively.
Subject
Compliant condition
Corresponding Conflicting Same/different
Amos 9 (4,5 ) 7 (3,4 ) 10 (5,5 )
Sandy 7 (2,5 ) 5* (3,2 ) 9 (3,6 )
Silvia 9 (4,5 ) 13 (7,6 ) 7 (4,3 )
Sandy’s performance differed significantly from what would be expected by chance in the
conflicting condition (binomial test: 5 out of 20 trials correct; p=0.041; see Table 6.2).
No other performances of any of the subjects in any of the compliant conditions differed
significantly from 50% of trials correct (p>0.05 for all).
Across the whole experiment (60 trials) Sandy exhibited a preference to initially move
the reward to the left and Silvia tended to move it to the right (binomial test: p<0.001
and p=0.007 respectively). Amos did not exhibit a directional bias in his initial choice of
direction (binomial test: p=0.245).
6.3.2 Latency to reward retrieval
Five trials were excluded from the retrieval latency analyses, either because the reward
broke part way through the trial (after the initial choice of direction was recorded) and
could therefore fit beneath either barrier, or because the subject left the apparatus. Latency
to retrieve the reward ranged from 2 to 181 seconds. Condition significantly affected how
long it took to retrieve the reward (GLM: F (2,163)= 3.86; p=0.02). Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference between time taken to retrieve
the reward in the corresponding condition compared with the same/different condition
(p=0.007), but not between any of the other conditions (p>0.05 for all). Whether the
initial direction in which the reward was moved was correct or incorrect had a significant
effect on latency to reward retrieval (F (1,163) = 38.17; p<0.001; Fig. 6.4).
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Figure 6.4 – Mean±SE latency to retrieve the reward from the tube in the different
compliant conditions, depending on whether the initial choice of direction in which to move
the reward was correct or incorrect.
There was also a significant effect of block on latency to reward retrieval (F (1,163)=9.24;
p=0.003), with latency being longer in the first block compared to the second block (Fig.
6.5a). There were no significant interactions between fixed factors.
Figure 6.5 – Change across testing blocks for each compliant condition in (a) latency to
retrieve the reward (mean ± 1 S.E.); and (b) the total number of deliberate directional
switches of the reward. S/D = same thickness/different compliance condition
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6.3.3 Directional switches
Directional switches occurred in 64.4% of all trials. In the 102 trials in which the incorrect
initial direction was chosen, a directional switch was necessary to retrieve the reward
(i.e. to move the reward towards and under the correct, compliant barrier). In 79.8% of
these trials, only the single required switch was made. When the correct initial direction
was chosen and the compliant barrier that could be displaced sufficiently was contacted,
subjects did still sometimes subsequently switch direction and move the reward towards
the incorrect barrier (in 19 out of 78 trials).
There was a pattern of fewer directional switches in the second block compared with
the first block across all conditions, though this was never significant (Mann-Whitney U
tests: p>0.05 for all). In both blocks, the most switches occurred in the corresponding
condition, followed by the conflicting condition, with the fewest switches occurring in the
same thickness/different compliance condition.
6.3.4 Latency to initial switch of direction
The time taken for subjects to deliberately switch the direction of the reward’s movement
inside the tube following its first contact with one of the barriers ranged from 2 to 47
seconds. Testing block had a significant effect on the latency to the first deliberate switch
of direction (GLM: F (1,104)= 6.51; p=0.01), with more rapid switching occurring in block
2 (Fig. 6.6).
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Figure 6.6 – Change across testing blocks in the latency (mean ± 1 S.E.) from the first
contact with a barrier to a deliberate switch of reward movement direction
There was no effect of compliant condition or whether the initial choice of direction was
correct or incorrect on latency to the first deliberate switch of direction, and there were no
significant interactions between any of the factors (p>0.05 for all).
6.3.5 Exploration of barriers
Only one subject (Silvia) regularly explored the barriers haptically, by pushing against
them with a single finger. She exhibited this behaviour a total of 32 times, including
in her first trial. Twenty-eight of her barrier explorations (87.5%) were of the incorrect
(non-compliant) barrier. She explored barriers most frequently (13 times) in the Conflicting
condition and all of these explorations involved the incorrect barrier. On five occasions,
Silvia was moving the reward towards the incorrect barrier, but before the reward contacted
the barrier she explored it with her finger, and subsequently changed the direction in which
she was moving the reward. Amos haptically explored a barrier (the correct, compliant
one) once, in his second to last trial, before the reward was inserted into the apparatus.
He subsequently moved the reward in the direction of this barrier.
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6.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate whether captive orangutans used thickness as a
visual cue to predict the compliant properties of barriers impeding the passage of a food
reward, and whether they might explore barriers haptically to extract relevant information
about their affordances. To do this we presented orangutans with the task of retrieving a
reward from a tube containing two vertical barriers that impeded its passage. Subjects
did not appear to base their initial choice of direction in which to move a reward on the
thickness of the barriers. This suggests that they were not using thickness as a perceptual
cue to infer the barriers’ compliant properties. Our predictions about which of the two
barriers subjects should move the reward towards if solely using thickness as a predictor of
compliance were not met, except for in the same thickness/different compliance condition,
where random responding was predicted. In fact, subjects’ performances did not differ
from chance-level (50% of trials correct) across any of the conditions, except for Sandy’s
performance in the conflicting condition. She only chose the correct initial direction
(towards the thicker, compliant barrier) in five out of twenty trials across the two blocks
of ten trials, which differed significantly from what would be expected by chance. It is
possible that Sandy was using barrier thickness as a visual predictor of compliance, perhaps
having learned to associate the thinner barrier with successful reward retrieval in the
corresponding condition that was presented first. She may have subsequently transferred
this learned rule (‘the reward can be accessed via the thinner barrier’) to the conflicting
condition, where it was no longer appropriate. This seems unlikely however, as she did
not perform very well in the corresponding condition (2/10 and 5/10 trials correct in
blocks 1 and 2 respectively). Sandy and Silvia showed significant left and right directional
preferences respectively over the 60 trials, which may have contributed to their overall
chance-level performances.
It is possible that the subjects may have become proficient at using thickness as a cue for
predicting compliance in the task if they had been presented with further blocks of trials
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and their performance had been allowed to reach asymptote. This was found to be true of
capuchins’ navigation of 2D mazes in a study by Pan et al. (2011). However, this was not
the aim of the current study; of interest here was whether subjects would use thickness
as a visual cue for predicting compliant properties from the outset of the problem, not
whether they could learn to do so over time by association.
Although it has previously been argued that latency may not be an appropriate measure
when comparing performance between different species (chapter 2), it may be informative
when trying to understand the decision making processes of individuals of the same
species when presented with different experimental conditions. On average it took subjects
significantly longer to retrieve the reward in the corresponding condition compared with the
same thickness/different compliance condition, but it seems likely that this was related to
the fact that subjects generally became faster with increasing experience of the apparatus,
as indicated by shorter latency to reward retrieval in block 2 compared to block 1 for all
conditions. Across all conditions, latency to retrieve the reward was significantly longer
when the initial direction of reward movement was incorrect. This seems obvious, but it
is worth noting because taking longer to obtain the reward might be considered to be a
cost to subjects. Evans et al. (2012) suggested that the 1-2 seconds taken to exchange a
token for food may have been long enough to hinder the performance of captive capuchins
(Cebus apella) in a delayed gratification task. In this study however, increased latency
seemingly did not provide enough of an incentive to choose the correct direction in the
first place, as although latency to retrieve the reward was shorter in block 2 compared
with block 1 across all compliant conditions, this did not coincide with an improvement in
performance in terms of correct initial choice of direction.
The fact that subjects always obtained the reward eventually, and did so with little penalty
or additional effort following an initial error (other than it taking longer to retrieve the
reward) perhaps meant that there was little incentive to choose correctly at the beginning
of a trial (Call and Carpenter 2001). Kacelnik et al. (2006) suggested that the declining
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performance of a New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides) across consecutive testing
sessions of the ‘flimsy tool’ problem may have been because she could choose again without
penalty following an error. Alternatively, the subject may have had an inclination to
explore the alternative option (Kacelnik et al. 2006). It is also possible that interacting
with the apparatus may have been rewarding in itself, as has been suggested to be true
for keas (Nestor notabilis ; Miyata et al. 2011), chimpanzees (Clark and Smith 2013), and
young children (Ellis and Siegler 1997).
Incentive and motivation could go some way to explaining capuchins’ use of size to predict
weight in Visalberghi et al.’s (2009) study. Transporting stones and nut-cracking is
energetically expensive and time consuming (Massaro et al. 2012) compared with having
to pull an alternative rake (‘flimsy tool’ problem; Povinelli et al. 2000), or roll a reward
back in the opposite direction (this study). Visalberghi et al.’s (2009) study on the
other hand provided subjects with a real incentive to make a correct decision regarding
which stone to select in the first place. The same might be said about toddlers exploring
the handrails in the study by Berger et al. (2005); the experiment exploited a real-life
scenario, and there was likely a real perceived cost of falling if the handrail’s properties did
not provide sufficient support (though the experimenter obviously ensured the subjects’
safety). Therefore, future studies should use paradigms that increase the incentive to
choose correctly in the first place.
Fewer deliberate switches were made between barriers in block 2 compared with block 1,
across all conditions. The latency to the first deliberate switch from one barrier to the
other was also shorter in the second block. Switching is a form of error correction that
may reflect a subject’s decision-making process (Visalberghi et al. 2009). Although it can
be difficult to determine if and/or when an animal is collecting perceptual information
(Chappell et al. 2012), these findings suggest that subjects rapidly became more adept at
interpreting the haptic feedback they received when they encountered a barrier with the
reward, and how this related to whether or not it could be bypassed. For example, when
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subjects pushed the reward against a non-compliant barrier, the feedback they received
suggested that the barrier’s affordances would not permit the creation of a functional gap
that would enable the reward to bypass it, causing them to change the direction in which
they moved the reward.
When Visalberghi et al. (2009) artificially manipulated the properties of stones so that
smaller stones were heavier than larger stones, they found that the capuchins consistently
selected heavier functional stones for nut-cracking. They did so by using appropriate
exploratory behaviours that enabled them to infer the stones’ affordances (Visalberghi
et al. 2009). In this study, in the conflicting and same/different compliant conditions,
compliance of the barriers could not be predicted accurately using diameter as a visual
cue. The compliant properties of the barriers could however be extracted via the use of
relevant exploratory procedures to directly experience their affordances. Therefore, under
these conditions, having experienced the ‘surprising’ properties of the barriers, subjects
might have been expected to use active testing behaviours to gain information about their
affordances and use this information to guide future behaviour (Chappell et al. 2012). One
subject (Silvia) regularly exhibited exploratory behaviour of the barriers. Her method of
pushing against the barriers with her fingers was an appropriate exploratory procedure
for extracting information about their compliance (Lederman and Klatzky 1987). She
did this most frequently in the conflicting condition, where all of her explorations were
of the thinner non-compliant barrier. This might suggest she understood something was
‘wrong’ and was attempting to extract information, like the capuchins tapping the artificial
stones (Visalberghi et al. 2009), which may have contributed to her performing better
than the other two subjects in this condition. On five occasions Silvia’s haptic exploration
of an incorrect barrier caused her to switch the direction in which she was moving the
reward. This implies that her decision-making was influenced by information she extracted
regarding the affordances of the barrier and the size of the functional gap that could be
created, i.e. that it would not be possible to displace the barrier sufficiently for the reward
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to pass under it.
Negative results of the type found in this study (i.e. a lack of evidence for a use of thickness
as a visual predictor for compliance) are notoriously difficult to interpret (Seed et al. 2012).
It has been argued that experiments based on contexts that are more ethologically valid
may be more likely to reveal abilities such as those investigated here, should they exist
(Seed and Tomasello 2010). However, one aim of using abstract, ‘unnatural’ tasks in a
laboratory setting is to attempt to reveal whether animals possess general, transferable
problem-solving abilities related to the capacity under investigation, as opposed a relatively
inflexible ability that evolved in response to a specific challenge (Roth and Dicke 2005).
Although captive orangutans did not use diameter to predict compliance in the problem-
solving context they were presented with here, the possibility that wild orangutans use
diameter as a visual cue to infer something about the compliant properties of supports
during arboreal locomotion and nest-building cannot be ruled out. The fact that wild
orangutans do not often fall from the canopy or reach arboreal ‘dead-ends’ implies that
they must understand something about the compliant properties of arboreal supports, and
such an ability would be expected to be under strong selective pressure. Furthermore,
wild orangutans have been shown to select materials appropriate for different elements
of nest building on the basis of diameter and structural properties (van Casteren et al.
2012), and there is experimental evidence that orangutans do understand the relevance
of compliance in an experimental tool-using context (Manrique et al. 2010; Walkup et al.
2010). However, whereas in the wild branch diameter is a reliable and easily observable
indicator of compliance (van Casteren et al. 2013), supports in captive environments have
very different material properties, and thin artificial supports may still be rigid. Therefore,
for captive orangutans diameter is not necessarily an accurate predictor of compliance.
Also, as captive animals are likely familiar with all the supports that are available to them
they have little need to be able to predict their properties (Phillips 2011). This is in stark
contrast to a wild orangutan faced with a vast amount of information to process regarding
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which supports are safe to utilise and which should be avoided. A less abstract, more
ecologically valid avenue for further investigation might be to see how captive animals in a
familiar environment would respond if novel supports varying in terms of their compliant
properties were introduced into their enclosure.
In the final empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 7) a unique opportunity was utilised
to investigate orangutans’ knowledge of compliance in a less controlled, more naturalistic
setup than the previous study (chapter 6). In chapter 7, captive orangutans are confronted
with novel horizontal supports in their locomotor environment, and I aim to examine how
they explore and learn about their compliant properties, with a focus on their positional
behaviour.
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LEARN ABOUT THE PROPERTIES OF NOVEL
COMPLIANT SUPPORTS IN THEIR LOCOMOTOR
ENVIRONMENT?
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Abstract
Dealing with arboreal support compliance is a key challenge faced by large-bodied animals
living in forest canopies, such as orangutans. Thin, fragile peripheral branches must be
utilised to access ripe fruit and cross gaps between adjacent trees, which poses issues of
safety and stability. Although a lot is known about orangutan locomotion and support
use in the wild, to our knowledge the behaviour of orangutans when interacting with novel
complaint supports has never been studied in captivity. We examined the positional and
exploratory behaviour of five Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) during their initial
4.5 hours of exposure to two novel horizontal supports: one with a diameter of 60 mm;
and a second (more compliant) one with a diameter of 45 mm. Contrary to traditional
theoretical preditions, large-bodied adults did not exhibit high frequencys of suspensory
behaviour when initially interacting with either of the supports; rather they used multiple
supports to avoid loading all of their weight onto a support with unknown compliant
properties. Subjects rapidly engaged in appropriate exploratory procedures (e.g. bouncing
at the tips of the supports) for extracting information about compliance. Calculating the
force being applied during bouncing behaviour revealed that the maximum force that an
individual applied during a bout increased with accumulation of time spent interacting
with a support, presumably as individuals gained knowledge of a support’s compliant
properties and became more confident.
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7.1 Introduction
Dealing with the compliant properties of arboreal supports has long been recognised as
a key challenge for animals living in forest canopies (Grand 1972). Two key problems
that need to be overcome are accessing edible items such as ripe fruit and crossing gaps
in the canopy (Grand 1972; Cant 1992), both of which involve utilising thin peripheral
branches where compliance (flexibility) is highest (van Casteren et al. 2013). Challenges
associated with compliance are particularly pronounced for large-bodied animals such as
orangutans (Pongo spp), because branches deform more under their mass compared with
smaller bodied animals (Cant 1994). This increases the width of gaps to be crossed (Cant
1987) and also means that branches are less stable and more likely to break (Povinelli and
Cant 1995; Thorpe et al. 2009).
Movement through a compliant arboreal habitat for a large-bodied animal is interesting
from a cognitive perspective because it is an example of physical problem-solving that
likely involves some form of planning as well as some knowledge of the invisible object
property of compliance. Particularly during gap-crossing, orangutans must be able to
predict how a branch will react to their own body weight before they move on to it and
judge whether or not it is a suitable support to utilise. Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. (1982)
suggested that the key factor driving the evolution of orangutan intelligence may have
been the requirement for locomotor solutions to such a complex arboreal habitat. Povinelli
and Cant (1995) developed this idea, proposing that having to deal with problems caused
by the combination of a large body and a fragile, compliant arboreal habitat drove the
evolution of basic self-conception in a great ape ancestor, which enabled these animals to
plan and execute complex locomotion necessary for safe and effective travel.
We know a good deal about orangutan locomotion and support use in the wild from
detailed field studies (e.g. Thorpe and Crompton 2005; Manduell et al. 2011; Myatt
and Thorpe 2011) and there is increasing evidence to suggest that orangutans may use
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support diameter as a proxy for compliance in the wild, both in the context of locomotion
(Thorpe and Crompton 2005, 2006) and nest building (van Casteren et al. 2012). A recent
study has demonstrated that compliance is significantly correlated with living branch
diameter (thicker branches are less compliant), as well as distance from the tip of a branch
(compliance rapidly dissipates with increasing distance from the tip; van Casteren et al.
2013). Wild orangutans have also been observed to use support compliance to their
advantage, by using their body weight to sway trees across gaps that are too wide to cross
directly (Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. 1982; Bard 1995). Thorpe, Crompton and Alexander
(2007) demonstrated that tree-sway substantially reduces the energetic cost of crossing
gaps, compared with jumping across, or descending to the ground and climbing back up
on the other side of the gap.
In this study we utilised a unique opportunity to observe the behaviour of captive
orangutans (P. abelii) interacting with novel compliant supports in their locomotor envi-
ronment, to examine how individuals learn about compliance in this context. Orangutans
need to be able to rapidly develop a good understanding of a support’s affordances in order
to use it safely and effectively. Novel objects trigger exploration, which enables individuals
to actively gather information about them and learn about their physical properties, thus
reducing uncertainty (Hughes 1997; Chappell et al. 2012). Exploration may be particularly
important when an object’s properties cannot be perceived via vision alone, as is the case
for compliance (though branch diameter and compliance are correlated in the wild; van
Casteren et al. 2013). Given that captive animals are generally very familiar with the prop-
erties of all of the supports in their enclosure, orangutans (particularly large-bodied adults)
may be expected to act cautiously when confronted with a novel support. They might
explore it visually on approach (Demery 2012) and then quickly engage in exploratory
manipulation to extract information about its compliant properties. It is known that
humans spontaneously carry out specific exploratory procedures that optimise the uptake
of desired information about an object; for example, the application of force by pressing
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or bending an object is commonly used to extract information about its compliance or
hardness (Lederman and Klatzky 1987). Demery et al. (2010) argued that rather than
being random, object exploration is targeted selectively and in a structured manner,
according to the nature of the problem that an individual is confronted with. Pressing or
bending would not be an appropriate exploratory procedure for extracting information
about the compliant properties of novel locomotor supports because such behaviours would
not exert sufficient force to reveal anything about their compliant properties. It seems
more likely that subjects would manipulate the beams by loading their body mass on to
them, causing them to deflect and hence reveal information about their compliance.
The aim of this study was to investigate the behaviour of captive orangutans on two novel
horizontal supports that differed in terms of their diameter and compliant properties. One
had a diameter of 60 mm and the second 45 mm, which are both within the range of support
diameters commonly experienced by wild orangutans (Cant 1987). Orangutan behaviour
was examined at the positional behaviour level, because typical object manipulation in
terms of smaller scale movements (e.g. pushing or twisting with the hands) would not exert
sufficient force to extract information about the compliant properties of the beams. It
was also possible to measure force being applied by individuals during bouts of deliberate
deformation (e.g. when they bounced on the supports causing them to deflect downwards),
providing a unique insight that would not be possible to achieve in the wild.
Specifically, we aimed to test the following hypotheses:
1. Individuals (particularly large-bodied adults) should employ high levels of suspen-
sory positional behaviour when initially interacting with a novel beam,
because this increases their safety and stability, as the animal has, in effect, already
‘fallen off’ the support (Cartmill 1985; Cant 1994). Frequency of suspension should
decrease over time as individuals learn that a beam will safely support their weight.
2. Individuals (particularly large-bodied adults) should use additional supports
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when initially interacting with a novel beam, because multiple support use
allows body mass to be distributed more safely compared with when only one support
is used (Cant 1987; Thorpe and Crompton 2005; Thorpe et al. 2009) and reduces the
risk of falling if different limbs are contacting different supports (Myatt and Thorpe
2011). Frequency of multiple support use should decrease over time as individuals
learn that a beam will safely support their weight.
3. Individuals (particularly large-bodied adults) should exhibit higher frequencies
of (a) suspension, and (b) multiple support use on the 45 mm beam
compared with the 60 mm beam, given that diameter predicts compliance (van
Casteren et al. 2013) and support diameter influences positional behaviour in the
wild (Thorpe and Crompton 2005).
4. Individuals (particularly large-bodied adults) should exhibit higher frequencies
of (a) suspensory positional behaviour, and (b) multiple support use at
the tips of the beams compared with the other sections of the beams, given
that the compliance experienced by an animal is affected by its position along a
horizontal support and compliance rapidly dissipates with increasing distance from
the free (unattached) end (van Casteren et al. 2013).
5. All individuals should rapidly engage in appropriate exploratory behaviour
of the beams, as novelty induces exploration (Hughes 1997). Because the usual
forms of exploratory manipulation for compliant objects (e.g. pushing or bending;
Lederman and Klatzky 1987) would provide insufficient force to reveal anything about
the beams’ properties, exploration will likely take the form of individuals loading
their body mass on to the beams and extracting information about compliance from
the extent of their deformation. This loading might be expected to increase over
time with accumulating experience of the beams’ properties.
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7.2 Materials and methods
7.2.1 Subjects and housing
Seven Sumatran orangutans (P. abelii) were housed in the enclosure at Chester Zoo, UK
where this study was conducted: a flanged adult male, two adult females, two juveniles
and two infants. As the two infants were difficult to distinguish and the beams did not
deflect under their small body masses, they were not included in this study. Details of the
five focal subjects from whom data were collected are shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 – Study subjects: age-sex class, age in years, and weight
7.2.2 Apparatus: the compliant branch system
As part of a project investigating the mechanics of bipedal walking in orangutans, a
compliant branch system consisting of a force sensor and a carbon fibre beam attached
in a cantilever arrangement was mounted beneath a tunnel connecting the indoor and
outdoor parts of the enclosure (Fig. 7.1).
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Figure 7.1 – (a) Photograph of compliant beam setup identifying the fixed and free ends
and sections of the beam (A-C), as well as additional supports (1-3) that could be used be
the subjects; and (b) a still taken from video showing the angle from which footage was
recorded
Over a period of five months four different beams were installed, which were designed to
replicate horizontal arboreal supports with different diameters and compliant properties.
Beams were presented in order of decreasing diameter (100 mm, 80 mm, 60 mm and 45
mm) and each beam was present for five weeks. There were three additional supports (1-3
in Fig. 7.1a) that could also be used by the subjects in conjunction with the beam. This
study examined behaviour of the orangutans during the first 4.5 hours of their exposure
to the two narrowest beams (60mm and 45mm diameter) that were presented third and
fourth. They had no prior experience of these supports. Information about the compliant
properties of the two beams used in this study and the extent to which they would deflect
at their tip under the weight of the focal individuals is given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 – Details of the compliant properties of the two beams used in this study and the
expected downward deflection of their tips under the body mass of the five focal subjects
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7.2.3 Data scoring
All behaviour during interactions between the subjects and the beams was continuously
recorded from video footage (see Fig. 7.1b for angle from which footage was recorded).
This enabled all of the behaviour of each subject to be recorded in detail, and was necessary
in order to capture infrequent behaviours such as deliberate deformation of the beams.
Details of the data recorded are shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 – Details and descriptions of data recorded
Positional behaviour and support use
Positional behaviour was classified following Hunt et al. (1996), including additional
modes described by Thorpe and Crompton (2006). This system records information
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regarding how weight is borne (in suspension: below support; in compression: above
support), trunk orientation (orthograde: upright trunk; pronograde: horizontal trunk),
and which limbs are bearing weight. Prost (1965) categorised all positional behaviour as
either posture or locomotion, with the two categories being mutually exclusive; the latter
involving gross displacement of body mass in relation to the environment. For this study,
the additional category of ‘dynamic posture’ was included, defined as posture involving
movement, often repetitive, which did not involve travel. Dynamic postures were classified
following Hunt et al. (1996), but included an additional component describing the dynamic
aspect of the behaviour. Examples of dynamic postures include sit/bounce and pronograde
suspend/swing (see Appendix C for detailed descriptions of dynamic postural modes). The
key distinction from locomotion is that these behaviours do not involve moving from place
to place (Prost 1965), for example along a support, but may involve moving around a fixed
location, for example swinging from side to side beneath a support without travelling along
it. Dynamic postures may be of particular interest in the case of novel locomotor supports
in a captive setting, as they tend to exert more force than locomotion and posture and
might therefore be related to exploratory behaviour, and ‘testing’ of the beams’ affordances.
For each positional behaviour mode recorded, information about the use of additional
supports (1-3 in Fig. 7.1a) was also recorded (Table 7.3); specifically whether the beam
was the only support being used, or whether additional supports were also being used,
either for weight-bearing or balance. A subject’s position along the beam was also recorded
(A, B, C in Fig. 7.1a; Table 7.3).
Force applied during deliberate deformation of supports
During bouts of dynamic posture subjects sometimes deliberately deflected the beam using
their own body mass (e.g. by sitting and bouncing). When a subject was positioned at
the tip of a beam it was possible to calculate the force they were applying. (As it was
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not possible to accurately ascertain the position of an individual mid-way along beam due
to angle from which video footage was recorded (see Fig 7.1b), and a subject’s position
along the beam (L in Fig. 7.2) was key to calculating force, force calculations could not be
carried out when subjects were positioned elsewhere on the beam). Force applied at the
free end of the beam was calculated by measuring the beam’s maximum vertical deflection
and calibrating it based on the weight of the subject (Table 7.1). The videos were scaled
based on the known diameters of the end plates of the beams. For each bout of deliberate
deflection, the maximum vertical deflection of the beam was measured in pixels using
ImageJ, and converted into metres. The force being applied could then be calculated using
the equation in Fig. 7.2.
Figure 7.2 – Force applied at the free end of the beam (P) was calculated based on knowledge
of the weight of the individual, the length of the beam (L), how much it deflected (V), and
the flexural rigidity of the beam (EI; see Table 7.2)
7.2.4 Data analysis
Due to the small sample size, and based on theoretical predictions regarding suspension
as a ‘safe’ behaviour on compliant supports, positional behaviour was conflated to the
following categories: suspensory locomotion, suspensory posture, suspensory swinging,
suspensory bouncing, compressive locomotion, compressive posture, compressive bouncing.
In some cases these categories were conflated further, to suspension vs. compression,
to enable meaningful analyses to be conducted. For the same reason, support use was
conflated to beam only vs. beam plus additional support(s). The distinction between
single and multiple supports was found to be the most meaningful way of interpreting
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number of supports used by Thorpe and Crompton (2005). Position along the beam was
also conflated to fixed end (sections A and B) vs. free end (section C; Fig. 7.1a) since
compliance rapidly decreases with increasing distance from the tip of a horizontal support
(van Casteren et al. 2013).
To enable detailed qualitative examination of behaviour, we plotted (a) positional behaviour
and (b) support use minute-by-minute for each subject. Chi-square tests were used to
compare frequency of suspension vs. compression (hypothesis 1) and single vs. multiple
support use (hypothesis 2) between the first minute of interaction with a beam and
subsequent time spent interacting with it. Chi-square tests were also used to look for
differences in frequencies of suspension vs. compression and single vs. multiple support
use between the two different beams (hypothesis 3), and between the fixed vs. free end
of each beam (hypothesis 4). In each case adults and juveniles were examined separately
to investigate the effects of body size on positional behaviour. Where sample sizes
were particularly small resulting in more than 20% of cells in contingency tables having
expected frequencies of less than 5, Fisher’s exact test was used instead of a Chi-square
test, as it is appropriate for examining the significance of associations regardless of sample
characteristics. Finally, to examine exploratory behaviour (hypothesis 5), for each subject
that performed multiple bouts of deliberate deformation at the tip of a beam we measured
the maximum force applied during each bout and plotted this against an individual’s time
spent interacting with the beam.
7.3 Results
Across all five focal subjects, the amount of time spent interacting with the 60 mm beam
within the first 4.5 hours of the beam being present was 3364 seconds. There was less
interaction with the 45 mm beam following its introduction: a total of 1139 seconds in the
first 4.5 hours. There was high inter-individual variation in the extent of beam interaction.
Table 7.4 shows the frequencies of the three categories of positional behaviour recorded for
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each subject on each beam, as well as the total duration each subject spent interacting
with each beam.
Table 7.4 – Summary of the frequency of positional behaviour recorded for each subject on
each beam, and the total duration each subject spent interacting with each beam. Fz is the
total frequency of behaviors recorded (loco + posture + dynamic posture)
7.3.1 Positional behaviour and support use
Fig. 7.3 and Fig. 7.4 show each focal subject’s positional behaviour and support use
minute-by-minute for all of the time they spent interacting with each beam.
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Figure 7.3 – Minute-by-minute positional behaviour for each subject on each beam, covering all of the time they spent interacting with
each beam. N.B. durations are cumulative rather than continuous, i.e. some subjects left the beam and returned to it multiple times
within the 4.5 hour period of observation. The red through to pale yellow spectrum represents suspensory positional modes and the dark
blue to pale blue spectrum represents compressive modes
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Figure 7.4 – Minute-by-minute support use for each subject on each beam, covering all of the time they spent interacting with each
beam. N.B. durations are cumulative rather than continuous, i.e. some subjects left the beam and returned to it multiple times within the
4.5 hour period of observation. Orange represents positional behaviour modes where the beam was the only support involved and blue
represents modes where multiple supports (beam plus any of the additional supports (1-3 in Fig. 7.1a) were used
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Adults exhibited significantly less suspension in their first minute spent interacting with
the 45 mm beam than in their subsequent time on that beam (Table 7.5). Although the
data for the 60 mm beam showed the same pattern, the result was not significant (Table
7.5).
Table 7.5 – Comparison of behaviour during the first minute of interaction with the beams
(1st min) and the remainder of time spent interacting with the beams (subsequent) for adults
and juveniles in terms of the frequency of (a) suspension vs. compression and (b) multiple vs.
single support use. – indicates Fisher’s Exact test was used due to expected cell frequencies
of less than 5
For juveniles on the other hand the frequency of suspensory behaviour did not differ
between their initial minute of interaction and overall time spent on either of the beams
(Table 7.5). Adults also used multiple supports more frequently in their initial minute on
the 45 mm beam than overall and showed the same (non-significant) pattern on the 60
mm beam (Table 7.5), whereas for juveniles support use did not differ between the first
minute and subsequent time spent on either of the beams (Table 7.5).
Overall, juveniles exhibited significantly more suspensory behaviour than adults on the
60 mm beam (Table 7.5; q21=6.577, p=0.010). Overall frequencies of suspension vs.
compression did not differ between adults and juveniles on the 45 mm beam (q21=2.079,
p=0.149). Significantly more behaviour exhibited by adults on the 60 mm beam involved
the use of multiple supports compared with juveniles (Table 7.5; q21=12.903, p<0.001).
Adults and juveniles did not differ in terms of support use on the 45 mm beam (q21=0.327,
p=0.567).
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Between-beam comparisons of behaviour revealed no significant differences in frequency of
suspension vs. compression (Fig. 7.3 and Fig. 7.5), or single vs. multiple support use (Fig.
7.4 and Fig. 7.6), for either adults or juveniles (Chi-square tests, p>0.05 for all).
Behaviour was generally focused at the tips of the beams (section C in Fig. 7.1a); except
for juveniles on the 60 mm beam; see Fig. 7.5aii). There were no significant differences
between the frequency of suspension vs. compression at the fixed end compared with the
free end of either of the beams for either adults or juveniles (Fig. 7.5; Chi-square tests,
p>0.05 for all).
Figure 7.5 – Positional behaviour (excluding locomotion) at different positions along each
beam for adult and juvenile subjects
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Adults were significantly more likely to use multiple supports at the free end of the 60
mm beam compared with the fixed end (q21=22.949, p<0.001; Fig. 7.6ai), whereas there
were no associations between beam section and support use for juveniles (p>0.05; Fig.
7.6aii). On the 45 mm beam, both adults and juveniles used multiple supports more
frequently at the free end compared with the fixed end (adults: q21=7.000, p=0.008;
juveniles: q21=22.596, p<0.001; Fig. 7.6b).
Figure 7.6 – Support use at different positions along each beam for adult and juvenile
subjects
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7.3.2 Deliberate deformation of supports
Both of the adult female subjects exhibited deliberate deformation of the 60 mm beam
within their first minute spent interacting with it (Fig. 7.3). On the 45 mm beam three
out of five focal subjects (Puluh, Emma and Budi) exhibited deliberate deformation
within their first minute of interaction (Fig. 3). Deliberate deformation (compressive and
suspensory bouncing) was focused at the free end of both beams (Fig. 7.5).
Fig. 7.7 shows that for bouts of deliberate deformation where it was possible to measure
the maximum force being applied to the beam by a subject because they were positioned at
the tip, there was a pattern of increasing maximum application of force with accumulation
of time spent interacting with a beam.
Figure 7.7 – Scatterplots showing the maximum force applied to the free end of a beam
during successive bouts of compressive or suspensory bouncing. N.B. durations are cumulative
rather than continuous, i.e. some subjects left the beam and returned to it multiple times
within the 4.5 hour period of observation
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There was inter-individual variation in how much force subjects applied to the beams in
terms of proportion of body weight. Budi applied the greatest force during deliberate
deformation: 2.8 times his own body weight in his final measurable bout on the 45 mm
beam (Fig. 7.7d), generating a downward deflection of the tip of approximately 0.169 m.
Emma and Subis’ maximum force applications were 2.35 times (a 0.375 m deflection; Fig.
7.7c) and 1.23 times (a 0.147 m deflection; Fig. 7.7b) their body weights, respectively.
7.4 Discussion
This study provided a unique opportunity for detailed examination of how captive
orangutans behave when confronted with novel horizontal supports with unknown compli-
ant properties. Being able to measure the force individuals were applying to the beam
provided a particularly interesting insight that it would not be possible to obtain through
studies in the wild.
The captive environment is far less complex than the forest canopy and captive animals are
generally familiar with the properties of all of the supports in their enclosure. It therefore
seems reasonable to expect that orangutans – especially large-bodied adults – might behave
cautiously when confronted with novel supports with unknown properties. Contrary to
theoretical predictions (e.g. Grand 1972; Cartmill 1985; Cant 1994) we found no evidence
for high initial levels of suspension; instead, adults seemed to select compressive modes
and utilise multiple supports during their initial minute of interaction with the beams.
This is more in keeping with the findings of Thorpe, Holder and Crompton (2007), which
showed that forelimb-assisted compression was used on the narrowest supports by wild
orangutans, because it increases stability in a complex, compliant habitat.
Orangutan positional behaviour conflated to suspension or compression did not differ
between the fixed end and the free end of the beams; but there were differences in terms
of the number of supports being used at these positions. Given that compliance decreases
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rapidly with increasing distance from the tip (free end) of a horizontal support (van
Casteren et al. 2013), it makes sense that orangutans should employ a strategy of using
multiple supports at the free end of the beams, where they are most compliant. Adult
orangutans selected positional behaviour involving multiple supports at the free end of
both beams, whereas juveniles were only more likely to use multiple supports at free end
of 45 mm beam. This is likely because the effect of body mass rendered the 60 mm beam
more compliant under the adults than the juveniles (the tip deflected approximately twice
the distance under the weight of the adult females compared with the juveniles), and
may also relate to the more cautious nature of adult females compared with immature
individuals (Thorpe and Crompton 2005).
Adults tended to rapidly engage (often within their first minute of interaction) in exploratory
behaviour in the form of deliberate deformation of the beams. Orangutans have been
shown to be relatively neophilic and bold compared with other apes, based on latency to
approach novel items (Herrmann et al. 2011). Dynamic posture in the form of bouncing
is an appropriate exploratory procedure to employ because it places a higher force on a
support than locomotion or posture, and therefore maximises information gain in terms of
the invisible feature of compliance. This behaviour mainly occurred at free end of beam,
which may be indicative of the selectiveness of exploration (Demery et al. 2010), in which
individuals target particular features of the novel object; in this case the most compliant
section of the beam.
Three subjects (Emma, Subis and Budi) exhibited multiple bouts of deliberate deformation
at the free end of one or both of the beams. The maximum force applied increased with
subjects’ accumulating experience of the beams properties, presumably as they became
more confident that they would not break. Budi applied a force of almost three times
his own body weight to the free end of the 45 mm beam, whereas adult females were less
forceful when performing similar behaviours, which may again be related to the fact that
wild juvenile orangutans are known to exhibit more risky locomotion than their mature
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counterparts (Thorpe and Crompton 2006).
The juvenile male in this study exhibited a relatively high frequency of suspensory swinging,
which appeared to be a form of play behaviour. Spinka et al. (2001) hypothesised that
play is ‘training for the unexpected’, which is often triggered by novel stimuli, and occurs
when individuals are able to explore actions in a low-risk setting (Buchsbaum et al. 2012;
Chappell et al. 2012). It is related to exploration and serves to help animals develop flexible
responses to cope with unexpected situations, such as falling due to a loss of balance
(Spinka et al. 2001). In the present study, during bouts of suspensory swinging Budi
would sometimes release his hands or feet from the beam mid-swing (Tecwyn, personal
observation), seemingly deliberately putting himself into a risky situation. This ‘self-
handicapping’ behaviour is thought to further enable the development of novel responses
to unexpected circumstances (Spinka et al. 2001).
There was little evidence for differences in behaviour between the two beams. Visual
exploration of a support’s diameter may play a more important role when a support is
out of reach and therefore cannot be explored via direct manipulation, which is often
the case during gap-crossing in the forest canopy, but was not the case here. It is also
possible that the sample size was too small to detect a difference in positional behaviour
repertoire between the beams, or that subjects were more confident on the 45 mm beam
(despite it being more compliant) having previously been exposed to the 60 mm beam
and the two thicker beams. We could also not eliminate the possibility that the focal
individuals had previous experience of similar supports, though they are uncommon in
captive environments.
Neither of the beams was as narrow or compliant as the narrowest supports encountered
in the wild (for obvious safety reasons), so it is possible that they were not particularly
challenging for the orangutans, though they did deflect several centimetres at the tip,
even under the weight of the juveniles. Furthermore, the beams were only 2 metres off
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the ground, so it could be that the orangutans did not perceive a significant safety risk
associated with falling.
To summarise, this study adopted a unique approach to investigate how captive orangutans
learn about the properties of novel supports in their locomotor environment. In their
initial minute of interaction, adults utilised compressive positional behaviour and used
multiple supports to increase safety and stability on a narrow horizontal support with
unknown compliant properties. They continued to use multiple supports at the free ends of
the beams where compliance was highest. Several subjects (adult females and the juvenile
male) deliberately deformed the beams by bouncing on them, particularly at the free end,
which was an appropriate exploratory procedure for gaining maximum information about
compliance. Furthermore, the force they applied increased as they gained experience of
the beams’ affordances and became more confident.
It seems that orangutans’ boldness when confronted with novelty and rapid engagement
in appropriate exploratory procedures enables them to quickly learn about the compliant
properties of novel supports, and therefore adopt safe and effective positional behaviour.
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The aim of this thesis was to expand our understanding of (1) the ability of great apes
to plan during physical problem-solving, and (2) how they might predict and explore the
‘invisible’ compliant properties of objects. Both of these aspects of cognition are particularly
relevant to challenges faced by great apes in the physical environment, especially orangutans.
Specifically, wild orangutan behaviour in the context of arboreal locomotion and nest-
building suggests an ability to consider alternative possible actions, plan of appropriate
sequences of actions, and select supports with appropriate compliant properties. The
research in this thesis investigated great apes’ ability to plan, and their understanding
of object compliance, by presenting captive individuals with novel problem-solving tasks
(chapters 2 - 6) and novel objects (chapter 7), and observing their decision-making and
behavioural responses.
When developing novel tasks, I aimed to bear in mind the challenges associated with
designing physical cognition tasks (as outlined in section 1.7 of chapter 1), particularly
those that could potentially be used to test multiple species, including non-tool users.
The pieces of apparatus that I developed – the puzzle-tube (chapters 2 and 6) and the
paddle-box (chapters 3, 4 and 5) – both fit many of the criteria that MacLean et al. (2012)
have suggested would be appropriate for broad comparative studies. They were both easy
to implement and as subjects required minimal training, they rapidly entered the testing
phase (which is particularly important when working in zoos under time constraints).
Both pieces of apparatus also had an adjustable level of difficulty. The number of gaps,
traps and barriers could be varied and the obstacles could be combined in different ways
in the puzzle-tube. The difficulty of the paddle-box could be adjusted in multiple ways:
by requiring subjects to perform particular actions before turning the start paddle (i.e.
the advance planning task); by altering the level at which the reward started; and by
designing configurations in which success required the start paddle to be turned away from
the goal.
I am by no means claiming to have eliminated the issues associated with investigating
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physical cognition; there is still a very long way to go. Like many others before me,
I faced the challenge of interpreting negative results (all ape subjects in the advance
planning and compliant barriers tasks, and some subjects in all other tasks), and trying to
decide whether these were due to an absence of the cognitive ability being investigated,
peripheral processes being simultaneously taxed, numerous contextual variables influencing
performance, rearing history, and/or the possibility that the task being presented was
inappropriate.
One key issue in my opinion is a captive animal’s incentive to get it right the first time, or
in the case of planning tasks, motivation to plan before acting. None of the apes in this
thesis were food-deprived prior to testing, and they received multiple consecutive trials, so
had lots of chances to get rewards. This is of particular concern in tasks where the reward
never became trapped so a reward is retrieved in every trial regardless of whether a subject
‘succeeded’, such as in the compliant barriers task (chapter 6). This could be rectified by
modifying the apparatus so that at either side of the reward’s central starting position
there was a one-way flap, so that once a direction was selected the reward could not be
moved back in the other direction (though error correction can in fact be a window onto
decision-making processes). This issue of correctibility was addressed with the paddle-box
apparatus because actions were not reversible as the reward could only move down through
the puzzle. However, there was no real cost of failure other than losing a small (albeit
desirable) food reward.
There is evidence that increasing the cost of performing a task in terms of effort required
can alter the performance of apes. Martin-Ordas et al. (2012) found that apes had a
preference for retrieving and using the longest tool out of a set of four in a sequential
tool use task, regardless of the distance over which a reward had to be retrieved. While
this is an appropriate strategy for success, it does not reveal anything about whether any
planning might be involved in tool selection. When the cost of retrieving the longest tool
was increased, so that the only way of accessing it was by using three increasingly long
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tools in sequence, apes started to pay attention to the distance over which the reward
had to be retrieved and select a shorter tool if appropriate (Martin-Ordas et al. 2012).
Bottlenose dolphins also switched to a more efficient problem-solving strategy in a tool
using task when the energetic cost of their preferred technique was increased (Kuczaj et al.
2009).
This issue of incentive to get it right in the first place is one benefit of carrying out
experiments in the field, where animals are more likely to be motivated by energetic
considerations and competition with conspecifics. Furthermore, seeing what animals
actually do in the ‘real world’ can shed light on the selection pressures that drove the
evolution of their cognition (Healy and Hurly 2003). But while studies of cognition in the
wild seem to be increasing in a diverse range of species (e.g. Keagy et al. 2009; Visalberghi
et al. 2009; Mu¨ller 2010; Benson-Amram and Holekamp 2012; Thornton and Samson 2012;
Healy and Hurly 2013), to date there have been very few field experiments involving wild
apes (but see Gru¨ber et al. 2009), probably due to logistical and safety concerns.
8.1 Summary of main findings
8.1.1 Planning in the context of physical problem-solving
The results presented in chapter 2 (puzzle-tube with multiple obstacles) suggest that at
least some orangutans were able to consider the effect of multiple obstacles (gaps, traps
and end pieces) on the path of a food reward, and select the correct direction in which to
move the reward out of two alternative possibilities. This task still had the issue of trial
success being based on a binary choice (i.e. move the reward left or right). Furthermore,
post-hoc analyses revealed that it was possible to succeed by using a series of procedural
rules. However, even if this was how success was achieved (by Amos), these procedural
rules were used flexibly and successfully from the first testing block, and were based on
functionally relevant components of the task. Although the sample size for this study was
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small, it permitted me to examine variation between individuals in detail. Rather than
being satisfied that at least one subject succeeded and ignoring data from those who failed,
I examined the performance of each subject to gain insight into what strategies each of
them may have been using when attempting to solve this novel task.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the majority of orangutans and bonobos tested were able to
perform an appropriate sequence of actions in a step-by-step manner (sequential planning
paddle-box task). However, all of the ape subjects tested failed to plan and execute
appropriate actions in advance of acting on the food reward (advance planning task).
High inhibitory demands related to the salience of the food reward were highlighted as a
possible cause of failure in this task (i.e. the inhibitory demands of the task may have
posed a cognitive load in addition to the planning demands, as tool use was found to do in
Seed et al.’s (2009b) trap-tube study with chimpanzees). It has been demonstrated that
replacing food with tokens in the reversed contingency task enables subjects to inhibit
the strong behavioural predisposition to select the larger quantity (Boysen and Berntson
1995; Boysen et al. 1996; Kralik et al. 2002; Albiach-Serrano et al. 2007; Addessi and Rossi
2011). Consequently it could be argued that one way to probe the contribution of poor
inhibitory control to failure in experiment 1 would be to pre-train subjects to exchange
tokens for food, and then use tokens instead of food in the paddle-box.
While testing apes with tokens in the advance planning paddle-box task was not possible in
this thesis, it was possible to investigate the impact of replacing reward items with tokens
on the performance of children (chapter 4). Surprisingly, children in all three age groups
tested did not perform better when their task was to retrieve a piece of sponge (token)
from the paddle-box, compared with children whose task it was to retrieve a desirable
sticker. Although the possibility remains that using tokens would improve the performance
of apes, there is evidence from studies with other primates that tokens are only effective
if they have a ’high-symbolic distance’ (Addessi and Rossi 2011) from the reward (i.e.
are a more abstract representation of the real food). For example, when individual food
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items were replaced with rocks (‘low-symbolic distance’ tokens) two chimpanzees still
struggled to inhibit picking the larger quantity (Boysen et al. 1996), but when the food
arrays were replaced with Arabic numerals representing a particular quantity of food
(‘high-symbolic distance tokens’), performance improved significantly (Boysen et al. 1996).
With the paddle-box, tokens can only be of ‘low-symbolic distance’, as although they would
remove the immediate presence of food, the quantity salience (i.e. one token = one food
item) would be retained, so the impact this would have on performance remains equivocal.
Therefore, while inhibitory control may have some influence on the performance of children
and apes in the advance planning paddle-box task, in the case of 4- to 10-year-old children
it does not seem to be the key factor limiting performance.
The paddle-box proved to be an appropriate paradigm for testing the planning abilities of
young children, because they had no difficulty understanding and following the limited
verbal instructions unlike in some commonly used tasks (e.g. ToL), and there were clear
developmental trends in performance. The way in which they approached the advance
planning task also revealed interesting differences in problem-solving strategies between
age groups.
The fact that adult humans did not perform perfectly in the advance planning paddle-box
task (chapter 5) shows that it is not a trivial task, and highlights the fact that assumptions
should not be made when interpreting the performance of animals. Some adults even
moved paddles that were irrelevant to solving trials, though they did this less frequently
when under time pressure, suggesting that when given unlimited time they tended to ‘play
it safe’.
8.1.2 Compliance in the context of physical problem-solving
The findings regarding orangutans’ knowledge of the compliant properties of objects were
somewhat ambiguous. There was no evidence that diameter was used as a visual cue to
predict the compliant properties of barriers partially blocking passage of a food reward
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(chapter 6). This does not however preclude the possibility that this strategy is used in
the wild to predict the compliant properties of arboreal supports; based on observations
of wild behaviour this still seems likely (e.g. Thorpe and Crompton 2005; van Casteren
et al. 2012). It is also known that orangutans can select tools with appropriate compliant
properties in a tool-using context (Walkup et al. 2010; Manrique et al. 2010). This study
also raises concerns regarding the subjects’ incentive to choose the correct initial direction
(as discussed at the start of this chapter), rather than choosing randomly, and then if
that does not work, try the other option. Further research in a more ecologically relevant
context is required to further explore apes use of diameter to predict compliance. An
interesting finding from this study was that the one subject who frequently explored the
barriers (Silvia) used the information she extracted to guide her behaviour. For example,
she would use her finger to push against the barrier she was moving the reward towards,
and if the barrier was not compliant she would change the direction in which she was
moving the reward (before it came in to contact with the non-compliant barrier) to push
it towards the alternative barrier. This suggests that exploration may be important for
extracting information about object properties that cannot be directly perceived using
vision.
Further evidence for the importance of exploration in understanding compliance was
observed in chapter 7, where orangutans were presented with novel horizontal locomotor
supports. Several individuals rapidly engaged in relevant exploratory procedures for
extracting information about compliance (e.g. bouncing), and this behaviour was focused
at the highly compliant tips of the beams. Interestingly, the subjects in this study did not
employ ‘safe’ (according to theoretical predictions) suspensory positional behaviour when
initially interacting with these novel supports; rather they opted for an alternative safe
strategy of using multiple supports so that they were not putting their entire mass onto a
support with unknown properties.
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8.2 Ideas and recommendations for future research
8.2.1 Locomotor support selection experiments
While carrying out experiments to investigate apes’ planning ability and knowledge of
object compliance in the field might prove too logistically challenging (particularly with
highly arboreal orangutans), more ecologically relevant experiments (i.e. in the context of
locomotion and nest-building) could be conducted in captivity. The compliant locomotor
support setup used in chapter 7 could be extended to examine the use of diameter as a cue
for predicting compliance, as well as the ability to consider alternative possible actions. A
choice between two or more supports could be presented, where only one support would
have appropriate compliant properties to afford access to an out-of-reach reward. For
example, a reward might be suspended from the ceiling centrally above the ends of two
horizontal supports: one twice as thick as the other. The thinner support would deform
downwards under the weight of the subject so much that the reward could not be reached.
The thicker support would be less compliant and deform less so that the reward would be
obtainable when the subject was positioned at its tip. The compliant properties of the
supports could also be confounded, like the barriers in the puzzle-tube in chapter 6; and
the setup could be configured so that subjects had to use the more compliant support to
access a reward.
8.2.2 Ape vs. monkey comparative work
In the introduction to this thesis I suggested that planning during physical problem-solving
and knowledge of ‘invisible’ compliant properties of objects may have been selected for
due to challenges in the physical environment uniquely faced by great apes (technical
intelligence hypothesis; Byrne 1997), but it was not possible to address this question
directly in this thesis. To date there have been relatively few systematic comparisons of
great ape and monkey physical cognition abilities (but see e.g. Amici et al. 2010; Manrique
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et al. 2010, 2011; Schmitt et al. 2012, 2013). While Manrique and colleagues (2010; 2011)
compared the performance of apes and capuchins at selecting tools with appropriate
compliant properties, to my knowledge there have been no direct comparisons of monkeys
and apes in terms of their planning ability in a physical problem-solving context. This
should be rectified, given that an ability to assess alternative possible action sequences and
select between them has been posited as one way in which apes and monkeys may differ
cognitively (Barrett 2003). It would therefore be interesting to test Old and New World
monkeys with the paddle-box (pilot work with capuchins and Barbary macaques suggested
that this would be feasible), to see if monkeys would solve the sequential planning task. It
would also be interesting to see if spider monkeys, which have previously demonstrated
impressive inhibitory control skills (e.g. Amici et al. 2008, 2010), might outperform apes
in the advance planning paddle-box task. If so, this would provide a strong indication that
inhibitory control may indeed pose peripheral demands in this task.
8.2.3 Modelling tasks and simulating behaviour
A relatively new approach in the field of animal cognition has been to use cognitive
modelling (e.g. van der Vaart et al. 2011, 2012; Chappell and Hawes 2012) to produce
simulations of behaviour, to help to distinguish between alternative explanations and
provide insight into how animals might be solving problems. Chappell and Hawes (2012)
generated ‘problem descriptions’ representing the 64 unique puzzle-tube configurations
presented to orangutans by Tecwyn et al. (2012; chapter 2 of this thesis). The information
that the ‘virtual orangutan’ possessed could be manipulated (e.g. it might have known
about the tube end pieces but not gap width), and different models were run to generate
simulations of behaviour. The outputs of the different models were then compared to the
behaviour of the real orangutans on a trial-by-trial basis. If a particular model generates
similar patterns of performance to a test subject (i.e. model and subject succeed in the same
trials and fail in the same trials) then this may provide some insight into the knowledge
possessed by that individual, and what cues they may have been using when attempting
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to solve the task, therefore providing an excellent method for examining inter-individual
variation (Chappell and Hawes 2012). Perhaps more importantly still, such models could
be used to highlight any issues with a novel piece of apparatus or planned experimental
design, thus permitting any creases to be ironed out before running experiments with real
animals (Chappell and Hawes 2012).
8.3 Concluding remarks
Despite a wealth of animal cognition research in recent years, we still have little idea how
animals solve novel problems in terms of the underlying mechanisms involved, and which
cognitive processes are shared between species, including humans. This can only be probed
with carefully focused experimentation. It is essential that continuing efforts are made
to develop novel tasks suitable for testing the physical problem-solving skills of a broad
range of species, particularly given the growing interest in the convergent evolution of
cognition. Developing methodologies that could easily be adapted to test distantly related,
anatomically diverse species (e.g. primates and birds) will be key to progress in the field
of comparative physical cognition, as it is the only way in which valid inferences regarding
the evolution of cognitive abilities can be drawn. Increased collaboration between labs
and research groups to collect comparative data across a wide range of species using
standardised protocols would enable more rapid progress to be made.
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Appendix A: Supplementary material for chapter 2
Gap-size task
Materials and methods
Four subjects participated in this task; the same three as in the task reported in the
manuscript, plus Radja, a 47-year-old wild-born female, who was accompanied by a
dependent juvenile during testing. The apparatus were the same as those used in the task
reported in the manuscript, but for this task there was only one gap at each side of the
puzzle-tube (two in total) and only two different gap-sizes (small and large). The apparatus
were presented to each subject in 32 trial-unique configurations, pseudorandomised into
four blocks of eight trials. Blocks were presented to subjects in a random order and subjects
received one testing session per day. The general testing procedure and data scoring were
the same as reported for the task in the manuscript. Two-tailed binomial tests (a=0.05,
n=32 for each) were used to assess whether subjects’ choice of initial direction differed
from what would be expected by chance and also whether they showed any directional
preferences.
Results
Amos’, Sandy’s and Silvia’s performances did not differ significantly from chance-level
(50% correct) across the 32 trials (binomial test: 17 trials correct, p=0.86; 16 trials
correct, p=1.00; and 16 trials correct, p=1.00, respectively). Radja only chose the correct
initial direction in 6 out of the 32 trials, which differed significantly from chance-level
(binomial test: p=0.001). Table A1 gives a summary of subjects’ performance across
testing sessions.
Table A1 Summary of performance across session
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Appendix B: Supplementary material for chapter 3
B1 Details of calculations of probabilities of succeeding by chance in the
sequential planning task
Based on the premise that the paddle on which the food was located at any given point
was rotated in a random direction, the probability of retrieving the reward in each of the
five different trial-types was as follows: 1 step, 1 solution: 0.5
2 steps, 2 solutions: (0.5 * 0.5) * 2 = 0.5
3 steps, 3 solutions (see Fig. B1): (0.5 * 0.5 * 0.5) * 3 = 0.375
2 steps, 1 solution: (0.5 * 0.5) = 0.25
3 steps, 1 solution: (0.5 * 0.5 * 0.5) = 0.125
Fig. B1 Schematic diagram of the paddle-box apparatus showing the three different ways in
which the reward could be retrieved in a 3 steps, 3 solutions trial
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B2 Binomial test results for each subject in each trial type in the sequential
planning task
Table B2 Performance of each subject in each of the different trial types in experiment 2. Bold
P values indicate significance in a binomial test (alpha=0.05)
B3 Results of sequential planning with goal change between trials experiment
Fig. B3 Number of correct trials (out of 12) for each subject across consecutive testing blocks
when the goal location was switched between trials. Only Jewel received the third block of trials
because Jingga and Yuno performed perfectly in block 2
206
Appendix C: Supplementary material for chapter 7
Table C1 Standardised descriptions of primate positional behaviour. Locomotor and postural
modes are taken from Hunt (1996) and Thorpe and Crompton (2006). Dynamic postures describe
additional behaviours defined for this study
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